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NEWS &ANALYSIS 
EPA at 30: Fairness in Environmental Protection 
by Eileen Gauna 
D eflecting on the U .S .  Environmental Protection 
�gency 's (EPA's) arrival at its 30th birthday, it is dif­
ficult not to anthropomorphize. This idealistic love child 
born of a strange affair between populist zeal and political 
atnbition 1 has developed into a conunanding agency whose 
decisions reverberate through the economy and signifi­
cantly affect individual J ives. Yet it is still difficult for stake­
holders who routinely encounter this mature behemoth to 
grasp its essential "persona." Charged with the unenviable 
mission of implementing most of the major environmental 
statutes and administering hWldreds of regulatory pro­
grams, 
2 it should come as no surprise that its character
would be complicated, and conflicted. Although this 
mega.agency's internecine struggles over policy and imple· 
mentation remain hidden from the outside observer,3 the 
contradicting institutional messages subsequently emerging 
from EPA causes it to appear to have a severe multiple per­
sonality disorder. This tendency is particularly acute when 
the subject of fairness arises, in particular the vexing distri· 
butiona1 issues . At  that point, an outside observer may see 
one of the more benevolent alter egos emerging, one insist­
ing that the Agency's priority is to ensure environmental 
regulation that is protecti ve and equitable.4 As sincere as 
this sentiment is for many individuals within the Agency, 
however, seemingly contradictory actions may issue from 
this institutional Janus. In some instances, for example, 
Agency actions evidence greater attention to protecting the 
Agency politically than addressing the plight of overbur-
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J . MARC C.  LANDY ET AL. , THE ENVIJlONMRNTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ASKINO l'H'E WRONO QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO 
CLINTON 22-33 ( 1994). 
2. See U.S. EPA. Alphabetical Listing of Projects and Programs, aJ
htrp://www.epa.gov/epahome/abcpgram.htm (lasl modified Nov. 6.
2000), 
3 . For a oolleccion of fascinating insider accounts, see LANDY ET Al . .  ,
supra nole I .  
4. See Deputy Administrator Speeches, EPA Deputy Administraror 
Fred Hansen 's Remarks Prepared/or Delivery to rhe Martin Luther
King Tribute 1998 ( Jan. 211 1998), at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/ 
a.sadspch.nsf/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2000); see al:ro U.S. EPA, ENVI­
RONMENTAL Jusncs 1 994 ANNUAL REPORT: FOCUSING ON ENVI· 
RONMENTA L PROTECTION POR ALL PEOPLE 3 ( 1 995) (EPA 
200-R-95-003),
deoed communities, 5 In addition, high level Agency offi­
cials at times articulate an overriding commitment to regu1a· 
tory relief for industry stakeholders and greater autonomy to 
state regulators, goals that, when examined closely, poten­
tially undermine the goals of distributional and procedural 
fairness to heavily impacted comrnunities.6 In this respect,
more is involved than the public relations spin of an agency 
maneuvering among special interest groups. Rather, these 
mixed messages reflect deeper institutional conflicts that 
impede the Agency's ability to provide comparable levels of 
environmental protection for all communities without de­
pleting institutional resources or causing undue damage to 
competing interests. At stake in this clash among agency al� 
teregos is the integration of fairness into environmental reg­
ulation, in other words, environmental protection for all. 
Endeavoring to assess the successes, failures, and limita­
tions of EPA's various attempts to manage fairness claims 
over the last 30 years would be a formidable task. Fairness 
and distribution issues in environmental protection are var­
ied. There is an issue of regulatory fairness that arises when 
some poJluting sectors of the economy go virtually unregu­
lated while others are subject to the torturous ratcheting of 
ever tighter standards. Closely related to this are property 
rights issues, fairness claims that arise when private prop­
erty of the few appears to be constructively confiscated, via 
regulation, for the benefit of the many. There is a fairness is­
sue that arises when environmental laws are enforced by 
criminal sanctions that effectively negate the types of mens 
5. Recently, for example, EPA sources <;Jaimed that in the mid- 1 990s,
EPA "buried" memos that outlined 11 comprehensive plan to Use its
existing legal auth.ority 10 better address racially disparate impacts
because of anticipated opposition from industry, states, and lhe Con­
gress. See John Stanton, Special Report, EPA "Buried" 1994 Plans
for Major Enviro�nJal Justice Roadmap, INSIDE EPA, 1-2, 24
(Mar. 3 , 2000). Industry sources noted that was probably a wise
choice given congressional opposition. Id However, if these memos
were withheld due to the activism of the 104th Congre s, there is no
explanation why the memos did not re-surface after congressional 
pressure subsided. Perhaps more telling is an intcmal EPA memo in 
the early years of the environmental justice movement, which 
showed a similar wariness and cautioned against a potenlial coal i ­
tion berween environmental justice activists and conventional envi· 
ronmental organizations. In that memorandum, an official rcpon.·
edly urges action IO allow EPA to gain recognition wilh such groups 
before " the peop le of color fairness i ssue reache [s.] !he 
'flashpoint'-that state in an emotionally charged public contro­
versy when activists groups finally succeed in persuading lhe more
influential mainstream groups (civil rights organizations. unions, 
chwches) to take ill-advised actions.' ' See The Real Story Behind 
EPA • s "Environmental Equiry" Report, 2 RACR, POVERTY & ENV'T
5, 18 (California Rural Lcga.1 Assistance Found. & Earth Island Inst. 
Urban Habitat Progr.im, San Francisco, Cal. ) ( Fa ll/Winter 
1991- 1992) (also quoting rh.e EPA official as tating "our goal is 10
make the agency's  substantial investment in envuonmental equity 
and cultural diversity an unmistakable matter of record with mnin­
s�am groups before activists enlist thom in a campaign rhal could
add lhe agency . . .  as a potential largel"), 
6. See infra notes 234-373 and accompanying ICXI.
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rea requirements familiar to criminal law and theory. 7 Then 
there is environmental justice, which presents some of the 
most perplexing fairness and distributional issues to con­
front the Agency thus far. 
Rather than attempt a sweeping treatment of fairness in
these various contexts, 8 this Article instead takes a look at
how EPA is managing the fairness issue in a discrete but 
highly charged context: pennit issuances that affect heavily 
impacted communities . This examination could prove help­
ful for several reasons. First, it  is by now fairly well estab­
lished that environmental risks are disrroportionately vis­
ited upon the poor and people of color, although pinpoint-
7. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Dem4nds of Integration in the
Evolution of Environmen.tal Law: Reforming Environmental Crimi­
nal Law, 83 GEo. L.J. 2407 ( l 99S).
8. For an e >.:ploration of these issues, see Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness
in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705 ( 1 997).
9. lNsnru·n; OP MEDICINE, TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 6
( 1 999 }. People of c-0lor and Lhe poor disproportionately Ii ve near in­
dustrial sites, haz.ardous waste sites, and other risk-prod ucing land
uses and, tlierefore, are subject to greater environmental risk. See 2 
U .S.  EPA, SUPPORTING Docu MENT 1 7  ( 1992) (discussing income
and racially dispamte exposure to environmental hazards from con­
taminated soil ,  air pollution, and water pollution) [hereinafter SUP­
PORTING DocUMENT].  See alJ·o I U.S. EPA, WORKGROUP REPORT
ro nm ADMINISTRATION ( 1992). See also RACE AND THE INCI­
OllNCf. OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A T IME FOR DISCOURSE 
166 ( Bunyan Bryanl & Paul Mohai eds., 1 992) (table summarizing
studies incticating exposure to air pollution disproportionate by race 
and income). For example, African-American children have a sig­
nificantly higher percentage of unacceptably high blood lead levels. 
SUPPORTING DocUMENT, al 9-20. Ethnic minorities lll'C likely to
consume more fish caught from waters that are contaminated with
pollutants. Id. at 1 2 .  People of color have disproportionate-ly greater
e11posure to pesticides because of agriculturul work. Id. at 10 (using
descriptive term "racial minorities, lo include Latino," Afri­
can-Americans, Blnck Caribbeans, Pueno Ricans, Filipinos, Viet­
namese, Laotians, Koreans and Jamaicans, and indicating that as
many as 3 1 3,000 farm workers experience pesticide-related ill­
nesses each year). See also Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "En11iron­
mental Justice ": The Disiributwnal Effects of EnvironmenJal Pro­
tectiOIJ, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 792-806 ( 1 993) (discussing evi­
dence regarding disparities) .
The issue Qf racially d.ispmponionate siting near hazardous waste
facilities bas generated several studies and an ongoing debate about
methodology. For studies 1hat conclude there is racial and/or income
di. parity, see. U.S. GENERl<L ACCOUNTING OmcE (GAO), SITING 
011 HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CoRRELATION
Wrrn RACIAL ANO ECONOMJC STA1'1JS OF SUIIROIJNOlNG CoMMU­
N rrtES ( J 983) (location of off-site hazan:lous waste facilities in EPA
Region IV); CoMM ISStON FOR R.ACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHU!ICH 
OF CHRIST, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN we UNlTED STAtts: A 
NATIONAL REPORT ON RACIAL AND Soc10-ECONOM IC CHARAC­
TERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE S ITES 
( I 987) (finding racial disparities for peop.le living near hazardous 
waste facil ities); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA F1TrON, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE REVISITED 3 {1 994) (oaliona) study of existing
and abandoned hazardous waste si tes finding racial disparity); Vicki 
Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Bar­
rios? A longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24
EcoLOOY L.Q. I ,  27 ( 1 997) (conc luding that the analysis support� 
the claim that 1he siting process was affected by the percentage of
Hispartics in potential host communities at the time of the siting);
Vick.i Been, Aruilyzins Evidence of EnvironmenJal Justice, l l J.
LAND UsE & ENVTL. L. I ,  21 ( l995) (national study of544 commu­
nities indicating that "certain types of neighborhoods-those with 
median family incomes between $ 1 0,001 and $40,000, those with
African American populations between 10% and 70%, those with
Hispanic populations of more than 20%, and those with lower educa­
tional atlainment-are being asked to bear a disproportionate share
of Lhe nation'& facilities") .  For contrary findings. see Douglas L. An­
derson et al. , Hai;ard.ou!I Waste Facilities; "Environmental Equity"
friues in Metropolitan Areas, Ev ALU A 110N REV. , Apr. l 994, at 1 23
(asserting that prior studies are not definitive and concluding other­
wise based upon comparison using different geographical areas).
For discussions of methodology used in &iting studies, see Michael 
ing the interrelating causes of the disparity remains illu­
sive. 
10 
This is an area where the need for regulatory reform
is evident. However, permit challenges often pit the regula­
tory fairness claims of the facility sponsor against the fair­
ness claims of the community affected by the facility. In 
some respects, state agencies have their own fairness claims
to pursue as well, 
1 1  
thus providing a study of EPA's manage­
ment of these multiple and competing claims. In addition, 
environmental justice claims in this context reflect various 
conceptions of justice, providing candidates for what types 
of fairness-oriented reforms have a better chance of suc­
cessful implementation. Contemplating fairness in the per­
mit process raises two related questions: whether the 
Agency is willing and able to undertake aggressive mea­
sures solely by resort to its discretionary authority under en­
vironmental statutes, or whether constitutional doctrines, 
the Civil Rights Act, executive orders, or mote targeted en­
vironmental legislation become indispensable catalysts to 
support, prompt, or mandate these efforts. Lastly, looking at 
the pennit process provides an interesting peek at the Janus
itself, including the multiple agency alter egos that emerge 
when the goal of environmental j ustice appears to conflict
with other high-priority endeavors within the Agency. 1
2
This in tum allows us to think about the kinds of program­
matic reform that might be necessary for EPA to better man­
age and resol ve these important fairness issues. 
This Article first provides a discussion of how fair­
ness-oriented reform might evolve within the permit pro­
cess. This section also examines permit issuances that were 
appealed to the U.S .  Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) 
on environmental justice grounds. These cases address the 
central issue of Agency authori ty to respond to environmen­
tal justice concerns, indicate how several EPA regional of­
fices attempted to resolve these disputes under the authority 
of environmental statutes, and provide an examination of 
the emerging role of reviewing bodies in this context. Pro­
ceeding one step beyond environmental Jaw, the Article 
looks at how EPA is responding to claims of disparate i m­
pact under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. However, rather 
than focus on the intricacies oflegal doctrine under Title VI 
law, this Article instead examines the analytical framework 
that the Agency devised to investigate disparate impact 
claims. Because EPA's Ti tle VJ regulations are general and 
open-ended, the Agency enjoyed wide latitude jo detennin-
Greenberg, Proving Environmental Inequity in Siting locally Un­
wanted lAnd Uses, 4 RISK: ISSUES IN HEAL1U & SAPETY 235 
( l 993 ); Been, at 2 1 ;  Colin Crawford, Analyting Evidence of Envi­
ronme111a/ Justice: A S1,gges1ion for Professor Been, 1 2  J. LAND 
Use & ENvrL, L. 103 ( 1 996) , See also James T. Hamilton, Testing 
for Environmental Racism: Prejudice, Profits, Political Power? 1 4  
J . POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. I 07 ( 1 995) (refined study of hazardous
wa.�te facility e,cpansions to test three economic theories of why dis­
tributions may vary by race) .
1 0. See Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A lAw and Planning
Approach to Environmental Racism, 1 1  VA. ENvn.. L.J. 495, 
506- 1 0  ( 1992) (discussing historical roning practices, such as
exclusionary and expulsive zoning, that resulted ln the placement of 
industrial and commercial facilities in minority neighborhoods). But
see Vicki Been, locally Undesirable Land Uses in Mirwrlry Neigh­
borhoods: Disproponiona1e Siting or Market Dynamics? L 03 YALE
L.J . 1383 ( 1994) [hereinafrer Di�proporrionate Siting or Market Dy­
namics?] (questioning assumption of discriminatory siting practices
and proposing mnrket dynamics as a potential explanation for exist­
ing disparities). 
1 1 .  See infra notes I J 1 -233 and accompanying texl (discussing Title 
vr claims) .  
1 2. See infra notes 234-373 and ac ompanying text. 
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ing the criteria to apply in a Title VI investigation. Equally 
important is the process by which this framework was de­
veloped. lt was within this process that EPA had to mediate 
among the fairness claims presented by communities of 
color, the regulated communi ty, and subnational regulatory 
agencies (state, regional, and tribal). 
But the Title VI guidance is even more significant when 
viewed in a broader regulatory context. Proceeding in a tem­
poral lock-step to the development of the Title VI investiga­
tory fratnework was the development of other high-priority 
programs within the Agency. This Article briefly examines 
three of these initiatives, focusing pr imarily on the point 
where EPA, its regulated constituency, and the states per­
ceived there to be the potential for Title VI claims to disrupt 
or even derail these nascent programs. The three areas ex­
amined are brownfield i nitiatives, the "Tier 2 refinery pro­
posal, ' which is an aspect of implementing the Clean Air 
Act {CAA) mobile source provisions that necessi tate new 
air penni ts at refineries, and "White Paper Number 3, "a re­
cently proposed guidance that pertains to efforts to reform 
new source permitting under the CAA. 1 3  This Article exam­
ines the Agency's response to this potential conflict and, ul­
timately, how its guidance for investigating Title VI claims 
reveals in part the resolution of this conflict. Although this is 
a story that is still wifolding at EPA, a few predictions can be 
made, as well as observations about who appear to be the 
winners and losers ultimately. The Article then concludes 
with exploratory suggestions for alternative approaches to 
fairness-oriented reform in permitting. 
Environmental Justice and Permits 
At the onset, it is noteworthy that environmental justice is­
sues do not arise only when facilities are first sited, a com­
mon assumption when environmental justice issues first 
garnered national attention. 14 Disparities in environmental 
protection have also made their appearance in enforce­
ment, 15 cleanup, 16 and standard-setting endeavors 1 7  and can
13. For consistency, this Article uses as examples cases and initiatives
involving air pennits. However, the same sorts of issues arise in
other media pennining contexts. 
1 4. The early environmenial justice campaigns focused on in09uitable 
siting of hazardous waste facili ties, which was the subject of several
Jaw review articles on environmenta.1 justice. See, e.g. , Rachel D. 
Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394
{ 1991 )  (examining reform of siting procedures): Naikang Tsao,
Amelioratillg Environmental Racism: A Citii.eTLf ' Guide to Com·
bating the Discrimina1ory Siting of Toxic Wasu Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV, 366 ( 1992); Lois Marie Gibbs & Brian Lipsett, The Siting
Game: A NIMBY Primer, 8 F. APPLIED REs . .it Pue. PoL'Y 36
( 1 993): Vicki Been, What '.1· Fairness Got to Do With It? Environ­
mental Justice and the Siting of l.LJcally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 
CoRN ELL L. REv. 1001 (1993) [hereinafter What's Fairness Got to 
Do With It?}; Rodolfo Mata. Hawriious Waste Facilities and Envi­
ronmental Equity: A Proposed Siting Model, 13 VA. ENvn. L.J. 
375 ( 1 994): D/spr-oportionate Siting or Mark£t Dynamks?, supra 
noce I O. The later articles on the siting include: Michael G. Gerra.rd. 
De=ns arid Angels in Hazardous Waste Regu/a1ion: Are Justice, 
Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable ? 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 706 
( 1 998); Christopher Billias, Environmental Racism wuJ Hawrdous 
Facility Siting Decisio11S: Noble Cause or Political Tool?. 4 
RACE & ETHNIC ANc. L.J, 36 ( 1998); Roger C. Field, Siting, Jus· 
tice, andthe Environme1ital lAws, 1 6 N. ILL, U. L. Rev. 639 ( 1996); 
Lawrence J. Straw Jr. ,  EnvironmertJal Justice: Racial Gerryman­
dering for E,1vironmen1al Siting Decisions, 1 4  VA. ENvrL. L.J. 665 
(1 995). 
1 5 . See Marcia Coyle et aJ., UMqual Protection: The Racial Divide in 
Environmental I.Aw, NAT'L L.J. , Sept . 21 , 1 992 ,  at S l -S 1 2  (report 
ou investigation of EPA enforcement activities indicating that for 
implicate agency policy throughout all of these institutional 
functions. However, most environmental justice challenges 
appear in the pennitting context for good reason. First is the 
immediacy of the adverse impacts. Responding to local con­
ditions that not only affect health but significant! y impair an 
already tenuous quality of li fe, residents in overburdened 
communities often view a new facility or a fac ility expan­
sion as the proverbial straw that breaks the camel's back. In 
addition, permit proceedings also raise concerns about com­
pliance and potential contamination, as well as the adequacy 
of the permit conditions and by implication, the associated 
standards. Therefore, not only questionable siting practices 
but inadequacies that exist in enforcement, cleanup, and 
standard setting all come to bear upon the permit process, 
making permit proceedings the most vigorously contested 
genre of agency actions by environmentaljustice activists. 
The bottom-up, grass-roots nature of geographically scat­
tered environmental justice challenges has given the envi­
rorunental justice movement an wiwieldy character. Thus, 
activists involved in this relatively new movement have 
been criticized for not articulating a clear, consistent con­
ception ofjustice. 1 8  By virtue of the movement's concentra­
tion on cornmwiity empowerment and social justice, the ar­
gument continues, it is ideologicallx unable to pursue a fo. 
cused environmental policy agenda. 19  The empirical obser-
federal air, water, and waste pollution laws, penalties in white com­
munities were 46% higher than in minority communities. Penalties 
under hazardous waste laws were about 500% nigher in predomi­
nantly white communitles than in predominantly non-white commu· 
nities) (hereinafrer UMqual Protecrion] : but see Evan J, Ringquist. 
A Question of Justice: Equity in Environmental Litigation 
1 974-1 991, 60 J, PoL. 1 1 48, 1 162 ( 1 998); M. Atlas, Rush to Judg­
ment: A11 Empirical Analysis of Environmental Equity in U.S. Envi­
ronmental Protection Agency Enforcement Actions, 35 LA w 61'. Soc'y 
REv. (forthcoming 200 I ) ,  See also Robert R. Kueh.n, Remedyi11g the 
UMqual E1iforce1Mnt of Environmenlal Laws, 9 ST. Jo1:1N's J. LE­
GAL COMMENT. 625 ( 1 994); Eileen Gauna. Federal ErivironmenJal 
Citit#n Provisions: Obstacles and lncenJives on the Road 10 Envi· 
ronmental Justice, 22 EcoLOGY L.Q. I ,  40.79 ( 1 995) (discussing 
obstacles communities of color and the poor might have in utilizing 
privare citizen suit provisions to address compliance problems). 
1 6. Valerie J. Phi l l ips, Have l.LJw Income, Minorities Been Left Out of 
the Environmental C�anup?, 38 Aovoc. (Idaho) 1 6  (1 995); 
Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste 
Cleanup: Expanding Public Participalion in the Federal Superfund 
Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 67 1 ( 1994); Samara fl. Swanston, 
An Environmental Justice Perspective 011 Superfand Authorization, 
9 ST. JollN 'S J, LBGAL COMM.ENT. 565 ( 1 994); James T. Reilly, En­
vironmenlal Racism, Site Cleanup and Inn.er City Jobs: Indiana '�· 
Urban In-Fill Incentives, 1 1  Y ALB J. ON Rso. 43 ( l  994); Decohn 
Ferris, An Examination of the S14perfand Reform Act of I 994, 9 ST, 
JOHN'S J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 609 ( 1 994); Vicki Been, Conceptions 
of Fairness in Proposals for Facility Siting, S MD. J. OF CONTE MP.
LEGAL ISSUES 13 ( 1 993- 1994). 
17. Catherine A. O' Nei11, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards,
Contaminated Fish, and ''Acceptable '' Risk to Nati!le Peoples, 19
STAN, ENm... L.J. 3 (2000).
1 8. This position was first articulated by Professor Vic.ki Been, see 
What 's Faimess Got ro Do Wirh lt?, supra nore 1 4, at i027-28 (nol­
ing failure to articulate a specific conception of jus1ice), and 1.ater by 
Christopher Foreman. See CmusroPEIBII. H. Folll!MAN JR., THE 
PKOMISE AND PERIL OF ENVlRONMENTAL JUSTICE 9, 1 1  ( 1 998) (ar· 
guing that faimoss is too vague to serve as an actual policy and fur. 
ther nocing that academics who write about environmental justice 
are strikingly unconcerned aboul the ancient scholarly and philo· 
sophical literature on justice), 
1 9. Foreman, supra note 18, at 3, 1 22-26. This book contains a variety of 
challenges to the studies that support charges of environmental ineq­
uities, several criticisms of the environmental justice movement, and 
advice to the movement co adopt an "epidemiological perspective." 
Id. ac 70. Foreman was subsequently criticized for his failure to ac­
knowledge su,dles with better methodology that suppo� the (crili· 
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vations that support these criticisms are fairly accurate. 
Whether·as a matter of deliberate strategy or simply because 
the movement is a grass-roots one, it has �ibited a consi s­
tent resistance to being pigeon-holed into a narrow concep­
tion of justice. 20 Robert Kuehn has examined environmental
justice claims and explains how they are grounded in differ­
ent theories of justice, such as distributive, procedural, cor­
rective, and social.  21 Nor does the movement have a targeted
policy agenda that is articulated with a high degree of speci­
ficity. This could be due in part because there is no hierarchi­
cal leadership structure or centralized effort within the 
movement. 
22 Al though there are networks oflocal organiza­
tions and activists who are prominent nationally, these activ­
ists consistently maintain a position that residents of im­
pacted communities speak for themselves.23 
The question remains, however, whether these asserted 
deficiencies belie the need for, or present insurmountable 
obstacles to, substantive fairness-oriented regulatory re­
form. 24 The criticism that "j ustice" is too vague a concept to
translate into a policy directive may be misplaced in the en­
vironmental context. In this arena, broad principles generate 
cized) seminal studies of erwironmental inequities, b is failure to ac­
knowledge the work of environmentl\ljustice scholars- who advocate 
refonn (rather than abolition) of risk assessment, and his "indulging 
in a superficial psychological deconstruction of the movement." 
AJan Ramo, Book Review, The Promise and Peril of EnviroMutntal 
Justice, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 94 1 , 942 (2000). See also David 
Lewis Feldman, LAW & PoL. BOOK REV. , Feb. 1 999, at 2, 66-69 (ac­
knowledging contribution but questioning Foreman's reliance on 
risk-based studies that are inconclusive and also noting that the use 
oflhe emotion-packet rhetoric with which activists have been attrib­
uted is commonly heard among n wide range of stakeholders) . 
20. Kirsten H. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives and Environmental Justice:
Second-Class Cleanups or Market-Based Equity?, 13 J. NAT. RE­
SOURCES & ENVTL. L. 3 1 7 ,  320 ( 1998) (notes refusal to be ''pi ­
geon-holed"); Ramo, Book Review, supra note 1 9, at 94 1 ( noting 
grass-roots nature of movement) ,
2 1 .  Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxono111y of Environme!llal Justice, 30 ELR 
I 068 1 (Sept. 2000). 
22. Ramo. Book Review, supra note 1 9, at 954-55 .
23 . In l99 l ,  activists convened and adopted a se t  of 1 7  principles,
among them the right  to panicipate at every level of deci�ionmak.ing. 
From this principal, em<ironmenlal justice act ivists proclaim that 
residents of impacted communities must have a role in the decisions
that affect their environments and speak for them elves. PROCEED­
rNOS, THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OP COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
LEAD.ERSHIP SUMMIT, xiii, Oct ,  24-27 (Principles of Environmental 
Justice 1 992).
24. Procedural regulatory refonn is an important component of the envi­
ronmental justice initiative, 1md there have been ef orts to expand
public participation opportunities. See U.S. EPA, Draft Publ ic In­
volvement Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 82335·45 (Dec. 28, 2000): U.S. 
EPA, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITS: A
RE.FERENCE GUIDE (2000) (EPA-500-R-00-007), available ar
ht1p'.//www.epa.gov/pennits/publ icguide . htm ( last updated Oct. 
16, 2000); Public Participation & Accountabil i ty Subcommittee
of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council ,  Envi­
ro nmen tal  Ju sti c e  Publ ic  Pa rticipa t ion  Check l is t ,  a t
http://es.epa.gov/oeca/rnain/ej/nejac (last visi ted Dec. 29. 2000). I n
some instances, early involvement has even l ed  to the project spon­
sot' s willingness to incorporate protective measures into the design
of the facility. See infra note 258 and ac ompanying text (discussing
Brownfields Title VJ Case Studies). However, the primary focus of 
this Article is on substantive proposals for more protective measures
because lbese proposals have met with the most resistance and pres­
ent the fairness conflicts under consideration. For a discussion of the
limitations of public participation mechanisms. see Scott Kuhn, &· 
panding Public Participation ls EssenJi al to Environmental Justice
and till! Democratic Decisionnwking Process, 25 ECOLOGY L,Q.
64 7 ( 1 999), and Eileen Gauna, The Envirc.mm4nJal Jll.ftice Misfit:
P14bl/c Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN . ENvrL. 
L.J . 3 ( 1 998).
and anchor significant reform. In international environmen­
tal law, for example, the precautionary principal has been in­
fluential in shaping approaches to decisionmaking, despite 
the lack of a uniform definition of the te:rm. 25 More specifi­
cally, in the domestic environmental regulatory context, the 
plea for "efficiency" has sheparded significant regulatory 
initiatives. EPA, without demanding a more precise concep­
tion of effic iency has for years pursued efficiency in multi­
ple forms, such as adopting simple goals o f  cost effective­
ness to the development and use of more sophisticated 
cost-internalizing strategies, cost-benefit analysis, perfor­
mance-based standards, and market regimes. Leaving to 
others the issue of whether these measures do in fact result 
in more efficient regulation, the central point is that the mea­
sures originated in fact and are justified on general notions 
of efficiency, without Agency officials appearing to wony 
too much about the comparative merit of traditional welfare 
. d d 
. } ' 26 economics an mo em env1rorunenta economics, or 
whether proposed efficiency-oriented proposals are consis­
tent with accepted theoretical models. 
Although proponents of efficiency-oriented reform are 
well organized and have considerable resources to pursue 
their interests, there is little to suggest that a focused, disci­
pl ined, or central policy agenda preceded many effi­
ciency-oriented regulatory reforms. For example, one of the 
earliest and arguably the most influential market-based re­
form came directly from the regulatory grassroots. In 1 975, 
the statutory deadline to comply wi th national ambient air 
quality standards (NAAQS) bad passed and it appeared that 
new air pennits for large indu strial facilities could not be is­
sued without further violating the standards.2
7 
Permit appli­
cants and pennit writers devised a way to allow st.ate regula­
tory agencies to issue pennits for newer, c Je-aner facilities 
while demonstrating progress in attaining NAAQS. At the 
margi ns of statutory authority, the offset s trate5y of 
nonattainment new source review (NSR) was born. The 
regulatory approach was subsequently affinned by the Con­
gress and codi fied in the CAA Amendments of 1 977.29 In
25 . See Emnt BROWN WEISS ET AL. , INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONM EN­
TAL LAW AND POLICY 1 57-59 ( 1998). One can see the influence of 
other broad and vague prir,ciples of stewardship and sustainabi l i ty ir,
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 1 6  U.S.C.  §§ 153 1 - 1544, ELR
STAT. ESA §§2- l 8, and other statutes protective of natUral resources.
26. See generally GLOBAL ENVlRONMENTAL EcoNOMtcs: Eoum AND
THE LIMITS TO MARKETS (Mohammed H.I. Dore & Timothy D.
Mount eds., 1999); A. Dan Tarlock. City Versus Countryside: Envi­
ronmental Equity in Context, 2 1  FORDHAM URB. L.J. 46 1 , 467
( 1 994) (discussing modem environmental economics). 
27. 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WA­
TER §3 . I B  n . J  ( 1 986) ; RICHARD A. LtROPP, AIR POLLUTION OFF­
SETS, TRADING, SELLING, AND BANKING 6 ( 1 980) (describing the
e it pans ion needs of the s teel indus t ry , loca ted most ly in
nonattainment areas); The Steel lruwsrry and E,iforcing tlie Ckan 
Air Act, in LANDY ET AL. ,  supra note I , at 204. 
28. In response, EPA promulgated an "emission offset policy" to allow
new sources of significant poU ution in noncomplyiog are11S. 4 1  Fed.
Reg. 55525 (Dec. 21 ,  1976); 4 1  Fed. Reg. at 55556; Lnt0FP, supra 
note 27, at 8 n .20. 
29. 42 U.S.C. §7503(c)( l ), ELR STAT. CAA § J 73(c)(I). Part D was.
a mended b y the  CA A A m e nd men ts  of 1 990.  42 U . S .C.
§§7470-75 15, ELR STAT. CAA §§ 1 60- 1 93 .  The offset approach was
also refined in a 1979 offset ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. 3282 (Jan. 1 6, 1979)
(codified as Emission Offset Interpretive ruling, 40 C.F,R. §5 1 , app.
S ( 1 979)), in NS R rules promulgated in 1 980, 45 Fed. Reg. 52676
(Aug. 7, 1980), and again in a 1 986 Emissi.ons Trading Policy State­
ment. 5 1  Fed. Reg. 438 14 (Dec. 4, 1986). These regulations have un­
dergone revisions from time to time. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 50766
(Oct. 1 4. 198 1 ) (netting on a plant wide basis); 49 Fed. Reg. 43202
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this case necessity was the mother of invention, and theory 
later caught up as scholars contemplated the market-ori­
ented nature of the newest member of the family of regula­
tory toots.3° 
Thus, although proponents of efficiency-oriented re­
forms did not initially pursue a well-defined agenda, few 
would seriously argue tbat the plea for more efficient regula­
tion, vague as it was, had little effect on environmental pol­
icy. More to the point, no proponent of efficient regulation 
would prefer that reform efforts await the consensus of a 
more precise definition of efficiency. This is a wise choice1 
for the holding power of efficiency does not lie in any par­
ticular formulation of the term. Efficiency-oriented reform 
enjoys continued public support s imply because col lec­
tively we dislike wastefulness, and rew.ation that purports 
to be ''cleaner, cheaper and smarter''3 1  has considerable
nonnative appeal.32 And in lumbering toward efficiency,
EPA is surely integra ting and i nsti tutionalizing effi­
ciency-oriented reforms into environmental regulation to 
an unprecedented degree. 
Simi larl y, in spite of the vagueness of the terms "j us­
tice" or "fairness," EPA should be able to respond to envi­
ronmental justice claims and pursue fairness-oriented re­
fonns as a pol icy objective in  a comparable fashion, as­
suming the commi tment to environmental justice is at 
least equi valent to the Agency's commitment to efficient 
regulation. And just as the effectiveness of efficiency-ori­
ented reforms are often evaluated ex post, fai rness-ori­
ented refonns can be evalua ted in a similar fashion. The 
lessons to be learned from regulatory history, i f  anything, 
tell us that innovation does not generally originate in the 
upper strata of an internally consistent theoretical frame­
work or even well-fonnulated policy, but in the trenches, 
here, the exigencies and conflicts presented in the course 
of permit proceedi ngs . 
Within this contentious context. the EAB in  recent years 
has addressed environmental justice concerns in 1 0  cases.33 
These cases involved three federal environmental statutes 
and four EPA regional offices (Regions II, V, Vll, and IX). 
(Oct 26, 1984) (fugitive emissions in applicability deternunations); 
54 Fed. Reg. 27274, 27286 (June 28, 1989) (federal enforceability of 
emissions controls);  and 57 Fed. Reg. 323 1 4  (July 2 1 ,  1992) (pbysi­
cal or operational changes at electric utility plants and exclusion pol­
lution control projects at util ity plants) .  For recent efforts to reform 
this air permitting program, see infra notes 32 1 · 73 and accompany­
ing text 
30. See generally Emission-Offset Banking: AccommodaJing Industrial 
Growth With Air-Quality Standards, 1 28 U. PENN. L. Rev. 937 
( 1 980); Jorge A. de! Calvo y Gonzales, Markets in Air: Problems
and Prospects of Controlled Trading, 5 HARV. L. REv. 377 ( 198 1) ;  
Stephen P. Winslow, Transplaming Emissions Trading ro Interstate
Area$; Will It Take Route ?, 5 PACE El"/Vll.. L,. REv. 297 ( 1987); 
Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Pennits: Lessons
for Theory and Practice, 1 6  ECOLOGY L.Q. 36 1 ( 1 989); Robert W. 
Hahn & Oordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Anal­
ysis of EPA 's Emissions Trading Prog_ram, 6 YALE J ,  ON REO. 109 
( 1989); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L.  Hestcr, lncenltve·BasedEnvi­
ronmental Regula/ion: A New Era From an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1 ( 1991) .
3 1 .  See U.S, EPA. Office of Policy Economics and Innovation Home 
Page, at http://www.epa.gov/opei (last updated Dec. 2 1 ,  2000). 
32. This is not to say that the appeal is always a good thing. Cf Gerald E.
Frug. Euphemism as a Political Strategy, 30 ELR 1 1 1 89 (Dec. 2000)
(cril.iquing use of "smnrt growth" rhetoric as obscuring difficult but
imponant issues) . 
33. See U.S. EPA, Environmenlal Appeals Board Formal Opinions, at
http:/lwww.epa.gov/eab/chrono.hun (last visi!td Sept. 29, 2000) 
(EAB slip opinions). 
Six of the cases involved CAA prevention of significant de­
terioration (PSD) permits.34 Two cases involved Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act permits,35 and the two oth­
ers involved Safe Drinking Water Act underground injec­
tion control permits.36 Because Regions may differ in their 
approaches to environmental justice issues, it would not be 
fair to generalize from cases involving four regional offices 
to EPA at large. Nor would it be fair to form conclusions 
about general environmental justice policy in any particular 
Region as there ma� be other Agency initiatives outside the 
permitting process. 7 
These cases are not irrelevant for purposes of our inquiry, 
however. Without further legislative action, the ultimate 
success of fairness-oriented regulatory reform in the permit­
ting context is largely dependent upon three considerations� 
(a) the scope of authority to address environmental justice
issues in existing environmental laws, (b) the willingness of
EPA to institute such reforms, either directly or by guidance
to delegated state and local agencies; and ( c) the level of
scrutiny afforded these cases by review ing bodies. Some
tentative generalizations may be made by examining the 
early development of the environmental justice case law
emerging in the EAB decisions.
Since none of the federal environmental statutes explic­
itly address environmental justice, such authority must lie in 
more broadly worded provisions. Richard Lazarus and 
Stephanie Tai have identified several sources of authority 
presently existing in environmental statutes, regulations, 
and guidance documents that may provide authority to ad­
dress environmental justice concerns in permit proceed-
34. The earliest case was from Michigan (Region V): In re Genesee
Power Station, L.P. , PSD Appeal Nos. 93· 1  et al., 1 993 WL 484880
(Genesee /), modified by In re Genesee Power Station, LP. , 4 E.A.D.
832, 1 993 EPA App. LEXIS 23, ADMIN. MAT. 40969 (Oct. 22,
1993) (Genesee II). Three were from Puerto Rico (Region II): In re
Puerto Rico Elec. PoWer Auth. (Cambalache Combustion Turbine 
Project), PSD Appeal No. 95-2, 6 E.A.D. 253, 1 995 EPA App. 
LEXIS 38, ADMIN. MAT. 40452 (Dec. 1 1 , 1 995); In re EcoE16;trica, 
L.P. ,  PSD Appeal Nos. 96-8, - 1 3, 7 E.A.D. 56, 1997 EPA App. 
LEXIS 5, AotiUN, MAT. 40632 (Apr. 8, 1 997); In re AES Puerto 
Rico, L.P. , PSD Appeal Nos. 98-29 et al . , 1 999  EPA App. LEXIS 1 7, 
ADMrN. MAT, 4 1 1 32 (May 27, 1 999). Two were from Cal ifornia 
(Region IX): In re KnaufFiber Glass, GmbH, PSD Appeal Nos. 98-3 
et al., post remand appeal EPA App. LEXlS 2, ADMIN. MAT. 41 053 
(Feb. 4, 1999) (Knauf I), In re Knauf Fiber Glass, GmbH. ADMIN. 
MAT. 4 1 2 1 8  (Mar. 1 4, 2000) (Knauf II).
35. One was from Indiana and involved a landfil l  (Region V). In re
Chem. Waste Mgmt. of Ind., Inc . • RCRA Appeal Nos. 95-2, -3, 6 
E.A.D. 66, 1995 EPA App. LEXIS 25, ADMIN. MAT. 40392 (June 
29, 1 995). The other was from Kansas and involved hazardous waste 
combustion (Region Vtl). In re Ash Grove Cement Co. , RCRA Ap­
peal Nos. 96-4, -5, 7 E.A.O. 387, 1 997 EPA App. LEXJS 30. 
ADMIN. MAT, 40732 (Nov. 1 4, 1997) . 
36. Both of these cases were out of Michigan (Region V). In re
Envotech, L.P .• UIC Appeal Nos. 95-2 et al, 6 E.A.D. 260, 1996 
EPA App. LEXIS 4. ADMIN. Mu. 40454 (Feb. 15 , 1996); In re 
Envtl. Disposal Sys. , Inc., UIC Appeal Nos. 98- 1 , -2. 1 998 EPA 
App. LEXIS 1 05, AoM1N. MAT. 4 1 073 (Oct. 15, 1998). 
37. See U.S. EPA, 1998 ENVIRONMENTAL JusncE BIANNUAL RE­
POKT: MOVING Tow.uos CoLLABOllATJVE/CoNSTKUcnvE PROB­
LEM SoL VINO ( 1 999). For links lO environmental justice initiatives at 
the regional level, sec hnp://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/indcx. Un­
doubtedly imponant as many of these programs are, however, it is 
difficult for any outside observer lO assess the true effectiveness of 
the programs absent an intimate involvement with each program. 
For a discussfon of how the environmental justice movement has ef­
fected a "renegotiation" of environmental law and policy and its ef­
fect on BPA initiatives in particular, see Richan! J. Lazarus, Sympo­
sium: lnrrovatfons in Environ,,u1ntal Policy: n Environmenlal Rac­
ism.! ThaJ 's What It /s," 2000U. ILL. L. REv. 255, 263-73 (2000). 
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ings.38 In an extensive analysis of the EAB·s cases that have 
addressed this authority, they conclude that the EAB is in­
creasingly willing to find discretionary authority to allow 
EPA or its state delegates to consider environmental j ustice 
when deciding on the issuance of a permit. In the cases de­
cided by the EAB thus far, the authority was contained in 
broadly worded "omnibus clauses," such as clauses direct­
ing the permitting official to consider permit terms neces­
sary to "protect health and the environment. "39  The EAB 's 
approach has been to examine this authority in light of Presi­
dent Clinton's 1 994 Executive Order on Environmental Jus­
tice.  40 The Executive Order by its tenns does not create addi­
tional procedural or substantive rights, nor is a federal 
agency 's com�liance with the Executive Order subject to ju­
dicial review. 
1 
However, the EAB has taken the position
that it has the obl igation to review the Regions' compliance 
with the Executive Order as a matter of policy or exercise of 
discretion to the ex.tent relevant under the particular envi­
ronmental statute. 42 
38. Richard J, Lazarus & Stephan ie Tai ,  lntegrming Environmerual Jus·
rice Imo EPA Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 6 1 7  ( 1 999);
see also Shel la R Foster, Meettflg the Enviro11111ental Jw;tice Chal· 
lenge1 Evolving Norms in Environmental Decisionmaking, 30 ELR 
30992 (Nov. 2000); Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, U.S. EPA
General Counsel (Dec. I, 2000) (on file with author) (regarding stat· 
utory and regulatory authorities under several environmental stat­
utes that are available to address environmental justice). In this 
memorandum, the Office of General Counsel declines to take an am·
biguous policy pasition, stating "(a] Hhough the memorandum pres· 
ents interpretations of EPA's statutory authority and regulations that
we believe are legally permissible, jJ does not suggest that such ac
lions would be uniformly practical or feasible . . . .  " Id. at I .
39. See, e.g. ,  In re Chem. Waste Mgmt., supra note 3 5 ,  at * 1 9 ,  AOMIN.
MAT. at 40394 (,noting that the administrator had the opportunity to
executD the policy behind the Executive Order by us i ng an omnibus
clause. under the Resource Conservat ion and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
that al lowed the permit to "contain such terms and condit ions as the
Administrntor (or the State) determines necessary to protect human
bcalth and the environment.'' 42 U,S.C. §6925(c)(3}, ELR STAT. 
RCRA §3005(c)(3)) ;  In re Envotech, supra note 36, at *47, AnMTN. 
MAT. at  40460 (UIC omnibus authority to impose, on a case-by-case
basis, permit conditions "necessary to prevent migration of fluids
i n to u ndergrou nd sources of d rink.ing wa ter ." 40 C. F.R.
§ I 44.52(a)(9)). Lazarus and Tai no!e this to be an important case be­
cause the UIC om11ibus authority wa.� conuiined "in the regulation� 
-rather than In the statute. Lazarus &. Tai, supra note 38, at 666.
40. An exception was the Genesee li t igation, which predated the Execu­
·tive Order, In the initial case, lhe BAB narrowly interpreted a provi­
�ion that non-air qual ity impacts must be considered in detennining
the applicable best available control technology (BACI). Genesee I, 
supra note 34. The EAB determined that the BACTprovision did not
ext.end to generalil.Cd community opposition, even on environmen·
taljustice grounds, as the s iting decision was a matter involving local
land use and zonin,g decisions .  Id. at 1 9-22. lo an opinion reissued lo
respond to a motion for clarification by the EPA' s Office of General 
Council, lhe BAB excised some of its original order, noting that 
"[a]ssuming without deciding that Mr. Dick' s environmental racism
argumept is within the scope of the Commission' s  authority to con­
sider under appl icable air qual ity rules and regulations (for Mr. 
Dicks does not chal lenge any of the emissions l imitations prescribed 
for the facil i ty but rather challenges the proposed location of the fa­
ci li ty nefil' the Flint/Genesee neighborhood), we conclude that the
Commission 's action was proper in that there is no basis in the record
for concluding that it acted with a racially discriminatory intent."
Genesee 1/, supra note 34, at 20, AoMIN.  MAT. at 4097 1 .  Thus, the
BACT provision at issue would be interpreted to allow for the con­
siderution of non-air quality impacts as they pertained to the ulti mate
emission limit selected. For a discussion of the evolut ion of the
EAB' s  initial resisLance lo environment.al justice claims lo a more 
accommodating per.;pective, see Lazarus & Tai, supra note 38 ,  at 
-655· 77.
4 1 .  See Exec. Order No. 1 2898. 3 C.P.R. 859 ( 1995), AoMIN. M.u. 4507S. 
42. /n re Chem. Was1e Mgm1., supra note 35, at 7, •24-25, ADMIN. MAT.
at 40395 . 
The EAB cases also provide a gl immer of important pol­
ky choices underlying some of the Regions' approaches to 
envirorunental justice claims. For example, when broadly 
worded omnibus clauses were used, the permi tting authori � 
ties tended to be fairly conservative in abiding by con­
straints plausibly inherent in the language of the omnibus 
clause, an approach that the EAB affinned. 43 For ex�le,
in In re Chemical Waste Management of Indiana, Inc. , the 
EAB noted that the Region correctly detennined that the 
omnibus clause did not allow the pennitting authority to 
deny a RCRA permit based "solely'' upon al leged social or 
economic impacts. Thus, the permit could be conditioned to 
prevent adverse health or environmental impacts, but could 
not be conditioned to "redress impacts that are unrelated or 
only tenuously related to hwnan heal th and the envirorunent 
such as disproportionate impacts on the economic welJ-be­
ing of a minority or low-income community."
45 In so find­
ing, the EAB ignored the fact that the petitioners had also re� 
quested a risk assessment because of their concern with ex­
posure to toxic chemicals, a measure that clearly would 
have fallen within the scope of the omnibus clause. 46 Ac­
cordingly, what remai ns unclear from these decisions is the 
outer bounds of regulatory discretion to condition or deny a 
permit based on environmental j ustice considerations. All 
of the cases to date involve challenges by environmental 
justice advocates47 who claim that the permitting agency did 
not exercise its discretion in a sufficiently protective man­
ner. '.However, no cases involve an appeal by the pennit ap­
plicant contending that the agency exceeded the scope of its 
authority in responding to environmental justice claims an 
appeal that would likely ensue if the omnibus cl auses had 
been used aggressively by the permitting authority.48 In al l
43. In a s imilar vein, see also In re Envotech, where the EAB similarly
noted thal the UIC regulatory omnibus authority did not give the Re· 
gion the autl1ority "lo redress alleged negative economic impacts on
the conununity, diminution in property values, or alleged prolifera­
tion of local undesirable land uses." Supra nore 36 at *"48 ADMJN,
MAT. at 4�0. However, the community was also concerned aboul 
poor compliance history, which permit conditions- might have ad· 
dressed with enhanced monitoring. Id. at *30, ADMIN.  MAt. at
40457. Some petitioners also took the position that the Region could
deny the permit on the grounds 1hat there were already numerous
land uses. If the Region had wanted to more aggressively use and tesl 
the limits of its discretionary authority, it could have decided that the 
risk of migration posed by the hazardous waste injection wells-n.1-
though perhaps acceptable in isolation-when combined with the
ex.isti.ng aggregated risks presented sufficient grounds for denial of
the permit.
44. RCRA Appeal Nos. 95-2, ·3, 6 E.A.D. 66, 1 995 EPA App. LEXIS 
25, 5, ADMIN. M AT. 40392, 40394 (June 29, 1 995). 
45. Id. al 6, AnMIN. MAT. at 40394.
46. Id. at 4, A)}MJN,  MAT. al 40393 .
47. I use the term "environmental justice advocates" throughout the Ar­
ticle inclusively to mean primarily residents of impacted communi­
ties and community-based orguniz;i.tions, but also including faith
groups, public health groups, civil rights groups, and academics
whose works support the goals of the environment.al justice move­
ment. In one of the EAB decisions, the petitioner that asserted envi­
ronmental justice claims was a competitor of the permit appl icant, 
but essentially advanced a position that was consistent with one tha1 
could have been asserted by a community-based organization. In re 
Ash Grove Cement Co.,  supra note 35. 
48. In In re Ash Grove Cemen1 Co. , there was an issue that the Adminis ­
ll'ator cxceedw the scope of its authority in requiring an indirect risk
assessment and imposing additional monitoring requirements. How­
ever, the requirement was not articulated as one made in response to 
environmental justice concerns, but was imposed because of higher
than benchmark values on the hazard index and under the authority
of a guidance document. U.S. BPA. STRATEGY FOR H /\ZAJlDOUS
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instances, the Regions ultimately concluded that there was 
no disproportionate adverse impact on the basis of race or 
income, either due to the results of a demographic analysis
or an impact analysis, 
49 although in two cases additional
conditions appear to have been placed on the pennit in re­
sponse to concerns of the affected communities. so Not all of 
the opinions describe the methodology the regional officials 
used in the envirorunental justice analysis, but those that are 
described appear to follow a basic approach that uses 1 990 
census data to detennine demographics (mean income or 
ethnic minority), and the use of a one� or two-mile radius to
determine the area of maximum impact.5 1  The methodology
for identifying a potential environment.al justice community
and determining disparity, which is particularly diftkult and
vulnerable to complicating factors, is continually changing
and evolving.52 However, the petitioners objections to
WASTE MINIMIZATION AND COMIIUS'JlON ( 1994). Supra note 35, at 
•32, ADMIN, MAT. at 40733. The Petitioner challenged the authority
for the: Administrator to impose requirements that had been promul­
gated by guidance rather than by rule. Id. 
49. In the early Genesee cases, the Region found that there would be no
adverse impact because the emissions would not result in a NAAQS 
violation. Genesee II. supra note 34, at 22, ADMIN. MAT. at 4()1)71 .  
B o t  the E AB  also appeared to rest i ts  decision o n  defenses common
to civjJ rights coses, that there was no discriminatory intent, id. at 
19-20, Aot.ttN.  MAT. at 4097 1 .  and that there was a legitimate, non­
disc:riminatory �on for denying a pennit at an alternative site com­
prised of a majority white population. Id. at 2 1 ,  ADMIN. MAT. at 
4()1)71 .  Su also In re Puerro Rico Elec., supra note 34, and In re 
Chem. Wal·te Mgmt., supra note 35, at *28, ADMIN. MAT. at 40393 
(no minority or low income community will face a disproportionate 
Impact within a one-mile radius); fn re Ash Grove Cement Co. , supra 
note 35 ("low percentage" of minorities in area and per capita in· 
come simillll' to income in sUITounding counties); In re Envotech, su· 
pra note 36 ( impact on minority or low income populations within 
two-mile radius minimum); In re En vtl. Disposal Sys. , supra note 36 
(using two.mile radius, concluding that percentage of minority pop­
ulation and low income population was less than the state averages). 
In In re &0£/ictrica, the Region detemuned that the average me­
dian household in ome of the petitioner 's  community was higher
than in the surrounding area, albei� lower than the commonwealth's 
average, and that the facility impacts fell below NAAQS . In re 
&oElectrica, supra note 35, at *30, ADMIN. MAT. at 40635; su also 
Knauf I, supra note 34, at • 126, ADMIN. MAT. at 4 1069 (the Region 
concluded, without further detail, that "it was unlilccly that an Envi ­
ronmental Justice issue applied.''); Knauf II, supra note 34 (no ad· 
verse impact because no NAAQS violation);  In re AES Pueno Rico,
supra note 34 (looking at potential impaclS of air emissions from the 
facili ty, the Region found that the four criteria pollutants tested fell
below NAAQS). 
50. In re. En�'Otech, supra note 36, at •39, ADMIN. MAT. at 40459 (the
Region imposed particularly stringent monitoring requirements on 
the pennits, including "daily sampling of the waste stream during the 
firs I 90 days of operation and weekly sampling thereafter, expanded 
monthly and annual sample constituent l ists and a full RCRA Ap­
pcndiJl IX nnalysis prior to commending injection.''); In re AES 
Pu.erto Rico, supra note 34 {Region required post construction ambi­
ent monitoring and a multisource air quality analysis of S02). 
5 1 . In the cases that describe tho methodology in greater detail , the ap­
proach typically involves talting pcrcapila income from 1990 census 
data, source location data from the 1990 toxic release inventory
(TRI}, and information from the Region's  pennit compliance data­
base. This data is plotted in the area detennined to be the location of 
the J1111JUmum impact from the source' s  emissions or other facility 
impaclS. Su In re AES Puerto Rico, supra note 34 (Regional offi· 
c:i.llls had performed an environmental justice analysis using the Re­
gion's Geographic lnfonnation System, comparing per capita in­
come and source location and concluding that there would be no ad·
verse disproportionate health impacts); In re Chem. Wt.1Ste Mgmt., 
supra note 35 (using census data); in re EcoElktrica, supra note 34.
52. See, e.g., R.EotON 2, U.S. EPA, DRAFT INTEIUM POLICY ON lDBN·
nFYING EJ AJIBAS (1997); ReotoN 5, U.S. EPA, REVISED IN• 
TfilllM GUIDELINES FOR IOENTJFYINO AND AooR.ESSING /\ PoTEN• 
TIAL BJ CASE ( 1998). The Office of Environmental Justice may 
methodology often fonned the basis for seeking review, 
thus making the EAB 's reviewing role an imponant consid­
eration in fairness-oriented reform efforts. 
As an initial matter, the EAB appears to view an environ­
mental justice analysis in pennit proceedings as a minimum 
requirement of the Executive Order3 "when a commenter 
submits at least a superficially plausible claim that opetation 
of the facility will have a disproportionate impact on a mi­
nori t): or low•income segment of the affected commu­
nity."54 This du� flows to delegated state and local permit­
ting authorities. s Thus, when such a claim has been made, 
the EAB will look to see if an environment.al justice analysis 
was conducted and will remand when there is insufficient 
detail in the administrative re�ord to support findings of th.e
analysis. 56 It has also stated its view that when a matter
clearly lies with.in th.e permitting official's authority as a 
matter of policy that discretion should be exercised in a 
manner that will better implement the Executive Order to 
the extent practicable.57 
This does not mean that the EAB's willingness to view 
existing authorities in l ight of the Executive Order automati­
cally results in successful appeals. The EAB will  reject the 
clai m when it views the pet i tioner's allegations as
overbroad, vague, and not supported by detailed evidence. 58
Additionally, because the Executive Order by its terms does 
not create rights, the failure to identify a specific source of 
authority under the environmental statutes has apparently 
soon release a draft Guide to Assessing a11.d Addressing Allegations 
of Environmental Justice. 
53. The one case that has remanded on these grounds is KMuf I, supra 
note 34, at • 1 27-• 1 29, ADMJN. MAT. at 4 1069. Lazarus and Tai sug.
gest that Lbe duty to provide an adequate record of an environmental 
justice nalys1s might depend in part on whether the Region has de· 
veloped environmentaljustice guidelines. Lazanis & Tai, Jupra note
�8. at 676+ 77. Subsequently. on appeal �ter the. environ�enr.al jus,
lice analy 1s was prepared, the EAB demed review findmg that the 
petitioners did not show that the emissions would lead to an adverse
impact because NAAQS for paniculatc matter bad not been ex­
ceeded and because applicable regulatory obligations concerning
public participation had been TJieC. Koouf II, supra note 34. at 23, 
ADMIN. MAT. at 41 223.
54. In re Chem. WllSte Mgmt. ,  supra note 35, at • 19, AoMIN. MAT. at 
40394.
SS. Kn.o,uf /, supra note 34. Although the Executive Order is directed at 
federal agencies, the BAB reasoned that the state/local pennitting 
authoriry stand� in the shoes of EPA for purposes of implementing 
the federal program and the pemuts issued arc federal pemuts. Id. at 
• 1 25, ADMIN, M1u. at 4 1218 .
56. In In re Knauf Fiber GlCJSs, the Shasta County Air Quality Manage­
ment District in ilS response to comments on the pemut, noted that 
Region IX reviewed its policies and "did not find a violation of [ ilS 
environmental justice] guidelines ." id. at 1 26, AOMJN. MAT. at  
412 18 .  However, the memorandum was submitted after lhe pennit
was issued. The EAB noted that the memorandum merely stated 
without adequate detail that a Region IX employee concluded that 
after reviewing the project location and surrounding demographics
that it was unlikely that an environmental justice issue applied. Id,
S1. In re Chem. Waste Mgmt., supra note 35, at 6, •23-24, ADMJN, MAT. 
at 40393; In re Envotech, supra note 36, •47, ADMIN. MAT. at 
40459. 
58. In Puerto Rico E/ec. Power, supra note 34, the EAB appeared to 
view the petitioner' s claim as vague and lacking evidentiary support.
The EAB also took the position that the pennit applicant's al leged 
poor compliance history did not bear upon the permit.condi tions. See 
also In re EcoE/ictrictJ, supra note 34, at •27, ADMIN. MAT. al 
40635 (noting that the petitioner did not explain the basis for its con­
tention that additional modeling should have been req�d). This is
likely a reflection of the limited resources available to commu­
nity-based envirorunental justice organizations. Lazarus & Tai, su­
pra note- 38, at 664.
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proven fatal to at least one of the claims. 59 Environmental 
justice petitioners have had unsuccessful appeals even in 
cases where the claimants identified specific sources ofau­
thority under environmental statutes or regulations, articu­
lated their claims in detail, and provided stronger eviden­
tiary support. The reason for this may lie in the consider­
able deference given to the permitting agency's view of the 
l imits of its authority, its methodology, and its environ­
mental justice analysis. A recent case involving a PSD per­
mit is i l lustrative. 
In AES Puerto Rico ,6-0 the petitioners, a community orga­
nization and several individuals,61 opposed a major source 
permit of  a 454-megawatt coal-fired power plant in 
Guayama, Puerto Rico, an area already hosting several
pharmaceutical and petrochemical plants. 62 This opinion is
rich in detail about the evidence that attended the environ­
ment al justice challenges to the pennit issuance, and in that 
respect provides valuable insight into the permitting pro­
ceedings. In this case petitioners tied the environmental jus­
tice claims to the Administrator's discretionary authority
under PSD regulations and guidance documents,63 arguing
that because the affected community was low income and 
many residents were experiencing health problems, Region 
II officials should have exercised their discretion in a more
protective manner.64 In particular, the petitioners asked the
Region to require a full air quality impact analysis for sulfur 
dioxide (S02)
61 and asserted that the Region should not have 
relied oo what they contended to be an outdated 1 983 attain­
ment demonstration for S02 .
66 In addition, petitioners ques­
tioned the accuracy of an impact analysis for particulate 
matter and the Region's change of an emissions limit in the 
pennit. This discussion will focus on the S02 issue, al­
though the EAB took a similar approach to the particulate 
matter issues. 
Basically, the petitioner wanted the Region to require pre­
construction multisource modeling and preconstruction am­
bient monitoring for S02, a request that reflects the petition­
ers' concern with cumulative impacts.67 Multisource mod­
eling analyzes not only the facility's emissions but the com­
bined impacts of all existing sources in the area, 68 and it is 
59. In Puerto Rico Elec. Power, the petitioner' s claim rested on the au­
thority under President Clinton' s .Executive Order on environmental 
justice, and not on authority under the environmental statutes. Supra 
note 34, at •4, Al>MIN. MAT. at 4-0452.
60. PSD Appeal Nos. 98-29 et al, 1 999 EPA App. LEXIS 1 7 . AoMIN.
MI\T. 4 1 1 32 (May 27, 1 999) .
6 1 .  The pelitionel'li were Dr. Jorge E. 00112.ales of the Univel'liity of 
Puerto RJco Mayaguez., Sur Contra la Contaminaci6n, a local com­
munity organization and Pedro J , Saade Llorens, on behalf of five in­
dividuals. Id. at l, AoMJN. MAT, at 41 1 32.
62. Id. at 3, 6. ADMIN, MAT. at 4 1 132, 41 1 33.
63. Id. at 9, 3 1 ,  ADMJN. MAT. al 41 1 34, 4 1 1 39.
64. Id. at 1 1 , 2 1 ,  AoMJN. Mu al 4 1 1 34, 4 1 1 36. 
65. The Region did not exempt AES from conducting preconstruction 
monitoring on particulate maner because the appl icable significant
impact levels were exceeded. Id. at 27, AoMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 38 .  
66. Id. at 22, AoMJN. MAT. et 4 1 1 34. 
67. Id. at 9- 1 ! ,  ADM.IN. MAT. al 41 1 34  (citing 40C,F.R. §S2.2 l (i)(8)(i), 
U.S. EPA, EPA Ntw SOURCE REVIEW WoRKSHOJ> MANUAL at
C.2S- .28 (Draft 1 990)) [hereinafter NSR MANUAL),
68. More specifically, a full impact multisource modeling is air quality
modeling that takes into account the "proposed source, existing 
sources, and residential, commercial, 1111d industrlal growth than ac­
companies the activities at the new source or modification." NSR 
MANUAL, supra note 67, at C.25. 
typically required to demonstrate that the proposed source 
in combination with other sources wil l  not cause or contrib­
ute to a violation of any NAAQS or PSD increment.69 How­
ever, because this requirement is "costly and time-consum­
ing," the pennitting official may allow the source to avoid 
this impact analysis using a screening device that compares 
the results of the source's modeled emissions to significant 
impact levels (SILs). In this case, the predicted 24-hour SO:z 
impact from the vroposed facility (4.97 micrograms per cu­
bic meter (µg/m )) was very close to exceeding the corre­
sponding significant impact level (5 .0 µg/m3) . 70 The Region
went ahead and exempted the applicant from a full impact 
analysis. Petitioners objected to this because they were con­
cerned that the combination of three controls selected by the 
pennit applicant would not in fact meet the corresponding 
emission l imit in the permit. They asserted that the only rea­
son the applicant proposed the combination of  con­
trols-which had not been previously used in prac­
rice--was to avoid a preconstruction air quality analysis.7 1 
Petitioners also argued that it would be difficult for the ap­
plicant to control the sulfur content of the coal, which could 
potentially increase the base emissions rate and conse­
quently exceed the SILs.72 On appeal, the BAB denied re­
view, noting that it was the applicantjs prerog,ative to accept 
lower emission limits to get below the SILs 3 and that, al­
though the applicant did not have much room for error in the 
sulfur content, the pennit required it to avoid errors that 
would result in a permit violation.74 In fact, the BAB en­
dorsed the Region's approach, indicating that its decision 
"breaks new ground on potential ly available control options 
. . .  and may be replicated [at other facilities) ."75  The BAB 
also gave the Region considerable deference on al l technical
challenges to the methodology used by the Region 76 and de­
clined to consider one petitioner 's independently performed 
multisource analysis because it had not been submitted dur­
ing the applicable comment period.77 This multisoutce anal­
ysis disclosed the potential for the combined sources to ex­
ceed the appl icable NAAQS.78 
The petitioners also requested preconstruction ambient 
monitoring and questioned the Region's reliance on a 1 983 
attainment demonstration based on modeling instead of
monitoring. 79 They also questioned the Region's use of data
obtained from a facility 1 8  kilometers from the proposed 
site instead of the results of modeling performed by the 
69, In re EcoEllctrica, supra note 34, at •24, ADMIN. MAT. at 40635 
(citing 4-0 C.F.R. §52.2 l (k) , (n)(2), and NSR MANUAL, supra note
67, at C.24- .25) . 
70. The Region exempted AES from conducting prcconstructlon moni­
toring of S02 because the results of modeling showed fhal antici­
pated air quality impacts ( 4. 97 micrograms over a 24-hour average)
fell below the applicable monitoring de minimis level (5.0 micro­
grams over a 24-hour average). ln re AES Puerto Rico, .rupra note
34, at 1 1 , ADMIN. MAT. at 41 1 34. 
71 .  Id. at 1 2- 1 3 . ADMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 34-35.
72. Jd. at 1 8 - 1 9, AoMTN, MAT, al 41 1 36. 
73 . Jd. at 1 4, ADMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 35.
14. Id. at 19. ADMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 36. 
75. Id. a1 14, ADMlN, MAT, a.t 4 l 13S.
76. Petitione� claim, among other things, that the model used was not
calibrated for tropical conditions and that the combination of BACT
controls had previously been used in practice.
77. In re AES Puerto Rico, supra note 34, at I .  AOMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 32.
78. Id. 111 1 6, Am.nN. MAT. at 4 1 1 35 .
79. Id. al 23, AoMIN. MAT, at 41 1 37.
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Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board in 1 990 that pre­
dicted concentrations in the Guayama area that exceeded 
NAAQS.80 The EAB denied review of this claim as well.
noting that attainment is a legal designation and that even 
if pe titioners' suspicions were correct, NAAQS would be 
threatened even without the emi ssions from the proposed 
facil ity. In addition, noted the EAB , the facil ity would be 
able to obtain a permit anyway because the impact was 
below the threshold for causing or contributing to air 
quality violations. 
The EAB's decision may not appear rematkab)e, espe­
cially when considering the very deferential standard of re­
view often applied in permit proceedings. 81 [n earlier cases,
however the EAB had stated quite boldly that as a matter of 
policy, dlscretion should be exercised in a manner that wil l 
better implement the Executive Order on Environmental
Justice. 82 However, in this case every discretionary decision
had been exercised by the Region in favor of going forward 
with the permit, often by adopting the applicant's requests. 
Instead of questioning the use of discretion in this matter, 
the BAB instead separated the issue of environmental jus­
tice analytically. For example, when discussing the major is­
sues the EAB often upheld the Region's exercise of discre­
tion 'by reference to generally apf lied policy and cases not 
involving environmental justice. 3 
The review of environmental j ustice came at the end of 
the opinion. In discussing the Regio� 's enviro�ental ju�­
tice analysis, the EAB focused on acnons the Region took m 
response to environmental justice conc�ms, sue� as con­
ducting an analysis of mean income (which estabhshed the
• )
84 1 . h di presence of a low-income commuruty , ana.>'.z.mg t e s-
tribution of toxic release inventory (TRI) fac1hues, and en­
gaging in extensive corresponden�f wi th the petitioner over 
the course of the pennit process. However. the EAB did 
not question whether information dissemination was re­
sponsive to the community's concerns, instead noting that 
"[t]be Region further analyzed.the dis�buti?n o� . . .  TRI . : .
facil ities . . . •  The TRI analysis pertams pnmanly to toxic 
chemicals rather than criteria pollutants (which are the focus 
of the PSD Program), but the Region's effort to provide 
meaningful responses on these issues contributes to envi-. . ti h G ' ty .,86 ronmental Justice or t e uayam.a commum . 
There was one significant condition placed on the permit 
in response to environmental justice concerns. The Region 
imposed post-construction ambient moni toring and a 
80. Jd.
8 1 .  
'The- Bou.rd may grant review of a permit decision if some as­
pect of the deci.5ion was based on ei ther a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact or conclusion of law, or if lhe decision in­
volves an important matter of policy or eitcrcise of discretion 
lhat warrants review, . . .  [P)ower of review should be only 
sparingly citcrcised, and most permit conditions should be fi­
nally detennined at the Regional level. 
Id. at 6, AoMIN. M,n. at 4 1 1 33 (citations omitted). 
82. Jn re Chem. Was1e Mgmt. , supra note 35, at 7, Aot.m,1, MAT. at
40393 .
83. For example, the EAB noled that the eitempti?n from a.full impactanalysis was validly applitd based on estabhshtd policy and the
quality of the modeling, i'I re AES Pueno Rico, supra note 34, at 22,
AoMJN. MAT. at 4 1 1 37. 
84. Jd. at 35. AoMIN. MAt. al 41 140.  
85. Id at 36, AoMTN, MAT. a l  41 1 40.
86. Id. 
post-construction multisource air quality analysis for S02. 87 
The EAB was clearly impressed by the Region's willingness 
to place these conditions on the pennit, noting: 
(T]his permi t contains addi tional conditions that are not 
mandated by the PSD regulations but are within the Re­
gion 's discretion to require. The Region incorporated the 
conditions into the permit as a tangible response to lhe 
community's concerns about air quality and to fulfill the 
goals of lhe Executive Order [ on environrnenlaljustice ) .88 
Curiously, however, the EAB did not seriously question 
the Region's decisio n to require this costly endeavor 
post-construction rather than preconstru�tion, the lat�er 
time being better suited to prevent a potential NAAQS vio­
lation. Thus, it appears from this case that to a _certa!n de­gree the BAB is willing to applaud the l:'se of d1scre�on. tocondition permits in response to environment�! JUSt1 ce 
concerns but is not incl ined to apply more probing scru­
tiny to th; permitting agency's methodology, use of discre­
tion, or ultimate findings. 
There are two primary lessons that can be taken from this 
case . The case indicates the li mited role judicial review is 
likel y to play in prompting faimess-o�e�ted reform, .but
looking slightly beyond the reported decision also provides 
an insight into the institutional dynamics th�t hin��r the de� 
velopment ofthis type of reform at the penrut-wntmg level. 
Looking to the latter issue, it may well  have been that Re­
gion officials felt they were using their authority aggres­
sively and protectively. Because the SIL had not been tech­
nically exceeded, pennitting ofticia�s might �ve deter­
mined that although they had authonty to require precon­
struction modeli ng, imposing that condition would �ve ne­
gated the incentive for the permit applica�t to use a_n �ova­
tive combination of controls. However, 1f the obJechon to 
preconstruction modeling is cost (as .the E�B sug�ests), the
case does not explain why the pemut apph�aot did not O?·
ject to multisource modeling after construction of the facil­
ity as part of the permit terms. 
This curiosity raises the question of credibil ity. From the 
community's perspective, there is likely to be a great deal of 
suspicion, particularly given the history of Agency resis­
tance to environmental justice claims.89 It would not be un­
common, or even unreasonable, for community members to 
believe that regional officials might be allowing the pennit 
applicant to avoid preconstruction monitoring and mod�l­
ing to avoid explaining how the Agency �ould grant a �aJ_orsource permit ( 453 tons per year ofS02) if the analysis d1s· 
closed that ambient concentrations al ready exceeded 
NAAQS. In the case, the Region apparently argued that if 
NAAQS vio�tions _were. later �scovered. . it woul? !1Ilder­take corrective action, mcludmg a possible rev1s1on of 
Puerto Rico's state implementation plan (SIP) on an expe-
87. Jd.. at 35 -36, ADMJN. MAT. al 4 1 140. 
88. Jd. at 36, ADMJN. MAT. at 4 1 1 40. 
89. For an anecdotal description of a hostile pennit proceeding, see Lulce
W. Cole, The Struggle of Ke rt lemon City: Lessons for the �'?ve,,,enl,
S Mo. J. CoNTi:!MP. LEGAL Issuas 67 ( 1 993- 1 994) (dcscnbmg hear­
ing concerning toitic waste incinerator): see also Sheila Poster, Ju:­
tice Frorn t� Ground Up: Distributive lnequliies, Grassroots Rem·
ranee, t� Transforma1ive Polilics of the Environmen!af Justice
Movemefll, 86 CAL. L. REV. ns. 8 1 1 - 1 3  ( 1998) (descnbmg com­
munity organization'� meetings wilh industry and government offi­
cials in Chester, Pennsylvania).
90. In reAES Puerto Rico, supra note 34, at 9, ADMIN. MAT. at 4 1 1 34.
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dited basis. 91  However, this is a regulatory action largely be­
yond the control of the community and does not require pub­
lic participation. The community would be in the position of 
having to take the Region at its word that this would be done. 
To state the dynamic bluntly, it is difficult for a community 
activist-the quintessential outsider-to tell whether the of­
ficial is really doing the best she can to protect the commu­
nity with.in the constraints of l imited authority or, con­
versely, whether the official is only trying to make it appear 
so but is actually being unduly conservative because of pres­
sure from the pennit applicant or a general lack of commit­
ment to environmental justice. Simply, there is no way to
tell.92 Undoubtedly, this is an area where leadership and
guidance from the highest levels of the Agency is crucial so 
that EPNs rank and file, as well as state and local program 
administrators, will be confident that they will  be supported 
in their efforts to use existing authorities to protect vulnera­
ble conununities. 
There is another lesson to be learned from this case, al­
though one has to go beyond the opinion to consider it. 
Benchmarks generally, and more specifically conunonly 
applied significance levels, systematical ly work against en­
vironmental justice communities. In Puerto Rico, the 
asthma rates are abnormally high, particularly among chil­
dren.93 In addition, because of the tropical climate and open 
louvered windows common to the area, remaining indoors 
does not provide protection against episodic high exposures 
ofpollutants.94 This in tum is problematic because the peti­
tioners had introduced evidence of noncompl iance by per­
mitted facilities in the area.95 So while emissions that may
fall below a 5 .0 SIL might legitimately be considered "de 
minimus" in a typical regulatory contex t, a 4. 97 SIL may 
not be ben ign in the context of a community with abnor­
mal health vulnerabilities and multiple impacts from di­
verse sources. As commonly noted, even standards pre­
mised upon conservative assumptions have turned out to 
be inadequate .96 
Separate from the empirical issues of adequately protec­
tive benchmarks and whether agency officials are attempt­
ing to be as protective as they can, is the issue of judicial re­
view. Because the Region declined to require a full impact 
91 . Id. at 26, ADMIN.  MAT. at 4 1 1 38 .
92. The suspicion of agency capture is a part of a larger theme of distrust
result ing in what Professor Laz.aru.s describes as a "pathological cy­
cle of regulatory failure, crisis and controver..y.'' Richard J. Lazarus,
The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal En viron­
mental Law. 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 3 l l ,  407 ( 1 99 1 ) .
93. Testimony of Dr. Jose Rodriguez Santana, Program Direcior of the 
Pediatric Pulmonology Program, Before the Nationnl Environmen­
tal J ustice Advisory Council (NEJAC), December 12,  2000, Wash­
ington, D.C. Transcript, Sixteenth Meeting of the NEJAC, vol. II,
pp. l l - 1 25 through 1 1 - 1 32 (Dec. 12, 2000) (on file with author) . 
94. Testimony of Rosa Hilda Ramos, resident of Puerto Rico, Before the 
NEJAC Air and Water Subcommittee, October 1 8 .  2000, in New
York City, N.Y. (Discussion of noncompliance by another power 
plant in Puerto Rico. Ms. Ramos additionally noted that at times 
residents would sit in their automobiles with the windows rol led up
in an attempt to escape smoke from power plants) (notes on file 
with author) . 
95. In re AES Puerto Rico, supra note 34, at 24-25, AoMIN. M AT. at
41 1 37 . 
96. Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice lmplicaJions of 
Quantitative Ri�k Assessment, 1 996 U. ILL, L. REV. 1 03 ,  1 16; cf 
Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Envirorimental Risk As­
sessment, 1 9  HARV, ENVTL, L REv. 409 (1995) (discussing perva­
sive uncertainties .
analysis before construction, the case should have raised 
signi ficant questions on appeal about the adequacy of the 
Region's approach. Despite the normally deferential stan­
dard of review applied by the EAB to pennit decisionS gen­
erally, the Executive Order on Environmental Justice gives 
the EAB justification to more closely examine Agency dis­
cretion once a vulnerable community is identi fied.97 Thus, 
the EAB could have questioned why the Region did not ex­
ercise its discretion in a more protective manner in tight of 
the troubling indicators about the ambient concentrations, 
the health problems in this community (high asthma rates), 
as well as the vulnerabilities of low�income communities
generally, e.g. , more restricted access to health care.98 In­
deed, there is a flavor of wishful thi nking to EAB 's logic in 
the assumption that violations at existing sources do not 
necessarily indicate potential NAAQS violations and are
enforcement issues not gennane to pennit issuances.99 On
the contrary, the judicial task should be to review the exer­
cise of discretion with a steady eye toward realistic rather 
than theoretical conditions. 100 The level of scrutiny need not 
reach inappropriate heights of j udicial micromanagement, 
but a much stronger message concerning the exercise o f  dis­
cretionary authority in light of the Executive Order may be 
conveyed while retaining deference to Agency decisions. 
But this has proven not to be the case thus far, either at the 
administrative level or in court. The petitioners in AES 
Puerto Rico sought judicial review of the EAB's decision in 
the First Circuit. 1 0 1  Among other claims, petitioners were
concerned that there would be no opportunity to review and 
comment on post-construction ambient monitoring and the 
post-construction multisource modeling analysis. The First 
Circuit rejected petitioners' claim, noting that although 
there was no legal requirement for public comment of 
post-construction pennit analysis, the analysis would be
conducted in accordance with EPA models and protocols. 1 02 
The remainder of the petitioners' challenges were similarly 
rejected. In the end, the petitioners were left with assurances 
of protection that they had no way to verify, a result that is 
more likely to heighten suspicion and skepticism about the 
process. The AES Puerto Rico and other EAB decisions 
therefore can unwittingly promote more conflict. Because 
reviewing bodies are l ikely to be considerably deferential to
pennitting authorities, 103 there is little pressure from this
97. Some may argue tha1, given 1he permitting agency's reticence to
find a vulnerable community as a factual matter, stricter scrutiny of
the methodology employed to identify 1lll environmental justice
community is also warranted. See infra notes 1 59-64 and accompa­
nying teKI.
98. In Chemical Waste Managemefll, the EAB acknowledged that par­
ticularvulnerabil i ties may be relevant and that a "[broad based] an11J­
ysis might �ave been based on assumptions thot, though true for a
broad cross-section of the community, are not true for the smaller
minority or low-income segment of the community ." 111 re C/iem
Wastt Mgmt., supra note 35, at *20, ADMIN. MAT. at 40394.
99. In re AES Puerto Rico, supra noie 35, at 24-25 , ADMTN. MA1", a l
41 1 37.
1 00. CJ. Daniel A. Farber, Taldng Slippage Seriously; Noru:ompliance
and Creative Compliance in Environmenial Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL.
L, REv, 297 ( 1999) (advocating the concept of sl ippage to inform
environmental doctrine and policy). 
1 0 1 . Sur Contra la Contamlnac i6n v. EPA, 202 F.3d 443, 30 ELR 203SK
(1 st Cir. Feb. 2000). 
102. ld. at 448, 30 ELR at 20360. 
103. ln EcoElicrrica, the Region ll officials also el templed the applicant 
from conducti.ng multisource modeling of impacts because the 
sou.rec d id not exceed applicable significance levels. lri re
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venue to encourage EPA to more aggressively use its discre­
tion to take protective measures during permit issuances. 
This could be particularly problematic for communities 
near heavily industrial ized areas where the aggregated risks 
are more extreme while the pressures to provide relief from 
regulatory requirements are even more demanding. 104 This
unfortunate situation is avoidable. The generic language 
commonly found in omnibus clauses have considerably 
more potential than has been used thus far. While clauses 
such as "protection ofhealt
h
" may include consideration of 
adverse health ef ects from permitted emissions, these 
clauses also may be more liberally interpreted to allow at­
tention to cumulative impacts, safety concerns stemming 
from increased traffic, or the increased risk of facility acci­
dents and resulting episodic acute exposures that are com­
mon occurrences in some communities .  
tos 
Clauses such as
"protection of welfare" may be used to allow consideration 
of quality of life impacts such as increased noise and odors 
and other facility-related impacts that may not result di­
rectly from the permitted releases. Such a clause may even 
authorize consider ation of impacts such as the potential for 
increased criminal activity and decreased property values, 
where appropriate. 106 
EcoEUctrica, supra note 34. at •25, ADMlN. MAT, at 40635. The 
Region also perfonncd an environmental justice analysis and con­
cluded that che facili ty did not have a disproportionate impact to 
lower income communities because the modeled impacts from the 
faci l i ty 's expected emissions fell below the NAAQS. Id. at •28, 
ADMIN. MAT. at 40635. The environmental justice analysis con­
sisted of overJayiog per capi!D income data upon source Joe lion 
data. The Region concluded tho! the median income of residents near 
the facility was higher than the median income elsewhere in the mu­
nicipali ty and nearby municipalities; however, the median income 
was lower than the commonwealth's median income. In this case, 
the EAB noted the Administrator's authority under the CAA, to take 
into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and 
other costs when decidi.ng upon an appropriate BACT emissions 
limitation, and to determine on a case-by-case basis whether such 
limitation is achievable for such source or modification through ap­
plication of product ion processes or avai lable methods, systems, 
and techniques. 40 C.F.R. §52.2 1 ( 8)( 1 2) .  However, while noting 
that the Administrator had broad authority and could have required 
a multisource analysis, the EAB also noted that even if such an 
analysis had been performed, the exemption was proper because 
it wil!l based on the source' s  own projected de minimis air qual ity 
impacts. In re EcoElectrlca, supra note 34, at •23, ADMJN . MAT. 
Ill 40634. 
1 04. For i t  i �  in these areas that well-funded industrial interests are keen to 
challenge what they perceive to be oppressive and inefficient com­
mand-and-control requirements. See, e.g . . infra notes 276-320 and 
accompan yi ng text ,  d i scus sing c lus tered refineries in the 
nonattainment Gulf Coast region where offsets arc difficult to obtain 
for major ources of criteria air pollutants. 
105. For example, Professor Kuehn notes that during the period from
1 994 to 1 997, the area around Convent, Louisiana, experienced 1 4 1
reported emergency releases of toxic chemicals .  This is a n  average
of three per month and a 500% increase in the average number ofac­
cidental releases since 1993.  Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to
Legal Representation: The Attack on the Tulane EnvironmenJal Law
Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J .L. & PoL'Y (forthcoming 200 1 ) {manuscript at
n.26, on file with author) (citing May 26, 1998, letter from Tulane
Environmental Law Clinic to EPA Office of Civil Rights); see also 
Ed Timms, Racial Patrerns: Economics and Segregation Left Mi· 
nori/l'es Closer to Toxic Sites, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct.
3 , 2000, at A l ,  available at 2000 WL 28 1 1 1 045 (describing how ac­
cidental releases from refineries force residents in nearby public
housing to evacuati: or adopt "shelter in place" strategies, i.e., shut­
ting the doors and windows and "hop[ing) for the best'').
106. Some regulatiollS' may specifically preclude the consideration of de­
creased property valucs. ln such a case, the specific regu)ation would
override a default assumption that this factor is germane to the wel­
f'ure of communities impacted hy the permit.
Stil l  other statutory phrases-such as those directing the 
permitting authority to consider the "social costs" imposed 
as a result of the facility's location or processes�an be 
used to consider a wider range of factors, such as siting and 
exposure disparities 1
07 
and harm to cultural or religious 
practices (land-based Native American beliefs). No EAB 
cases, for example, have considered the nonattainment NSR 
provisions of the CAA in connection with an explicit envi­
ronmental justice chatlenge. 108 These provisions require
that "an analysis of alternative sites, sizes, production pro­
cesses, and environmental control techniques for such pro­
posed source demonstrates that benefits of the proposed 
source significantly outweigh the environmental and social
costs imposed as a result of its location, construction, or 
modification.'' 1 09 This phrase, particularly because it is cou-
1 07, In particuhn, these provisions would be helpful where evidence of 
risk disparity is difficult to obtain because ofscientific uncertainty or 
because of the lack of resources or information 10 conduct a 
risk-based analysis. 
108. Two recent cases that have discussed 1he alternatives annlrsis and
social cost criteria of nonattainment NSR arc an EAB decision in In
re Campo Landfi.11 Project, Campo Bank Indian Reservation, NSR
Appeal No. 95- 1 ,  6 E.A.B. 505, AoMIN. M.n. 40526 (June 19,
1996) (orderdenying review in part and remanding in part), and a Ti­
tle V case before the Administrator in In re Operating Perm.It Form­
aldehyde Plant Borden Chem., Inc. Geismar Ascension Parish, La.,
Petition 6-0 1 -J .  Pennit No. 263 l -VO (order responding to peti­
tioner' s request that lhe administrator object to the issuance of a state
operating permit) (on file with author). Although the Campo case in­
volved a Native American tribe and Borden involved a low income
area, in neither case was the al ternative and socio! cost criteria ex­
plicirJy tied to 11h environmental justice challenge. In In re Campo,
the petitioner claimed that an alternative site should have been cho­
sen because the landfil l  was situated over a sole-source aquifer. In re
Campo, at 520, AoMtN. MAT, at 40530. The EAB noted that there
were appropriate control measures to reduce the risk to insignificant
levels. Jd. at 524, AoMIN. MAT. at 4053 J .  The EAB also noted lhat
because part of the reason for the project was to develop and diver­
sify the economic base of the tribe, the use of non-tribal land was not
a viable altemotive. Id. at 523, ADMl'N. MAT. at 405 3 1 . In In re 
Borden, there was an apparent environmental justice challenge in
one count that was a Title V1 claim, which the Administrator appro­
priately declined to review it as it was under consideration by the
EPA Office of Civil Rights. /11 re Borckn. at 5 1 .  The contention th11t
the altema1ives/social cost analysis was insufficient did not appear
to rest upon the demographics of the community but upon more gen­
eral allegat ions that the environmental impacts outweighed lhe "so­
cial an(! economic benefit'' of the facility. Id. at 35. Thus, the Admin­
istrator reasoned that the process and control equipment met and al
times exceeded applicable requirements and impacts were mini­
mized or avoided as much as possib le. Id. at 39, More specifically,
the Administrator noted that NAAQS were met al the property line,
soil and groundwater were protected by impervious materials, the lo­
cation near Borden's primary customer would reduce transporta­
tion-related risk, there was low risk of off-site emissions, few resi­
dences nearby, and no schools, hospitals, estuaries, or historical, cul­
tural, or archeofogical sites in close proximity to the proposed plant
Id. at 40-43. In addition, six alternative shes were considered but re­
jected because they had insufficient space or would cause increased
potential impacts. Id. at 43-44. The Administrator used the socioeco­
nomic profile of the community to suppon the site-, noting that the
area was a desigm1ted enterprise zone and consl?Uction and opera­
tion of the plant would increase employment and tax revenue. Id. at
4 1 .  Althougb speculative at this poi.nt. the analysis might have dif­
fered if the petitioner had argued that a disparate impact (assuming
one existed) was itself a social cost to be weighed against the grant­
ing of a pennit. This would have made the existence of a racially dis­
parate impact relevant to a �nnit re<juiremcnt, but the case would
likely have resulted in denial of rev iew as the facts indicate that
off-site impacts were minimal.
109,  42 U.S.C. §7503(n)(5) ,  BLR STA.T. CAA § 1 73(a)(S) (emphasis 
added). The reference to social costs may allow the pemi.itting au­
thority to consider a wider range of impacts, including nonbealth im­
pacts. See, e.g. , Eileen Gauna, Major Sources of Criteria Pollutants 
in Nooorrainment Areas; Balancing the Goalt of Clean Air. Environ-
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pled with a reference to consideration of alternative sites 
and processes, provides ample authority to develop a sub­
stanti ve alternatives analysis and a more protective permit­
ting framework. Without more probing review, the Agency 
is left without judicial encouragement or support and, 
therefo re , many pe r m i t t i ng o ffi c ials cont inue to 
underutilize these important provisions. Testament to this 
observation is the fact that EPA has -yet to issue guidance on 
the nonattainment NSR alternatives analysis and social
cost criteria. 1 10 
The issue of deferential review, for a di fferent reason, is 
significant in considering the interplay between the environ­
mental statutes and the Civil Rights Act, specifically Title 
VI. State and local regulators often forcefully assert that al­
though they have obligations wider Title VI, they do not
have the authority to condition or deny permits on environ­
mental j ustice grounds if the permit applicant otherwise
meets all requirements of the applicable environmental stat­
ute. The BAB cases refute that central contention to some
degree, and this fact raises a host of other issues.
The Title VI Saga 
Because of the apparent reticence of environmental agen­
cies-at the local, state, regional, or federal levels-to con­
dition or deny permits on environmental justice grounds, 
community activists have instead turned to Title VI, a 
nonenvironmental statute, as a potential redress for long
standing racial disparities in environmental burdens. 1
1 1  
Title
mental Justice, and Industrial Development, 3 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J .  
ENYT'L, L. & PoL'Y 379 ( 1 996), In addi 1ion, 1he key phrase under the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) that 
grants the Administrator the authority to register pesticide use is that 
the pesticide wil l  not ha vc "unreasonable a dverse effects on the envi­
ronment," which in tum is defined to require the Administrator to 
consider the "economic, social and environmental costs and benefits 
of the use of any pesticide." 7 U.S.C. § I 36(bb), ELR STAT. FIFRA 
§2(bb) (emphasis added) . 
1 1 0, In re Bortkn, supra note 1 08, at 36. 
1 1 1 , For a discussion of legal doctrine, see Julie H. Hurwitz & E. Quita 
Sullivan, Using Civil Rights Laws to Challenge Environmental Rac­
ism, Frorn Bean to Guardians to Chester to Sandoval (unpublished 
manuscript on file wilh author) ; Bradford C. Mank, ls Thue a Pri­
vate Cause of Action Under EPA 's Title VJ Regulmior,s?; The Need 
10 Empower Envirotllrn!ntal Justice Plaintiffs, 24 Co LUM, J. ENVn... 
L. 1 ( 1999); Gilbert Paul C11m1sco, Public Wnmg.r, Private Rlghls:
Private Attorneys General/or Ci vil Rights, 9 VILL, ENVTL. L.J. 32 1
( 1 998) (private righl of  action under Title VI); Wesley D .  Few, The
Wake of DlscriminiJ/ory Intent and the Rise of Title VJ i n  Environ­
menial Justice Lawsuits, 6 S.C. ENVTL, L.J . 1 08 ( 1 997); Michael 
Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Titit VJ of the
Civil Rlghls Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285 ( 1995); James H. Colopy, Tht
Road Less Travtled; Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title
VI ofllu! Civil Rights Act of 1 964, 1 3  STAN , ENvrL. L.J , 125 ( 1 994); 
Lazarus, supra note 9. Ste al.ro Bradford C. Mank. The Draft Title VJ
Recipient and Revised Investigation Guidances; Too Much Dlscre­
rion for EPA and a More Difficult Srandardfor Complainants? 30 
ELR 1 1 144 (Dec. 2000); Bradford C. MIIJlk, Reforming Stale
Brow,lfield Programs to Comply With Title VI, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1 1 5 ( 2000); Luke Cole, " Wrong on tht Facts, Wrong on the
Law ": Civil Rights Advocates Excoriate EPA 's Mos1 Recent Tirle VI
Misstep, 29 ELR 1 0775 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter Wrong on the
Facts]; C. S ilverman, EPA 's lnierim Guidance for Investigating Ti­
tle VI ComplainJs Cl,aflenging Permits: The Bumpy Road Toward a
Federal Environmental-Civil Rights Policy, 6 ENvrL. L. 35 ( 1999); 
NATIONAL ADVlSORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY & 
1'EClfNOLOGY1 REPORT OF l'H£ TITLE Vl 1MPLEM£NTATION ADVI­
SORY COMMITTEE! NE.Xl' STEPS FOR E p A, STA TB, ANO LocA L ENVl· 
RONMENTAL Jusncs PltOORAMS ( 1 999) [hereinafter Tll'LE VI 
FACA REPORTl ; June M. Lyle, Reactions to EPA 's Interim Guid·
ance.• Tiu! Growing Battle for Control Over Environmental Justice 
VI, f
irst enacted in 1 964, was i nterpreted in 1983 by the U.S. 
Supreme Col.lrt to give federal agencies the authority to pro­
mulgate regulations precluding recipients of federal funds 
from engaging in activities that have a discriminatory "ef­
fect, 
" 1 1 2  i .e., regulations that prohibit disparate impacts
rather than regulations prohibiting only intentional discrim­
ination. Following the practice of many federal agencies. in 
1 973, EPA first promulgated regulations aimed at alleviat­
ing discriminatory effects. 1 1 3 The most recent iteration spe­
cifically provides in part that "[a] recipient shall not use cri­
teria or methods of administering its program which have 
the effect of subjectin2 individuals to discrimination be­
cause of their race." 1 1.r 
However, it was not until almost 20 years later, in Sep­
tember 1 993 , that EPA saw the beginning of a steady stream 
of administrative complaints alleging Title VI violations by
state and local environmental agencies. 
1 1 5 Most of the com­
plaints involved the permitting process 1 1 6  and consequently 
raised the perplexing issues that are discussed later in this
Article. At that time, the EPA Office of Ci vii Rights ba,d nei­
ther the resources nor the analytical framework to begin the 
task of investigating and deciding the claims. ln 1 996, the 
continuing institutional paralysis prompted activists to 
write a letter to EPA Administrator Carol Browner about the 
lack of action on the pending complaints. 1 17 Although EPA
Decisionmaking, 75 IND. L.J. 687 (2000); Bradford C. Mank, Envi­
ronmental Justice and Title VJ; Making Recipient Agencies Justify 
Tlu!ir Siting Decisions, 73 Tu1.,. L. REV. 787 ( 1999); Michael D. 
Mattheisen, The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's New En­
vironmental Civil Rig his Policy, 1 8  VA. ENYfL, L.J .  1 83 ( 1 999) : 
Kristen L Raney, Thi! Role of Title VJ in Chester Residents v. Seif: Is 
tlu! Future of Environflli!ntal Justice Really Brighter?, 1 4  J. NAT. 
RESOURCES & E111vrL. L. 1 35 ( 1998- 1 999); Maura Lynn Tierney. 
Environrru:ntal Justice and Title VJ Challenger to Permit Decisions:
Thi! EPA 's Interim Guidance, 48 CAn-t. U. L. R.Ev. 1 277 ( 1999); 
J immy White, Environmental Ju.rtfce: ls Disparatt Impact
Enough ?, 50 MERCER L. R1,v. I J 55 ( 1 999); Richard Monette, Envi­
ronmental Justice and Indian Tribes; The Double-Edged Tomahawk
of Applying Civil Right.r Laws in Indian Country, 76 U. DET. MERCY 
L. Rev. 72 1 ( 1 999); Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Jus­
tice, and tlu! EPA: The Brief History of Adminfstratiw Complaints
Under Title VI ofthi! Civil Rights Act of / 964, 9 J. ENvrL. L. & Lmo. 
3()1) ( 1994), 
1 1 2. Guardians Ass ' n  v. Civil Serv. Comm' n of lhe City of N.Y., 463 
U.S . 582, 584, 593 ( 1 983). 
1 1 3. 38 Fed. Reg. 1 7968, 1 7969 (July S ,  1 973): see also 46 Fed. Reg. 
2306 (Jan. 8, 1 9 8 1 ) and Nondiscrimination in Programs Receiving 
Federal Assistance From lhe Environmental Protection Agency, 49 
Fed. Reg. 1 659 (Jan. 1 2, 1 984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 7). 
1 14 .  Nondiscrimination in Programs Receiving Federal Assistance From 
the Environmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 .3S(b) (2000). 
See also 40 C.F.R, pt .  7.35(c) (2000) (providing that "[al recipient 
shall not choose a site or location of a facility that has the purpose or 
effect . . .  of . . .  subjecting [individuals] lo discrimination under any 
program . . . on the grounds of race . . . .  "). However thi provision is 
001 gencralJy, appllcable in the permitting context as most recipients
(state environmental agencies that have been delegated permitting
authority), do not choose the site. Generally the site has \>ten chosen 
by the project sponsor before the pennit application is submitte-d. 
1 1 5 .  Wrong on the Facts, supra nolt 1 1 1 , at 1 0775. 
1 16. When the lnttrim Guidance was re1eased, 14 of the 1 8  complaints 
under invest igation involved pennitting. Enviro111tU11jla/ Justice:
Browner Defends Release of Interim Policy 011 Processing of Civil
Righls Comp/alms, 29 Env' t Rep. (BNA) 233 (May 22, 1 998) (com­
ments of Administrator Browner to Title VI FACA Subcommittee). 
In May 2000, Anne Goode, director of the EPA Office- of Civil 
Rights, noted that thrce-'luarters of the complaints received involve
pennltting. Title VJ Guidance Offers Predictability, Community
Protection, Goode Say.r, 3 1  Souo WASTE R1,P. , 2000 WL
1 2746197 (June 29, 2000). 
1 1 7 . Wrong on thi! Facts, supra note 1 1 1 . at I 0775. 
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committed to actively investigate at least five of the pending 
cases, the next item to come from the Office of Civil Rights 
was not until February 1 998; it was not a ruling on any in­
vestigation but rather an 1 1 -page docwnent ti tied Interim
Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Com­
plaints Challenging Pem1its (Interim Guidance). 1 1 8  The In­
terim Guidance sparked a firestorm of criticism. Environ­
mental justice activists' tentative endorsement of EPA's ef­
fort as "an important first step" 1 1 9 was undoubtedly wel­
comed by the Agency when compared to the stinging criti­
cisms coming from the indus!r)'/bus iness sector and
state/local regulatory agencies. 120 Many of these stake­
holders felt the Interim Guidance left too many unanswered 
questions and complained that the ensuing uncertainty
destabilized ex isting permit programs. 121 
Apparently in response to the strong criticism, in April 
1 998, EPA established the multi-stakeholder Ti tle VI Imple­
mentation Advisory Committee formed wider the federal 
Advisory Committee Act (Title VJ FACA). 1 22 The commit­
tee cone! uded its mission in March 1 999, submitting its re·
port to EPA. 1 23 Al though the mission of the Title VI FACA
was to help EPA provide guidance to state agencies on how 
to comply with Title VI, the discussions inevitably clustered 
arowid the questions left unanswered by the Interim Guid­
ance and, consequently, led to a variety of plausible inter·
pretations of a cognizable c laim under Title VI. 1 24 Given the
diversity of stakeholders and their significant differences on 
fundamental questions, it is not surprising that the commit­
tee did not achieve consensus on the majority of issues, with 
possibly two important exceptions. First, the committee
agreed on a set of overarching principles . 1 25  Second, the
committee menibers agreed that it was more important to 
explore the complexities of the issues rather than to achieve 
a series of ''i nnocuous, watered-down" recommend�
tions. 1 26 In addition to several procedural issues, the com­
mittee identified eight crucial substantive issues that EPA 
needed to address. 
The issues identified lead to the very point where, in a 
manner of speaking, the rubber meets the road. How the 
Agency would address these questions would more accu­
rately reveal EPA's environmental justice policy than its
public statements, and perhaps in a less direct way provide 
insight as to its institutional ability to address competing 
1 18.  U.S. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR lNVESl1GATING TITL6 Vl Ao. 
MINISTRA� CoMPLAINTii CHALLENGING PERMrn ( 1998) (avail­
able from lhe ELR Document Service, ELR Order No. AD-3660) 
[hereinafter lNTERJM GUIDANCE]. 
1 19. Leiter from 44 Signatories (representing a coalition of grass-roots 
activists, community groups, environmental justice networks and re­
source centers, church and labor leaders, attorneys, and academios) 
IO Anne E. Goode, Director. commenting on the Interim Guidance,
at 2 (May 5, 1 998) (on file wilh aulhor), 
1 20. TITLE VJ FACA REPORT, supra note I 1 1 , at 3.
1 2 1 . Id. at 4-5. 
1 22, The author was a member of the Title VI implemenmtion subcom­
mittee appointed as a member of the academia stakeholder group. 
Other stakeholder groups included industry, nongovernmental orga­
niZlltions, and state/local governments. See NACEPT FEDERAL Ao­
VlSORY COMMITlll,E, SUMMARY OF l1{E TITLE VJ IMPLEMENTATION
ADVISORY CoMMITTBEMEETING (MAY 18- 19, 1998) (the list of par­
ticipants of this initial meeting is at the end of the summary). 
1 23. TITLE VJ FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 .  
1 24. Id. a t  3 
125, Id, at l l - 13 .  
l26. Id. at 10-1 1 . 
fairness claims. The Agency did respond in June 2000, 
with a 1 47-page draft revised guidance contai ning its own 
internal guidance for investigating Title VI administrative 
complaints as well as external guidance for EPA fund re­
cipients (Draft Title VI Guidance) . 1 27 By focusing on (a) 
the questions posed by the Conunittee, and (b) how these 
questions were answered or left unanswered under the 
Draft Title VI Guidance, the reader may gain a better ap­
preciation of the issues in this politically difficult and tech­
nica l ly complex area. 
Defining and Evaluating Adverse Effects 
The first substantive issue presented by the committee was 
the difficulty in defining and evaluating effects. 1 28 At its 
most narrow, an adverse effect could be construed to mean
adverse health effects 1 29 directly caused by the permitted re­
leases only. 1 30 A more expansive interpretation of adverse 
effects would i nclude not only the newly permitted releases, 
but those changes to the community's well-being that are re­
lated to the permit at issue, 1 3 1  in light of the aggregate
sources of pollutants and other adverse impacts existing a t  
the time the permit is under consideration. This could poten­
tially incl ude not only the cumulative risks posed by all per­
mitted releases, but their possible synergistic effects as 
wel l .  1 3 2  Also included would be al l foreseeable adverse im· 
pacts that may befall the community as a result of the per­
mitted operations . These facility-related (rather than solely 
emission-related) impacts could incl ude increased traffic, 
odors, and noise. Often, community residents are as con­
cerned with these immediate impacts on their daily l ives as 
they are with the potential ly latent effects of permitted re­
leases. Lastly, the scope ofimpacts recognized under a more 
expansive interpretation could include other "environmen­
tal, economic, cultural, social ,  or psychological harm[s],'' 
for example, damage to a si te that is sacred to a Native 
American tribe or others with land-based bel ief systems, or 
plummeting residential land values, or even prostitution ac­
tivities encroaching upon residential nei�hborhoods that 
would not have occurred but for the facil ity. 33 Clearly, com-
1 27. U.S. EPA, Draft Tille VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients 
Ad:m.in.istcring Environmental Permitting Programs (Draft Recipi­
ent Guidance) and Draft Revised Guidance for 1nves1iga1ing Title VI 
Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits (Draft Revised ln­
vesligation Guidance), 65 Fed. Reg. 39650 (June 27, 2000) (avail­
able from the ELR Document Service, ELR Order Nos. AD-45 1 7  
(Draft Recipient Guidance) and AD-45 16  (Draft Revised Invest iga­
tion Guidance)) [hereinafter Draft Thie VI Guidance]. 
1 28. TrrLe VJ FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 , at 57-65. 
1 29. Bodily impairment. infirmity, i l ln ess, or death. Id. al 58. 
1 30. Id. at 57. In  !Ilf!nl oflhe d iscussions the Agency uses the t.erm "emis­s ions'' instelld o "releases." This is because many of the perm.ii dis­
putes under consideration involve air perm.its. However, releases 
could include rhe addition of pollulants into the water (effluent) or 
releases of pollulants into lhe land by underground injection. !lfot­
withst.anding the more broadly applicable ierm, because mosl of the 
examples in this Article involve air permits, the iernt "emissions" is 
often used interchangeably with "releases." 
1 3 1 .  Id. 
1 32 .  Id. at 60. 
1 33 . In Chesler, Pennsylvania, forexamplc, prostitutes began to frequent 
the: area to solicit the uuckdrivers who were waiting to unload truck­
loads of conraminat.ed soils. Testimony of Zulene Mayfield Before 
the NEJAC Committee, Transcript. In the Matter of the Fourteenth 
Meeting of lhe NEJAC, vol l ,  pp. 1 -7 1 ,  1 ·72 (Nov. 30, 1 999); see
also Tri'LE VJ F ACA REPORT, supra note 1 1  l, at 60; LOKR W. 
CoLE ,I< SHEJLA R FOSTER, FROM THE GIIOUl'iD UP, ENVIRONMEN· 
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munity residents see the permit as the gateway to a wide 
range of undesirable impacts and. additionally, to the atten­
dant risks of accidents at Ute faci l ity and/or chronic noncom­
pliance. Given the difference between a narrow view of the 
meaning of "adverse effects" and the more expansive view, 
it is little wonder that this issue occupied hours of vigorous
disagreement among the committee members. 1 34  
EPA attempted to resolve this contentious issue under the 
subsequently issued Draft Tit/e VJ Guidance. Aliliough it is 
somewhat unclear, the Draft Title VJ Guidance appears to 
limit the types of recognized adverse effects to health im­
pacts. 1 35 First. the guidance explains that in assessing 
whether an adverse impact exists, background sources of 
stressors may be considered. 1 36 The definition of "stressor''
in the glossary oftenns includes "any substance introduced 
into the environment that adverselr affects the health of hu­
mans animals, or ecosystems." 1 3  Although noise, odors, 
and increased traffic are not always "introduced into the en­
vironment" by the permittee in the literal sense, the defini­
tion specifically lists "noise'' as a factor that may adversely 
affect a receptor. 1 38 Thus, to a l imited degree EPA intends to 
consider a range of cumulative impacts that affect health. To 
this baseline, the facility's impacts are added. However, it is 
less clear whether the Agency will consider facility-related 
impacts that are not emission- related impacts. Equally sur­
prising is that the guidance does not explicitly address 
whether nonhealth-related impacts can be the basis of a 
claim, as it focuses exclusively on health-related impacts. 
The only clue lies in an oblique reference in an appendix ti­
tled "Summary of Key Stakeholder Issues Concerning EPA 
Ti tle VI Guidance." In that section, which appears to be a 
general response to corrunents, the Agency notes that nei­
ther the Interim Guidance nor the Draft Title VJ Guidance
"require[ ] recipients to address social and economic issues 
that they are not authorized to address."139 As omnibus
TAL RACISM AND THE RISE 01' THE ENVIRONM ENTAL JUSTICE 
MOVEMENT (2000) (describing the Chester residents' campaign) 
1 34.  See supra note 1 22 (the author was a member of the Title VI 
FACA Committee) . 
1 35 .  Toe glossary definition of "impact" s tales: 
In the health and environmental context, a negative or harm· 
fol effect on n receptor resulting from exposure to a stressor 
(e.g., a case of disease). The likelihood of occwrence and se­
verity of the impact may depend on the mngnitude and fre­
quency of exposure, and other factors affecting toxicity and 
receptor sensitiv i ty. 
Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39666. 
1 36. However, in determining whether there is a violation, only "sources 
of s1ressors (e.g., facilities), stressors (e.g . • chemical or pathogens), 
and/or impacts (e.g., risk of disease)" Within the recipient 's authority 
wil l  be considered. Id, at 39670. This latter significant limitation on a 
Ti lle V1 claim is related to another substantive question and will be 
discussed in greater detail. See infra notes 1 59-64 and accompany­
ing text . 
1 37 .  The complete definition is: Any factor that may adversely affect re­
ceptors, including chemical (e.g .. criteria pollutants, toxic contami­
nants), physical (e.g., noise, extreme temperatures, fire) and biologi· 
,cal (e .g., disease pathogens or parasites). Generally, any substance 
introduced into the environment that adversely affects the health of 
human.s ,  animals, or ecosystems. Airborne stressors may fall into 
1wo main groups: (a) those emitted directly from identifiable sources 
and (b) those produced in the air by interaction between chemicals 
(e.g., most ozone). Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39666 
138. Id. 
1 39. Draft Title VI  Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 3969 1 .  Although per­
haps intended lo signal EPA 's  policy position, it nevertheless begs
the question, Laz.arus and Tai have made a convincing case that there
clauses may allow such considerations, the ambiguity re­
maining in the Draft Title VJ Guidance wiili respect to defin­
ing adverse impacts is surprising given the repeatedly artic­
ulated importance of this issue to all stakeholders. 
A question related to evaluating an adverse impact is the 
type of proof that may be required to establish a violation 
under complaints grounded on allegations of adverse health
effects. 140 The adverse effect might be established only by a
strict test of causation similar to tests developed in toxic tort
cases. 1 4 1  This standard would probably require epidemio­
logical studies demonstrating the presence of actual harm, 
and other evidence would need to be submitted to show an 
exposure pathway and the causal l ink between the demon­
strated harm and the permitted activities. An adverse impact
could also be established by evidence of differential risk. 1 42
This standard would account for the potential latent effects 
of exposure to toxic chemicals but would l ikely re11:iuire the 
use of comparative quantitative risk assessments. 1 Given 
the number of complaints pending and the limited resources 
available to investigate the complaints, such a complicated 
and resource-intensive analysis does not seem feasible. 144
An alternative test would be to infer an adverse effect based
on elevated levels of poll utan ts in the impacted area. 145 The
latter is a test essentia11y using differential exposure as an 
evidentiary surrogate for differential risk. 
Before EPA addressed this issue in the Draft Title VJ
Guidance, it used a differential exposure test-or what it 
termed a "relative burden analysis"-in Ute Shintech case . 
The S hintech case involved a controversial Title Vl admin­
istrative complaint that was under investigation at the time 
of the committee deliberations, but the claim based upon the 
permit was mooted when the permit appl ication was subse­
quently withdrawn. 146 This investigation was the Agency's
first attempt to evaluate an alleged adverse impact. After 
this portion of the investigation was closed, EPA requested 
that the Science Advisory Board (SAB) review the method­
ology the Agency had used. 147 The SAB in its report ob-
is considerable authority within the environmental statutes to ad· 
dress a potentially wide range of impacis that raise environmental 
justice concerns. See Lazarus & Tai, supra note 38, at 6 1 9, 668; see
also Gauna, supra note 109, at 392-95 (social cost criterion). 
1 40. Some compl a i n l s  a l lege d i scri m inat ion in public partic i pa­
t ion opportu n i t ie s .  
14 1 . TITLE VI FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 , a t  58.
1 42 .  Id. at 59 (industry stakeholders rejecting "'circumstantial" evi­
dence of a causal link in favor of risk assessments an epidemio­
logical evidence). 
143. In order to prove that the risk at issue is greater than risks posed to 
other communities that are predominately white or higher income,
several risk assessments may have to be prepared and compared. In
addi t ion, risk assessments in the permit context can be unrelioble in­
dicators of risk. See Ashley C. Schannauer, Science and Policy in 
Risk Assessmenl: TIU! Need for Effective Public Participation, 24 
VT. L. Rev. 3 1  ( 1 999).
1 44. See, e.g. , 0RAfT REV1SED DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMA"l10N REGARD­
ING Lou1slANA DEPAR TMENT OF ENVIRONMEl'ITAL 0UALJTYIPER­
M.TT FOR PROPOSED SHINTECH FACILITY, Tln.E VJ AoMJNJSTRA11VE 
COMPLAINT (1998) (describing in vestigation findings using an rela­
tive burden analysis); see also infra note 1 46  (crit ique of methodol· 
ogy used in Shinrech case by Science Advisory Board (SAB) and 
proposing a more complicated methodology). 
145. Draft Title Vl Guidance, supra note 127, at 3966 1 .
146. I n  addition 10 a claim of disparate impact premised upon !h e  granting 
of a permit, the Shintech case also alleged a paUern and practice of 
racial discrimination; the pattern and practice case is stiU pending.
141. SAB, Al'! SAB REPORT! REVIEW OF DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT
ME'l'HODOLOGIES ( 1988) [hereinafter SAB REPORT], 
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jected not only to the descriptive phrase ••relative burden" 
but advised EPA that the consideration of differential expo­
sure was too limited because de minim.is risk could not be
considered in such an analysis. 1
48 
However, the SAB also
identified significant problems with a risk-based analysis as 
well,  noting that both methodologies would tend to underes­
timate risks; 
1 49 
Ultimately, the Draft Title VI Guidance reveals that the 
Agency has endorsed a differential risk standard by its intent 
to use risk values as benchmarks for adverse impacts, adopt· 
ing an acceptable cancer risk of less than one in one million 
and an acceptable non-cancer risk of less than one on the
hazard index . 1 5 0  These ri sks are considered "not ad­
verse,"although risks above these levels are not necessarily
presumed to be adverse. 1 51  However, in also indicating i ts
148. Id. at 2.
1 49.  In discussing both an enhanced relative burden analysis (ERBA)
that takes into account dispersion of pollutants, and a risk-based 
analysis tenned Cumulative Outdoor Air Toxics Concentration 
Exposure Methodology (COATCEM) (dispersion model analyz­
ing ou1door concentrations of hazardous air pollutants), id. at 7, the 
SAB noted that: 
[t]hey do not take into account short-term excursions from 
steady state levels. As a result there could be acute exposures
that may be significandy higher than the calculated steady
state levels. Neither ERBA nor COATCEM evaluate deposi­
tion transfers to otherenvironmental media of emitted chemi­
cals or subsequent reemission of these chemicals. In addition,
both methodologies assume that all emitted chemicals dis­
perse in the same manner. They do not take into account that
some emitted chemicals are stable while others are reactive.
In addition, they do not address the fact  thatcenain chemicals
are released in the vapor phase, while others arc associa1ed
with particles.
Jd. al 17 .  The SAB also noted serious limitations where the method­
ologies did not consideror evaluate acute intermittent exposures, the 
length of residence: of persons with 1he census blocks, and their activ­
ity patterns, as well as limitations due to the fact that input data from 
the TR1 was self-reported and based upon estimates. Id. Neither take 
into account exposures from drinking water, soil, or food chain path· 
ways due to air emissions. Id. at 1 6. 
In order to address the limitations of the methodology, the SAB 
recommended that EPA conduct a sequenced analysl5 that would be­
gin with a site-specific analysis of exposure using the Basic Relative 
Burden Analysis (annualized emissions from TRI data) to identify 
the chemicals upon which to focus, or more optimally an Enhanced 
Relative Burden Analysis (including dispersion modeling) to iden­
tify toxicity-weighted exposures. After this basic toxicity-weighted 
exposure analy.sis, EPA could supplement it With the use of risk as­
sessments of the chemicals or c lasses of chemicals of concern . The 
COATCEM methodology had promise in this regard, bl.It the SAB 
cautioned that an uncenainty and sensitivity analysis had to be pcr­
fonned for each methodology. 1ben an impa.cl would be considered 
' 'significant" if the calculated risks were both above the de minimis 
level and the toxicity weighted exposure ratios were larger then the 
uncertainty factors. Finally, the findings should be val idated with 
site-specific ambient monitoring data. 
Two things stand In marked contrast in lhe SAB report. First is that 
the methodologies used and proposed by EPA have significant limi· 
tations that would be expected to underestimate risk. Id. at 25. 29. ln 
addlt.ion, the SAB appears lo suggest that the exposure ratios have to 
be larger than the uncertainty factors, thus making uncertainty pre­
clude a finding of significant risk. This would mean that use of the 
methodology proposed by the SAB would systematically work 
against impacted communities, even though the SAB specifically 
noted that whether an identified disparity is substantial and whether 
the impact is at or above a level of concern are policy issues. Id. at 6. 
150. Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 127, at 39680.
IS i .
OCR may mm a finding in  instances where cumulative risk 
Jewels fall in the rang� of 1 in I mllliop ( I  0-6) to l in 1 0,000 
intent to consider "toxicity-weighted emissions"m and
"concentration levels,"
1 53 the Agency does appear to retain
the option to rely solely upon differential exposure to deter­
mine whether an impact is adveIBe in some instances. 
In decl ining to adopt the common-law causation standard 
and in failing to adopt or reject the more expansive defini­
tion of "adverse impact," EPA appears to be a.dhering to a 
version of risk-based analytical methodology that supports 
most rulemaking proceedings and other regulatory func­
tions. It remains to be seen. however, how practical this evi­
dentiary standard may be in case-by-case adjudications of 
Title VI claims, which are likely to increase in number given 
the continuing perception that federal and state initiatives 
-promote measures that are industry friendly at the expense
of the heavily impacted communities. 
154 The Agency's re·
fusal to take an explicit stand on other facility-related im· 
pacts, in particular nonhealth-related impacts, is telling. In­
stitutionally, EPA has long been hesitant to venture too
deeply into the realm of the social sciences, 155 preferring in­
stead the more precise world of engineering and the hard
sciences. 1
56 This hesitancy has come at a price, as the
Agency has been criticized for not tackling the more diffi­
cult socioeconomic questions and turning a blind-eye to the
real world in which environmental laws are enforced. 157 The 
guidance did little to dispel this criticism. Although expand­
ing the stakeholder process to include environmental justice 
activists and residents from impacted communities, the 
Agency 's corresponding retreat from an analysis that 
would require consideration of their social, cultural, po­
litical , and economic realities has left participants feeling 
that they have wasted their time. 158 This unfortunate re­
sul t might impair the Agency's abili ty to engage in out­
reach i n  subsequent issues where stakeholder participa­
tion is indispensable. 
Id. 
( lO°i. OCR would be more likely to issue an adversity find­
ing for Title VI purposes where the cumulative cancer risk in 
the affected area was above I in 1 0,000 (values above l can· 
not be represented as a probabil ity of developing disease or 
other effect 0,.) . . . .
152. Id, at 39679.
1 53 . Id. 
1 54. See generally CBE et al. Tier 2 Comments, infra note 304. 
1 55 . When lhe issue of environmental racism first surfaced nationally,
then-Administrator William K. Reilly cook the position that a gov­
ernmental agency is l imited in its capacity to affect larger cultural
and social trends, and that the failure to achieve equitable environ­
mental protection was a symptom of a larger pattern of industrial 
growth and the legacy of inherited poverty and discrimination. See
William K. Reilly, Environmental Equity: EPA 'r Position, EPA J .•
MarJApr. 1 992, at 1 9-22. In the 1992 Workgroup Report, Agency
staff noted that the exis tence of injustices and socioe.conomic factors
was beyond the sco�of the report as EPA could act upon inequities 
based only on scientific data. Sul'PORTING Docm.rnNT, s11pra note 9,
at 2-3.
156. Id. 
157. See The Draft Civil Rights Guidance: The Comrover.y ConJinues,
ENvn., F., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 46. 5 1  (interview with Thomas J. 
Henderson, Deputy Director of Litigation, Lawyer.i' Committee for
Civil Rights, who criticizes "EPA's continuing reticence to accept
its responsibil i ties beyond the comfort of scientific and technical
considerations"); see also Gauna. supra note 1 5 ,  at  3 1 .
158. See L etter to Carol Browner and Anne Goode, fro m  Center for Race, 
Poverty and the Environment and Other Environmental Justice Or­
ganizations and Individuals (Aug, 26, 2000) (on file with author)
(concerning the Draft Title VI Guidance) [hereinafter EJ Activists 
Title VI Comments).
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Identifying the Community of Concern 
Another question posed by the committee and answered by 
the Draft Title VI Guidance concerned the method ofidenti­
fying the affected community. This of course is dependent to 
a large degree on the types ofimpacts that will be considered 
in the first instance. Although the committee assumed that 
the baseline or comparison population would likely be com­
prised of the jurisdiction of the recipient (typically the
state), H9 the Draft Title VJ Guidance was more detailed.
EPA affirmed in the guidance that the reference area would 
be the recipient's jurisdiction under the relevant environ­
mental statute. 1 60 However, the comparison population 
would apparently depend on the allegations of the case and 
could include either the general population of the reference 
area or only the non-affected portion of the reference 
area. 1 6 1  I n  other words, one can compare th e  affected popu­
lation w ith the general popul ation (defined by the 
Agency's jurisdiction). Alternatively, one can compare the 
affected population with the unaffected population within 
the general population of the recipient agency's jurisdic­
tion, or the most likely affected with the least likely af­
fected (by percentage), or even the statistical prob a bi Ii ty of 
certain demogra8hic groups within an affected population 
being affected. 1 
Determining the "affected" population rather than the 
comparison population was more problematic to some com­
mittee members. Some favored the use of monitoring data 
and computer modeling to determine the communities 
within the facility's exposure pathway. Environmental jus­
tice advocates were more skeptical of this method because 
of their view that monitor placement is generally Inade­
quate or nonexistent in many environmental j ustice com­
munities. 163 In the Draft Title VJ Guidance, EPA endorsed
and preferred the use of monitoring data and modeled anal­
ysis, but it recognized that the more simple proximity ap­
proach may be used where more detailed estimates cannot
be developed. 1 64
Determining the Degree of Disparity 
The third substantive issue concerns how to determine the 
degree of disparity that is required to establish a violation. 
The conunittee discussed alternative descriptive measure­
ments, such as "significant disparity," "substantial disparity," 
"above generally accepted nonns," "appreciably exceeding 
the risk to (or the rate in) the general population," or "any 
measurable disparity."16 A statistical approach using two
standard deviations or higher was discussed. 166 Some ob­
jected because of a perceived lack of connection between the 
statistical correlation and the actions of the facility at issue, 
others because the approach fai led to account for communi­
ties that may be particularly vulnerable, for example, a com­
munity experiencing abnormally high rates of asthma. 167 
159. TITLE VJ FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 , at 67-68.
1 60. Draft Tit le Vl Gl,jdance, supra note 127, at 39666.
1 6 1 . Id. at 3968 l .
162, Id. 
163 , TrrLE YI FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 ,  at 65-66,
1 64. Draft Title V1 Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39679.
J 65 . TrrLE YI FACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 ,  at 7 1 .
1 66. Id. at 69.
167. id. at 70.
U l timately, EPA adopted a hybrid approach.  First, 
'[m]easures of the demographic disparity between an af­
fected population and a comparison population would nor­
mally be statistically evaluated to determine whether the 
differences achieved statistical significance to at least 2 to 3 
standard deviations." 168 The Agency will then in  some man­
ner account for uncertainties such as population shifts, accu­
racy of predicted risk levels, population size, demographic 
composition of a general comparison population, and the 
proportion of the affected area within the recipient agency's 
iurisdiction. 169 After a "dernogra-phic dis-parity" is exam­
ined, the Agency will tum to examine the disparity in im­
pact, considering other factors such as the level of adverse 
impact, its severity, and the frequency of occurrence. 1 70 In 
one final balancing act, EPA will weigh the demographic 
disparity against the disparity of impact and make a final de­
termination whether the overall degree of disparity is
enough to support a claim. 1 7 1 The Draft ntle VJ Guidance
cautions that there is no fixed formula or analysis to be ap­
plied and no single factor is applicable in all cases. 172
This convoluted approach is apparently designed to give 
the Agency wide latitude to address complicated situations, 
such as where the disparity of impact is large but tbe dispar­
ity in demographics is relatively slight 173 or vice versa. 174
Other demographic complications may arise, for example, 
where one ethnic minority is disparately impacted within 
the context of a general population having a relatively high 
percentage of a combination of ethnic minorities, such as 
where an African-American community is disparately im­
pacted within an air shed that has a 90% ethnic minority 
population overa11 (African American, Hispanic, Native 
American, and Asian combined). rn 
Although it is understandable why the Agency would 
want to retain this flexibility, it provides little guidance and, 
therefore, little predictability as to how the various factors 
1 68. Draft Title VJ Guidance, supra note 1 27 ,  at 39682 (emphasis  
in origina l ) .  
1 69. Id. 
1 70. Id.
1 7 1 .  Id.
1 72. Id.
1 73. Providing this very scenario, the Draft Title VI Guidance states: "For 
jnstance where a large disparity (e.g., a factor of JO times higher) ex­
is ts with regard to a s ignificant adverse impact, OCR might find dis­
parate impact even though the demographic disparity is relatively 
slight (e.g. , under 20%)." Id, 
174. The Agency did not address this situation, which may present a more
difficult case. This would typically occur in a situation where the ad­
verse impact is slightly above a cognizable threshold of adversity, 
but the white population is affected just below that threshold, the dis­
parity in impact would be slight. 
1 75. 
Jd. 
For example, state populations may .be U5ed as a basis for 
comparison with the affected population. Recent data show 
that the proportion of total 'minority' populations (defined as 
other than white races together with white Hispanics) range 
from about 4% to 50% of various state populations. In light of 
that variance,, the adoption of a single level of disparity, such 
as a factor of 2, as the only indicator of significance, would 
lead 10 highly inconsistent results. If a complaint alleged dis­
crimination against minorities, as defined above. in some 
states, a significant disparity would be presumed to exist if 
less than 1 0% of an affected population were minority, 
whereas in other states, the percentage would have to tcach 
100%. 
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wi ll be weighted. For example, if the demographic disparity 
is relatively low but the community is experiencing elevated 
blood lead levels (and therefore a larger disparity in impact), 
would this constitute a disparately impacted community? 
Conversely, if a community in an air shed is experiencing a 
hot spot due in part because of the permitted releases, but 
other communities are similarly exposed to higher than nor­
mal levels of pollutants because of their proximity to traffic 
corridors, is the first community disparately impacted?
1 76 
To determine whether the first, second, or both disparities 
count necessarily involves an examination as to the cause of 
the disparities. This in tum may potentially involve EPA in 
an examination of environmental protection not in isolation, 
but in the context of a range of considerations common to 
the social sciences-such as exclusionary zoning practices, 
white flight in residential patterns, or inadequate access to 
public services-as well as the recipient agency's role in ex­
acerbating these existing conditions by continuing to issue 
permits in overburdened communities. 
The Role of Existing Environmental Standards 
Industry representatives and some state regulators are 
strong adherents of the view that if a pennit applicant com­
plies with all applicable requirements under the relevant en­
vironmental standards, there can be no violation of Title 
VI. 1 n The logic supporting th.is position is that environmen­
tal laws are designed to--and in fact do-accomplish an ad­
equate level of protection for all members of society; thus, 
just because environmental burdens and benefits are not dis­
tributed even1y does not constitute illegal discrimination. 
During the committee deliberations, EPA ruled on a Title VI 
administrative case that appeared to support this view. In 
what came to be called the Select Stee/17  case, the EPA Of­
fice of Civi l Rights dismissed a Title VI complaint involving 
a PSD pennit on the rationale that there was no adverse im­
pact because the air shed was in compliance with NAAQS. 
Apparently a bit wary that too much might be read into the 
Select Steel decision, EPA was quick to point out in  the 
guidance that compliance with environmental laws did not 
constitute per se compliance with Title VI. 1 79 Instead, com­
pliance with a health-based standard would raise a presump­
tion that the impact, however disparate
ll 
was not adverse, a 
preswnption that could be overcome. 1 0 
Environmental justice representatives were adamantly 
opposed to using health-based standards in this manner and 
criticized the rationale during the committee deliberations 
and also in response to the Draft 1itle VJ Guidance. Such 
standards, they argued, were often insufficiently protective 
to begin with, had not been fully implemented, and did not 
take into account the particular vulnerabilities of a commu­
nity. 18 1  Moreover, the health-based ambient standards
1 76. The problem may be panicularly difficult where there arc several
disparately impacted communities within the recipient agency's ju­
risdiction, but the problem is not severe enough to establish a claim
based on a paltem and practice of discrimination. 
1 77. Tm.E VJ F ACA REPORT, supra note 1 1 1 , at 72.
l 78. St. Francis Prayer Cir. v. Michigan Dep' t ofEnvtl. Quality, EPA File
No. SR-98-R5 (Select Steel).
1 79. Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39680.
1 80. l<L 
1 8 1 . TITLE VI FACA REPOXT, supra note 1 1 1 ,  at 72� see also EJ Activ­
ist.� Title VI Comments, supra note 158,  at 50-SS ; Letter to Carol 
tended to cover large geographical regions (like an air shed); 
thus, while the geographical area might comply with the 
standards overall, toxic bot spots could well occur within
those areas. 182 The fact that such a presumption is rebuttable
would be oflittle benefit to communities within the hot spot, 
as inadequate monitor placement (perhaps itself the result of 
discriminatory practices, unintentional or otherwise) would 
prevent the complainant or EPA from obtaining the data
necessary to rebut the presumption. 183 Rebutting such a pre­
sumption would also conceivably requ ire additional empiri­
cal data such as information about home and workplace 
risks, exposures from other media, and information about 
atypical health problems the community may be experienc­
ing, data that the Agency is unlikely to gather on its own. 
In addition to these cri ticisms, there may be other more 
nuanced consequences of creating such a presumption. Al­
though the Office of Civil Rights committed itself to "work 
closely with recipients'' and "provide the recipient with sev­
eral opportunities to respond," 184 the claimants role is much 
more circumscribed. The Office of Civil Rights may request 
interviews of the claimant or relevant documents in its pos­
session. However, the guidance was clear on the Agency's 
position that "EPA does not represent the complainants" and 
the investigation .. does not involve an adversarial process 
between the complainant and the recipient. " 1 85 The only 
time the claimant is expressly given an opportunity to re­
spond is very late in the administrative appeal process if the 
recipient requests a hearing before an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) and subsequently files an exception to the 
ALJ's determination and the EPA Administrator elects to re­
view the determination. In contrast, there are "no appeal 
rights for the complainant built into EPA's Title VI regula­
tory process." In practice, the experience of claimants is that 
after submitting a claim they hear little if anything from the 
Office of Civil Rights. 1 86 
This raises an important procedural issue. Since the recip­
ient is not going to rebut a presumption that a health.based 
standard is protective and the claimant does not have an ac­
tive role in the administrative investigation, EPA is in the 
position of having to rebut its own self-imposed presump­
tion. There is little to support a prediction that the Agency 
wi ll  attempt to do so. And even if such a successful rebuttal 
were to occur, the absence of adequate monitoring in some 
impacted communities may make the rebuttal finding diffi. 
Browner and Anne Goode, from Golden Gate UniveJSily School of 
Law' s Environmental Law and Justice Clinic Regarding Draft Til le 
VJ Guidance, 9 - 1 1 (Aug. 28, 2000) (on file with author); Letter lo 
Carol Browner and Anne Goode, from Professor Al ice Kaswan, 6 
{Aug. 28, 2000) (on file with author); Lett.er to Carol Browner and 
Anne Goode, from Professor Eileen Gauna, 7 (July 27, 2000)(on file 
with author). 
1 82. TITLE V1 FACA REPORT, supra note I l l , at 72.
1 83 .  Id. Inadequate monitor placement was also a concern of I.he NEJAC 
Air and Water Subcommittee in submitting comments to the Office 
of Air and Rw:liadon on EPA' s Draft Urban Air Toxics Strategy. See
NEJAC AIR AND WATER SUBCOMMllTEE'S U1U3AN AIR TOXICS 
WORJCING GROUP, COMMENTS TO TH£ OFFICE OP AIR AND RAOIA•
110N ON rnE EPA's DRAFT UR.BAN AIR ToXJcs STRATEGY 9- 1 3
(1999) (recommending the public have an opportunity to petition the 
state and EPA for air monitoring changes). The corrunents are listed 
as Appendix C lO the 1999 NEJ AC REPORT ON PERMITTING, infra
note 356. 
l84, Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 127, at 3967 1 .  
l 8S .  Id. a t  39672. 
1 86. See EJ Activists Title VJ Commcnis. supra note I 58, al 2-4 (stories 
of frustration). 
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cult to sustain on appeal.  The more troubling scenario, 
however, is that the presumption will provide the Office of 
Civil Rights a tempting alternative to the difficulty and ex­
pense of conducting a comparative risk-based disparate 
impact analysis .  And the vigor by which the Agency will 
interrogate its own presumption will be vulnerable to the 
shifting philosophies and pol itical wil l  that occur from ad­
ministration to administration. 
Agency Jurisdiction 
Regulatory officials appear to have a range of views as to the 
appropriateness of addressing environmental justice issues 
in the course of issuing permits. However, even those that 
are open to the idea have expressed two concerns. First, that 
they may not have authority to condition or deny a permit on 
environmental justice grounds. 1 8 7  After all , none of the fed­
eral environmental statutes mention environmental justice 
or grant explicit authority to go beyond typical requirements 
to protect heavily impacted conununities. Moreover, the as­
sociated siting decisions are made in corporate boardrooms 
long before the recipient regulatory agency is invol ved and 
depend in large part on local land use and zonip.g decisions, 
also outside the purview of these agencies. 1 88 The second 
concern squarely presents a powerful competing fairness 
claim by the agency: it would be Wlfair to hold recipient reg­
ulatory agencies accountable for impacts over which they 
have no control . 
Responding to the second concern, EPA clearly agreed 
with the states. This agreement came, apparently, well  be­
fore the issuance of the Draft Title VI Guidance, during a 
meeting between Administrator Browner and state officials 
in late 1 998. 1 89 Thus, it was no surprise when the guidance, 
in unequivocal terms, stated that ''in determining whether a 
recipient is in violation of Title VI or EPA's implementing 
regulations, [EPA] expects to account for the disparate im­
pacts resulting from source of stressors (e.g. , facilities), 
stressors (e.g. , chemicals or pathogens), and/or impacts 
(e.g., risk of disease) within the recipient's authority.''
190
Unfortunately, this unequivocal position taken by the guid­
ance only begged the more central questions. Exactly what 
impacts are within the recipient agency's jurisdiction? If, as 
the recent EAB decisions suggest, there exists wide author­
ity under the environmental statutes to undertake an envi­
ronmental justice analysis during pennit proceedings, pre­
sumably there must be authority to do something about 
some of the associated impacts. lt would be a curious read­
ing of a statute to presume that Congress granted authority to 
consider excessive impacts while at the same time preclud­
ing the ability to address those very impacts by granting au­
thority to issue only typical permit conditions. Assuming 
there exists such authority, what is the scope of impacts that 
may be considered under the environmental statutes? Do 
agencies have authority to condition permits in order to mi t­
i g ate o r  av o i d  nonemi s s i o n - re l ated i mp ac t s  and 
nonhealth-related impacts? To take it one step further, do 
agenc ies have authority to deny a permit on similar 
grounds? If the answer is yes, then a related and critical 
1 87 .  TITLE VI F ACA R.l!PORT, supra note 1 1 1 , at 72. 
1 88 .  Id. at 76. 
1 89. Id. at 78. 
1 90. Draft Title Vl Guidance, supra note 127, at 39670. 
question emerges under Title VI law: if a recipient agency 
fails to exercise this discretionary authority in response to a 
known significant racial disparity, has it violated its duty Wl­
der Title VI by using methods of administering its program 
that has the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimina­
tion because of their race? 
The Draft Tille VI Guidance did not answer the scope of 
authority question, which would have taken EPA down the 
legal slippery slope and head first into these difficult ques­
tions. The Agency may have decided, wisely perhaps, to 
await the development of case law by the EAB and ulti­
mately the courts. Curiously, however, EPA did take a stand 
on the issue of permit denial The Guidance explains that 
"denial or revocation of a permit is not necessarily an appTO­
priate solution"19 1 to a disparate impact, and that EPA will 
"likely recommend that the recipient focus on other permit­
ted entities and other sources within their authority to elimi­
nate or reduce . . .  disparate impacts." 1 92 Thus, by refusing to 
explicitly address the scope of authority question while at 
the same time essentiaJly requiring recipient agencies to 
spread the required mitigation among the regulated commu­
nity, it leaves its own Office of Civil  Rights in an Wltenable 
position. It is possible that this office-underfunded for the 
task and c hronica l ly  s ubj ec ted to congress i on a l  
interference 1 93-will o n  its own i n  case-by-case investiga­
tions venture to advise recipient agencies of their Jegal au­
thority under environmental statutes. Alternatively, the Of­
fice of Civil Rights would Wlderstandably prefer to avoid 
the untested legal issues. The investigatory framework out­
lined in the guidance g ives it ample opportunity to do so; at 
that point it may become tempting to use the presumptions 
created by the guidance or the flexible criteria for determin­
ing disparity in a marmer that wil l  allow the Office of Civil 
Rights to dismiss the complaint. 
New Versus Renewal Permits 
Just as the agency jurisdiction question presented the fair­
ness issue for state regulators, the issue of permit renewal i l­
lustrates the potential W1fairness to some industry stake­
holders. When a project sponsor initially commits substan­
tial capital to build a facility, it likely anticipates a usefu1 life 
of the facility of at least 30 years. But a permit typically ex­
pires in five years. So there is a common understanding that 
these permits will be serially renewed as long as the facility 
complies with pollution control pennit conditions that typi­
cally apply. Title VI destabilizes that compact. Consider, for 
example, a faci lity built in 1 990., before the advent of per­
mit-related Title VI complaints. It would be unfair to tell this 
facility owner, who expected routine permit renewals, that 
her multimillion dollar facility can no longer operate be-
1 9 1 .  ld. at 39653, 39683,  
192. Id. at 39683 . 
1 93. See Jennifer Silverman & Cheryl Hogue, Budget: Limits to Civi( 
Rights Guidance Included in Bill Approved by House Funding 
Panel, 29 Env' t Rep. (BNA) 5 1 6 (July 3. 1998) (noting rider on 1 999 
appropriations biU precluding the use of appropriated funds to inves­
tigate civil rights complaints under the inJerim Guidance); Environ­
ml!ntal Justice: EPA Should Follow Rulemaking ProcedJAresfor Ti­
tle VI Guidance. House Report Says, 30 Env' t Rep. (BNA) 880 
(Sept. 3. 1 999) (noting house report on EPA fiscal year 2000 appro­
priations prohibi t ing the use of funds to investigate pending com­
plaints under the lnJerlm Guidance and criticizing EPA for issuing 
guidance instead of using formal rulemaking procedures). 
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cause a permit renewal would violate the regulator's Title 
VI duty by continuing to subj ect the host communi ty to a 
racial ly disparate impact. This unfairness could be exac­
erbated by the fact that closing the facility would not ap­
preciably redress the community 's problems because of 
multiple contributors to the overall impact, including ex­
empt, grandfathered, and nonpermitted sources . And it is  
simply unfair, argue some, to "hold a facility hostage to 
changing demographi cs. " 1 94 
At the other end of the spectrum is the perspective of envi­
ronmental justice advocates. They point out that the civil 
rights laws have been in effect for decades (prior to the 
building of many of the oldest existing facilities) and facility 
owners do not have an absolute right to a permit renewal. 
Moreover, they point out that most renewal situations do not 
involve changed demographics and that many facil ities up 
for permit renewal have a poor history of compliance or
have operated in a discriminatory fashion for years. 19s In
fact, permit applicants expect new requirements upon re­
newal as standards often change over time. Presenting their 
own fairness cla ims, they point out that a ton of pollution re­
sulting from a pennit renewal is just as harmful as a ton of
pollution resulting from an initially granted pennit. 196 
In responding to this difficul t issue, EPA appears to have 
studiously steered a middle course. The Draft Tille VJ Guid­
ance rejects the industry position that renewals should be 
treated differently categorically, affinning that new permits, 
renewals, and modifications can all support a Title Vl
claim. 1 97 However, a potentially important and controver•
sial exception was created in an apparent attempt to mitigate 
the harshness to some industry constituents. EPA has taken 
the position that a civil rights investigation will likely be 
closed if the permit action at issue involves a significant de­
crease in overall emissions or a decrease in the pollutants of
concern. 1 98 Since newly permitted facilities cannot "de­
crease'' emissions and since by definition modified facilities
generally involve emission increases, 199 this exception per­
tains only to permit renewals. In other words, if an applicant 
for a renewal agrees to decrease emissions, the applicant 
may avoid a potential Title VI challenge to the agency based 
on its permit. 
Environmental justice advocates criticized this position, 
reasoning that a comparatively small decrease in emissions 
will not help the overburdened community, given the mag­
nitude of the facility emissions overa11200 and the cumulative
194. Comments of Greg Adams, on behalf of a consortium of wastewater
agencies in southern California, made at a Title VI Listoning Session 
sponsored by the EPA in Los Angeles, California, on August 2, 2000
(on file wilh author). 
1 95. TrrLE VI FACA REPORT, supra no1e 1 1 1 , at 8 1 .
196. Jd. 
197. Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39677.
198. Id.
199. See. e.g., 40 C.F.R. §� l . 1654(a)( l)(x) (2000) (s- ignificant net in·
creases to major sources of criteria air pollutants). 
200. The glossary defines significant as "[a] detenninatlon that an ob­
serve� value is sufficiently large and meaningful to warrant some ac· 
tion. (See statistical significance) ." Draft Title VI Guidance, supra 
oote 127, at 39655. Significant for purposes of regulating criteri11 air 
emi�sions , for e,;ample, is LYJ>ically 40 Lons per year of volatile or·
game compounds (VOCs), 40 C.F,R. §5 1 . 1654(aX l )(x). To place
this number in context of some of the more intensive indW1trial activ­
ities, one might compare that amount with the 3 million pounds per 
year of expected emissions-including 692,200 pounds per year of
tox.ic air pollutants-from lhe facility al issue in .the  Sbintech invesd-
effect of multiple-source impacts in the area. In addition, 
this provision disadvantages facilities with better control 
teclmology while benefitting older faci l i ties with poor pol­
lution control, as the latter can more easily reduce emis­
sions. Notwithstanding these criticisms, it remains to be 
seen whether facility operators will respond to this incentive 
to reduce emissions. In large part, that will depend on 
whether they perceive Title VI as posing a credible threat to 
their operations under the new Draft Title VI Guidance.
Mitigation 
If an investigation should reveal the presence of an "adverse 
disparate impact," the issue of whether, bow much, and how 
to mitigate raises another set of questions. As an initial pro­
cedural matter, industry representatives argue that state offi­
cials should be allowed to justify impacts before mitigation 
is required, and environmental justice advocates maintain 
that mitigation possibilities should be explored before the 
issue of legal justification is addressed in the investig� 
tion. 201 In other words, environmental justice advocates be­
lieve that an agency should always attempt to mitigate ad­
verse effects, even if the disparate impact is otherwise le· 
gally justified. In terms of how much mitigation should be 
required, the possibilities include mitigation sufficient to 
(a) eliminate the disparity, (b) reduce risk to acceptable
levels, or (c) make reasonable progress in eliminating the
disparity. The committee also focused on acceptable miti­
gation strategies, with the committee deliberating primar­
ily on the relationship between the adverse impact and the
mitigation undertaken.
At its most narrow interpretation, mitigation could mean 
only those actions that reduce or eliminate the adverse im­
pact at issue. A more moderate approach would allow mi ti­
gation measures that do not reduce the disparity, but ad­
dress its etTects,202 such as medical monitoring, research
into cwnulative risks and synergistic effects, or enhanced 
emergency response systems. The most expansive view of 
mitigation, termed by the committee "loose nexus" mitiga­
tion, would include benefits to the host community that do 
not otherwise reduce the disparity or mitigate its  effects, 203
such as a day care center, for example. Loose nexus mitiga· 
tion may close?' resemble proposals for compensated sit­
ing schemes. 20 
A committee workgroup on mitigation achieved a con. 
sensus that a moderate to narrow nexus mitigation approach 
would be best, an approach that essentially requires the miti­
gation to be as narrowly tailored to the adverse impact as 
possible but allows some substitute fonns of mitigation 
gation. See Kuehn, DeTTJing Acee.rs, supra note I 05, at 3. Excluding 
the proposed Shin!cch facility , there were 127 facilities emitt ing a 
total of _approximately 44.7 19.609 pounds per year of air reJcases 
within a 3-mile radius of the proposed facility . U.S .  EPA, Drnft Re­
vised Demographic Information to TitJe VI Adminislrative Com­
plaint Re: Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality/Pennit 
for Proposed Shintech Facility (Apr. 1998) (Attachment I-TRI Fa­
cility Counts excluding Shintech) (on file with author). 
20 1 . TrrLE VJ FACA REPORT, supra note l l  l , at 83.
202. Id at 86. 
203 , The committee acknowledged that what is "loose nexus mitigation"
depends on bow one defines the scope of an adverse effect. Id at 87. 
204, Compare Raebel D. Oodsil , Remedying En11/ro11171enraJ Racism, 90
Mica. L. REv. 394 ( 199 1)  (examining the reform of siting proce­
dures), with Vicki Been, Compensared Siring Proposals: ls It Time 
to Pay �trenrion?, 21 FOIDHAM Uu. L.J. 787 ( t 994). 
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when reducing or eliminating the facility impacts is not pos­
sible. 205 Although reasonable and logical from a health stand­
point. the workgroup acknowledged that this recommenda­
tion, if adopted, would raise its own set of issues about pro­
cess. 206 What if, for example, most members of the host
comm.unity preferted compensatory or loose nexus mi tiga­
tion? I f  that were the case and an agreement was negotiated 
along those lines, should the EPA Office of Civil !tights de­
cline to investigate a claim brought by a community mem­
ber who was not a party to the mitigation agreement? 
Last l y, there were questi ons about the e ffect  of 
agency-sponsored or facilitated mitigation measures taken 
in advance of any particular perm.it proceedim;, termed by 
the Title VI FACA a "Track 1" approach. This latter 
pro-active approach was strongly recommended by the 
collllruttee overall as possibly the best means to address 
long-standing disparities caused by diverse and multiple
sources, 208 as well as addressing the entire range of commu­
nity concerns, including nonhealth impacts and impacts be­
yond the jurisdiction of the environmental agency. The 
Track 1 approach was developed by a subcommittee 
workgroup charged with developing a template for state 
agencies to consider, a model approach that would ideally 
help recipient agencies administer their programs to avoid
Title VI claims in the first instance.209 It was originally envi­
sioned by the work.group as a preventative approach that 
would lie outside the confi nes of any particular permit pro­
ceeding or Title VI investigation.2 1 0  However, before the Ti·
tie Vl FACA had been formed, some state regulators had 
taken the position that similar state environmental justice 
programs should be an alternative to Title VI compliance.2 1 1
These state agencies were adamant that th e  states who com­
mitted resources to devising such environmental justice pro­
grams should be afforded deference in a subsequent Ti tle VI
investigation.2 1 2  The issue of deference then itself became
vigorously debated.213 
EPA, under the Draft ntle VI Guidance, seized upon the 
Track 1 approach and assigned to it an extraordinary role in a 
Title VI investigation. Metamorphosed as an ''Area Specific 
Agreement," this approach essentially became the center­
piece of the new Draft Title VI Guidance, as weJI as the 
means for the Agency to resolve all of the conflicting claims 
of fairness in one tidy package . The central idea is for the re­
cipient agency to identify overburdened areas and enter into 
agreements among the residents and other stakeholders to 
el iminate or reduce adverse impacts "to the extent required
by Title VI. "2 1 4  The agreement might, for example, establish
a ceiling on pollutant releases, with a steady reduction over 
time, i.e., a declining cap.2 1 5  Ideally, the process of arriving
205. TnLE VI F ACA REPoRT, upra note l I J ,  at 86-87.
206. Id. at 88-90. 
207. Id. at 25-3 1 . 
208. Id. ai J O.
209. Id. al 9- 10.
2 10. fd. a, 25-26. 
2 1 1 .  See Environmental Justice: Home-Grown Programs Good Alrerna·
rives to EPA Civil Rights Guidance, States Say, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
1 83 (May 15 ,  1 998). 
2 1 2. TITLE VI FACA R£PO.RT, supra note I 1 1 , at 26-29. 
2 1 3 . fd. 
2 14. Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 127, at 39675.
2 1 5 . Id.. 
at such an agreement will include state and local govern­
mental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and other 
stakeholders with the ability to help solve the identified
problems.216 The guidance explains that if the analysis un­
derlying the agreement supports the conclusions that there 
will occur "actual reductions over a reasonable time,"2 1 7  the 
agreement will merit "due weight" in the course of a Title V1 
inves�ation and EPA will close the pending investiga­
tion. 21 This may occur even if the claimant was not in­
cluded in thef.rocess and was not party to the area-specific 
agreement. 21 In addition, later-filed complaints concerning
other pennitting actions in the geographical area covered by 
the agreement will be similarly dismissed unless the agree­
ment is ' 1no longer adequate" or is "not being properly im­
plemented."220 In substance, the area-specific agreement 
categorically constitutes adequate mitigation. 
A few observations can be made about this provision. 
First, it allowed the Agency to avoid directly addressing the 
issue of whether "loose'' or "moderate'' nexus mitigation 
was sufficient by stating that the impacts should be reduced 
"to the extent required by Title VI." It therefore remains un­
resolved how closely the mitigation has to be tailored to ad­
dress the impacts at issue in any pennit proceeding. The 
vagueness of this provision in tum has allowed the Agency 
to retain the vagueness in its provisions defining the scope 
of impacts that will support a claim. However, the use of 
area-specific agreements to dismiss pending actions clearly 
answered the "how much" question, adopting a reasonable 
progress standard to suffice instead of requiring a degree of 
mitigation that will eliminate the disparity or reduce risk to 
acceptable levels. The provision also excuses the Tecipient 
agency from having to consider mitigation strategies in the 
permit proceeding at issue and, therefore, excuses EPA from 
having to decide the agency jurisdiction issue, i .e . ,  whether 
under the environmental statutes there is authority to condi­
tion permits beyond nonnally imposed conditions. 
The due weight provision also appears to have a more ex­
ceptional role from an evidentiary and a procedural stand­
point. Once the due weight threshold is met, due weight ef­
fectively operates as a conclusive presumption of compli­
ance with Title VI in the proceeding at issue, thus excusing 
the Office of Civil Rights from having to determine whether 
there is a disparate impact to begin with or whether the im­
pact, if it exists, is otherwise legally justified. This is pecu­
liar considering that the strategies in the area-specific agree­
ment may have little connection to the permit conditions at 
issue and the types of i mpacts in the Ti tle VI complaint un­
der consideration. Accordingly, there seems to be little justi­
fication for such a presumption as an evidentiary matter. 
Equally remarkable is that the provision also functions as 
res judicata or collateral estoppel in subsequent Title VI ad­
ministrative proceedings. Given the exceptional power that 
this provision has, the strategies that might suffice to sup­
port a finding that actual reductions will occur over a rea­
sonable time are critically important components of the 
2 16. Id, 
21 7, Id. 
2 1 8. Id. 
2 1 9 . While noting that infonnal resolutions may be more successful if re­
cipients work with complainants, EPA notes that reduction plans 
may be developed without consulting complainants or others. fd. at 
39674. 
220. Id. at 39664.
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agreement. However, other than a statement that the under­
lying analysis should have "sufficient depth, breadth, com­
pleteness and accuracy, 
"221 the guidance does little to elab­
orate on the reduction strategies that are contemplated or 
the criteria that will be applied to determine their antici­
pated efficacy. 
ln addition to the vagueness concerning the criteria to 
judge the agreements' reduction plans, the Draft ntle VJ 
Guidance did not discuss with any specificity EPA's over­
sight role in ensuring that the area-specific agreements do in 
fact yield actual reductions in disparate impacts over a rea­
sonable time. Nor did the guidance discuss to what extent 
emission increases from newly pennitted facilities would be 
allowed to consume the gains made by the proposed reduc­
tion strategies. Equating Title VI compliance with the exis­
tence of a pollution reduction plan in an area-specific agree­
ment would logically require that a baseline will be estab­
lished and that strong oversight by EPA will be undertaken, 
particularly given the problems with measurement, predict­
ability, and enforceability that such agreements present. It 
remains to be seen, however, how rigorous this oversight 
will be in practice. 
Justification 
As noted earlier, the sequence of considering j ustification 
was important to conunittee members. Some believed that 
legal justification should only be considered after alterna­
tive sites and processes had been analyzed and all feasible 
mitigation efforts had been made. 222 As a practical matter, 
this approach requires recipient agencies to test the bounds 
of their legal authority in imposing additional permit condi­
tions. Others on the committee took the position that this 
step was unnecessary ifthere was a legally recognized j usti­
fication for the disparate impact. Other than this important 
procedural point. there remained the issue of what circum­
stances justify a racially disparate impact. Proposed justifi­
cation tests ranged from strict necessity with benefits flow­
ing directly-and perhaps exclusively-to the impacted 
community, to less stringent tests justifying disparate im­
pacts that would be too costly to mitigate or involve facili­
ties that provide some public benefit. 
The Draft 7ille VJ Guidance first stated the Agency's 
seemingly strict position that the recipient would have to 
demonstrate that the challenged activity was "reasonably 
necessary to meet a goal that is legitimate, important and in­
tegral to the recipient's institutional mission."223 This ap­
pears to include only permitted operations that are designed 
primarily to provide environmental benefits, such as a waste 
water treatment plant. Anything else, such as a manufactur­
ing facility, is not integral to the mission of an environmen­
tal protection agency. Moreover, even if the challenged ac­
tivity is integral to the recipient's mission and, therefore, 
justified, such a justification may be rebutted if EPA deter­
mines that a less discriminatory alternative exists.224 
22 l .  Id. at 39675. 
222. Id. at 39683.
223 .. let at 39685 (emphasis 11dded).
224. 1be presence of I.his "'rebuu.able presumption" in an investigation
where the complainant is not considered an "advetse" party and 
whose role is limited raises the now familiar question-who will re­
but the preswnplion? See infra notes 1 77-86 and accompanying te!lt.
Immediately following this conceptual ly straightforward 
test are provisions that call this interpretation into doubt. 
The guidance states that the Office of Civil Rights will 
" l ikely consider broader interests, such as economic devel­
opment . . .  if the benefits are delivered directly to the af­
fected population and if the broader interest is le91timate1 
important and integral to the recipient's mission.' Thus, 
the key to deciphering the twin provisions will lie in whether 
the Agency really meant to use the word "and" or whether it 
possibly meant to use a disjunctive for the three qualifiers. It 
seems odd that a broader interest like "economic develop­
ment" would ever be an interest that is integral to the mis­
sion of an environmental protection agency. The grammati­
cal ambiguity is important; if the Draft Title VI Guidance is 
ultimately implemented to allow goals or broader interests 
that are legitimate, important or integral to the recipient 
agency's institutional mission, that will justify virtual ly all 
disparate impacts. Anything less, however, makes the refer­
ence to economic development il logical . 
There are several observations to make at this point about 
EPA, fairness, and the Title VI saga. First is that institution­
ally the Agency did not confront the competing fairness 
claims explicitly, calling the shots on who wins and who 
loses. Nor did EPA explicitly address its own difficult posi­
tion. lf EPA were to actually impose a Title VI administra­
tive remedy, the withdrawal of ftmds is likely to result in the 
Agency re-acquiring previously delegated state permitting
programs. 226 This will present resource difficulties and have
severe political consequences. Whether the investigation 
framework was intentionally designed to avoid these hard 
questions is pure speculation. Similarly, it is a nyone's guess 
to what extent the Agency might have been influenced by 
the fairness claims presented by the different stakeholders. 
But assuming for a moment that such claims had bearing on 
the ultimate resolution, which fairness claims prevailed? 
The claims by state regulators that they should not have 
their funding revoked for effects over which they have no 
control was squarely addressed. They should not. However, 
there are stil l  no safe harbors because EPA did not take an 
explicit position on the recipients' scope of authority or 
whether addressing nonemission and nonhealth impacts 
was within that scope. The fairness claims of the regulated 
community Were twofold: first, individual perm.it applicants 
should not be penalized for the existence of racial disparities 
caused by a multitude of sources, and second, pennit re­
newal applications should be afforded special consideration 
because of the swtlc costs involved. Both claims gained 
some ground in terms of remedy. Perm.it den ial was taken 
off of the table as a potential solution to addressing dispari­
ties, but more stringent pennit conditions remain a possibil­
ity. In the case of tenewals, an attractive safe harbor has been 
created for facility operators who can reduce overall emis­
sions. More importantly, however, the uncertainties created 
by the still-open questions (scope of adverse impacts and 
scope of the recipient's legal authority to condition permi ts 
225. Draft Tille VI Guidance, supra note 1 27, at 39683.
226. Recent experience of EPA' s oversight of state enfo.rcernent of fed­
eral environmental statutes illustrateS the Agency's wil lingness lO
go lO great lengths to avoid withdrawal of delegation for failure to 
follow EPA's enforcement policies. Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution
and the Public Health. 24 HARV. BNvn.. L. REV. 352, 359 (2000) 
(noting that although EPA bas initiated withdrawal proceedings 
against states, it has never actually withdrawn a staie's delegation) 
(hereinafter Devolution and the Public Health].
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beyond typical requirements) may not be of great practical 
significance given the alternative compliance route possible 
by devising area-specific agreements. Overall, recipient 
agencies and industry stakeholders have made significant 
gains and have expressed greater satisfaction with the Draft 
Title VI Guidance.227 
The resolution of the fairness claims ofimpacted commu­
nities presents a more complicated picture. The essential 
thrust of many claims is that it is unfair for commm1ities of 
color to disproportionately suffer the insults of permi tted in­
dustrial activity. EPA did respond to that claim by creating 
an incentive for the development and implementation of 
pollution reduction strategies. Because these agreements 
are voluntary and provide for reasonable progress over time, 
however, it appears that Title VI, as interpreted by EPA, pro­
vides no immediate relief for these communities in the near 
future. In addition, the guidance's suggestion that the recipi­
ent agency focus on all permitted entities to reduce the dis­
parate impact may prompt state regulatory officials to test 
the bounds of their legal authority more aggressively under 
existing environmental laws. Unfortunately, these potential 
benefits are dependent upon the commitment by state regu­
latory agencies to begin with, a commitment that varies 
from state to state. This bodes badly for the very cases that 
Title VI was designed to redress, in this context, cases where 
state and local regulatory agencies neglect ever-increasing 
environmental degradation in communities of color. In a fi­
nal ironic twist, the Draft ntle VI Guidance may have re­
moved the one unintended benefit to such communities that 
resulted from the earlier Interim· Guidance: the uncertainty 
created by the much-mal igned Interim Guidance made state 
regulators and industry stakeholders more inclined to bring 
affected residents into the process earlier and more willing 
to be flexible and to work out solutions.228
In many respects, the competing claims of fairness pre­
sented EPA with a zero-sum choice. To the extent that cumu­
lative impacts are attributable to nonpennitted sources, 
making the regulatory agencies and by extension the 
pennittees somehow accountable for those impacts necessi­
tates winners and losers. In that respect, impacted communi­
ties were clearly the losers because these impacts will not be 
redressed under Title VI. With respect to penniHelated i m­
pacts, there is a more subtle zero-sum choice presented. To 
the ex.tent that regulatory agencies have to press legal au­
thority to impose atypical permit conditions or deny per­
mits, agencies stand to lose due to greater pressure from reg­
ulated stakeholders and the risk of litigation, and the im­
pacted communities stand to gain. To the extent that pennit 
applicants get their permits denied or conditioned based 
227. Environmental Justice: Draft Revised Civil Rights Guidance Clar­
ifies Definitions, Addresses State Issues, 3 1  Env' t  Rep. (BNA) 1 33 1
(June 23, 2000) (no1ing indusu-y source's  praise o f  the guidance);
Environmenlal Justice: Expanded Verswn of Civil Rights Guidance
Enjoys Broad Support, EPA Official Reports, 3 1  Env' t  Rep. (BNA)
1 58 1  (July 28, 2000) (EPA Office of Civil Rights Director Anne
Goode noting support from recipients, bul some concerns from in­
dustry and environmental groups). But see Sieve Cook, Environmen­
la/Justice: Stales Faull EPA Civil Righls Guidance as Vague, lock­
ing Defini1ions, Nonbinding, 3 1  Env't Rep. (BNA) 1773 (Aug. 25
2000); see also Environmental Council of States (ECOS), Com­
ments on Revised Title VJ Guidance (as approved by the Cross-Me­
dia Committee on Aug. 1 4, 2000) (on file with author) .
228. See Catherine Bridge, Digging Up )us/ice, TAE RECORDER, Nov.
24, l 999, at I (interviewing several attorneys working on environ­
mental justice cases).
upon environmental justice considerations, facility spon­
sors stand to lose and impacted communities stand to gain. 
EPA attempted mightily to avoid this choice by utilizing an 
area-specific agreement. If EPA succeeds in this effort, it 
will accomplish a win-win-win scenario. The regulatory 
agencies may remain comfortably within the express scope 
of their authorities under the existing statutes, the facility 
operators will not have additional enforceable limits and 
other conditions incorporated into their pennits, and im­
pacted communities eventually will gain some measure of 
relief from adverse impacts . It remains to be seen whether 
such an alternative com�liance strategy, known and criti­
cized in other contexts, 29 wi ll be effective.230 Unfortu­
nately, the strategy carries a remarkably high risk of regula� 
tory failure, with overburdened communities standing alone 
to absorb the losses. 
If EPA bad not devised a way to avoid the win-lose sce­
nario, other interesting approaches to addressing competing 
fairness claims might have emerged. The Agency might 
have explored policy-oriented common-Jaw approaches to
allocating risk and loss.23 1 For example, the Agency could
have compared the m1derlying interests, it could have al lo­
cated the potential losses to the class better positioned to ab­
sorb the loss, or it could have allocated the potential losses to 
the least innocent parties. Under an interest-balancing ap­
proach, the impacted communities would win because their 
interests (freedom from racial discrimination and freedom 
from bodily harm) would likely have outweighed the mone­
tary interests of the recipient agencies (funding) or the mon­
etary interests of the regulated community ( costs of mitiga­
tion) . Indeed, Title VI itself evidences a preexisting con­
gressional detennination that these very interests surpass 
economic considerations in most instances. 232 Allocating
the potential loss to the party best positioned to absorb the 
loss would likely lead to a framework that would require a 
much higher degree of mitigation, probably to the level of 
advanced technical capability using individual control strat­
egies . At the point where narrowly tai lored mitigation 
would not be sufficient to reduce the risks to an acceptable 
level or appreciably reduce the impacts, the resulting loss, 
e. g., facility shutdowns in the case of permit reneWals, may
tip the scales in favor of the recipient agency. 233 This is con-
229. See generally Clifford Rechtschaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and 
11,e States Battle for the Future of EnvironmenraJ Enforcement. 30 
ELR I 0803 (Oct, 2000); Rena I. St.einwr, Reinventing E11vironmen­
tal Regulation: The Dangtrous Journey From Command to 
Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENvrL. L. Rev. 1 03 ( 1 998) [heroinafter
Dangerous Journey].
230 . .Russell Harding, director of the Michigan Department of Environ­
mental Quality, told reporters that the Draft Title VJ Guidance wa.� 
"a liger without teeth" and tha1 he was "not going lo pay particular at­
tention to it." Environmental Justice: Draft Revised Civil Righi$, su­
pra note 227, at 1 33 1 .  
23 1 .  The use of common-law approaches 10 fill in the gaps in statutes is 
not unconunon, particularly in environmental law. For example, 
strict liabi lity for abnonnally dangerous activitie was used to rel.ax 
causation standards under the Comprehensive Environmental Re­
sponse, Compensation, and Liabi l i ty Act ( CERCLA) . See
P.El!CIVAL, infra note 377. 
232. Certain justifications, uch as business necessity, cues the point
where economic considerations cease to be subordinate. 42 U.S.C.
§2000c-2(k)( I )(A)(i) (2000).
233. Although under this approach it could stil l  be argued that the recipi·
ent agency and regulated community is �till bettor able to absorb the
loss, that argumenl would necessarily lead to an interest balancing
approach in order to account for nonmonetary losses sustained by the
impacted community.
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sistent with the more protective environmental standards 
that retain sensitivity to costs, but the approach would not go 
as far as some cost-blind or technology forcing standards 
known to environmental law. 
Under a least innocent approach common to tort law, a 
tn0re generalized analysis would likely lead to the conclu­
sion that the regulatory agency and by extension the regu­
lated community are less innocent than the affected commu­
nities. The regulatory agencies are less innocent because 
they contractually undertake to avoid disparate impacts in 
exchange for federal funding. The regulated community is 
less innocent because of its practice of externalizing costs 
by releasing harmful agents into the environment. In con­
trast, the affected communities neither undertake any spe­
cific obligations to perform, nor do they inject harmful 
agents into the environment nor as a class do they profit 
from the activity causing the impacts. 
A case-by-case inquiry involving interest comparison, 
loss allocation, and relative innocence might not be as clear. 
It could be argued, for example, that if the community of 
color became established after the facility was sited, the im­
pacted community is less innocent than the pennit applicant 
and by extension, the regulatory agency. Yet, even this rela­
tively straightforward "coming to the nuisance" scenario 
does not end the inquiry. If anything, such a case pulls EPA 
into an interdisciplinary exploration of circumstances limit­
ing residential options, a phenomenon best explained by the 
social sciences. Additionally. this approach would allow 
consideration of a range of equitable factors, such as the fa. 
cility's compliance history in the case of renewals and the 
availability of alternative sites in the case of new permits. 
The method is comparable to a court's use of its equitable 
powers and might be more responsive to the factual context 
presenting competing fairness claims. For example, if 
there is a disparate impact but construction of the facility 
predated the establ ishment of  the affected community and 
the facility has a good compliance record, a permit might 
be renewed on similar terms with off-site mitigation as the 
primary solution. However, if there is a disparate impact 
and the host community preexisted the facility and the fa. 
c i l ity had compliance problems in the past, that would ap­
pear to be a good case for more stringent monitoring and 
control requirements and, in extreme cases, possibly a per­
mit denial . In these cases, the Office of Civil Rights could 
examine how aggressively the recipient agency used its 
discretionary author ity to protect the impacted commu­
nity. This approach has the potential to couple the ingenu­
ity of common-law equity and incremental rule refinement 
with the advantages of agency expertise, while reaping the 
benefit of newly developed data about localized environ­
mental and health conditions. Such an approach might be 
better suited to the diversity and complexity of environ­
mental justice scenarios. 
Although perhaps speculative at this point, it is never­
theless important to consider the interplay between the 
guidance and other high-priority initiatives wi thin the 
Agency, as well as the effect that a more protective inter­
pretation of Title VJ might have had on those programs. 
This might provide an indication of how more protective 
fairness-oriented approaches can coexist with effi­
c iency-oriented reform. 
Environmental Justice and "Reinvention" 
In recent years EPA has been experimenting with ways to 
niake enviroIUI1ental regulation more efficient. The senti­
ment expressed by some in the environmental field is that 
command•and-control regulation has outlived its useful­
ness, primarily in addressing the easy environmental prob­
lems such as poflution caused by relatively large facilities. 
However, the second generation of environmental prob­
lems, degradation caused by much smaller diverse sources, 
cannot be solved by this outdated strategy. Proponents of 
this view adopt a philosophy that rests upon a belief in the 
superior efficiency of the market and devolution of author­
ity to the local Level.234 In :response to thjs sentiment, the
Cl inton Administration through EPA pledged to "reinvent" 
environmental regulation, primarily by affording regulatory 
relief to heavily regulated sources by promoting a variety of 
innovations, including performance-based standards, trad­
ing regimes, and incentive-based compliance.235 In the per­
mit context in particular, streamlined permit proceedings 
and operational flexibi lity were proposed as a way to de­
crease complexity and delay. The addition of enhanced pub­
lic participation and substantive environmental justice crite­
ria in permit proceedings appear to confl ict with these par­
ticular reinvention strategies. It is this apparent conflict that 
has to be examined closely and addressed or there is sure to 
be continued resistance to environmental justice proposals. 
In order to assess how a more protective Title VJ interpre­
tation or how permitting reforms may potentially conflict 
with these high-priority initiatives, three discrete programs 
are examined: brownfields, the Tier 2 refinery proposal, and 
White Paper Number 3 .  These discrete initiatives are used 
primarily because they involve pennits as well as il lustrate 
EPA's application of its current reinvention philosophy, 
which is likely to continue under the Bush Administration, 
albeit perhaps under different terminology. The brownfield 
initiative promotes re-use ofindustrial sites, the Tier 2 refin. 
ery proposal involves an aggressive market-based strategy, 
and White Paper Number 3 involves a "flexible" approach 
to CAA permitting using the concepts of bubbles and ad· 
vance approvals. All are designed to respond to the perceived 
inefficiencies of a command-and-control pennitting system. 
The following discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive 
treatment of reiovention generally, 236 or a critique of the mer­
its of the three approaches in particular. Rather, the goal is to 
examine the potential conflict between these programs and 
environ.mental justice goals in the permitting context. 
234. See, e.g .. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Refomung En­
vironmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 333 ( 1 985}; Richard L. Revez,
Rehabilitating lnterstau Competition: Rethinldng the. "'Race to the
Bottom " Ration.ale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. Rsv. 12 10  ( 1992).
235. See U.S. EPA Office of Policy, Economics & lnnovation, lnnovalive
Programs Across EPA, at http://www.epa.gov/opeilbyepa.btm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2001) .
236. Professor S teinzor bas wri tten several articles q uestioning
reinvention initiatives and devolution. See Devolutkm and r!,e Pub­
lic Health, supra note 226; Rena L Stcinzor, Tiu! Corruption of Civic 
Environmentalism, 30 ELR 10909 (Oct 2000}; Dangerous Jourru!y, 
supra note 229; Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Pro-­
ject XL: Does tlu! Emperor Have Any Clothes? 26 ELR 10527
( 1996); see also William Funk. Bargaining Towards rhe New Mil­
lennium; Regulatory Negolian·on and tlu! Subversion of tlu! Public 
Interest, 46 DuKE L.J, 1 35 1  ( 1 977); bur see Jody Freeman, Collabo­
rative Governance in the AdministraJive Stale, 45 U .C.L.A. L. Rsv.
1 ( 1997).
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Brownflelds 
EPA-sponsored brownfield redevelopment was designed to 
respond to a �rceived disincentive resulting from environ­
mental laws. 37 It was widely believed that developers and 
industrial manufacturers declined to purchase and develop 
unused industrial sites because of a concern about potential 
contamination and resulting liability under the Comprehen­
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA). The irony is that many of these sites do not 
qualify for Superfund action because of more highly con­
taminated sites on the national priorities list .  However, be­
cause of the fear of potential liability these sites remain 
idle, often abandoned by their former owners, thus pre­
cJuding cleanup and reindustrialization in areas needing 
economic revitalization. Meanwhile, project sponsors of­
ten choose greenfields (nonindustrial sites) to build new 
industrial faci lities, thus promoting urban sprawl. In order 
to encourage the recycling of these idle industrial sites, 
EPA devised a brownfield action agenda2 3 8  in the 
mid- l 990s to facilitate redevelopment using a mix of regu­
latory incentives ,  including grants to local governments to 
facilitate brownfield redevelopment and the use of EPA 
discretion to c larify and limit the CERCLA liability of pro­
spective purchasers. 239 EPA also considers imposing less 
stringent cleanup standards if the site will be used for in· 
dustrial instead of residential purposes. State brownfield 
programs address similar sites that are potentially subject 
to state cleanup laws. 
Given the obvious connection between environmental 
justice and brownfield development, there has been sub-
237. See U.S. EPA, THE 8kOWNFI£LDS ACTION AoENDA ( 1 996): see
also U.S. EPA, Brownjie/ds Assessment Demonstrarion Pilots, at
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pllotlst.htm (last updated May 26, 
2000). For a history of this administrative in itiative, see Paul
SkanLOTI Kibel, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfields, and
Justice, 25 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 589 ( 1998) lhereinafterKibel, 
The Urban Nexus); see also Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One. Piece of
the Puule; Why State Brown/ields Programs Can 't Lure Busine.sses
to the Urban Cores Without Finding the Missing Pieces, 5 1
Rurous L. REV, 1 075, 1 1 24 ( J  999) (questioning the accuracy of 
the assumption that l iability is a s ignificant disincentive). 
238. See U.S. EPA, THE BkOWNFIELOS EcONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT 
IN ITIATIVE APPLICATION GUIDELINES FOR DEMONSTRATIONS 
( 1995) (EPA 540-R-994-068). 
239. Paul Kibel summarizes the regulatory incentives nicely :
In terms of CERCLA implementation, the EPA Agenda 
called for several changes in agency policy and operating 
procedures. These changes included, among other things ( I )  
CERCLIS delisting, in which EPA removed over 25,000 
properties from the national track.log list of contaminated 
sites; (2) prospective purchaser agreements, in which EPA 
agreed nol to sue new owners for environmental remediation 
costs for contamination that occurted prior to purchase: (3) 
comfort letters, in which EPA set forth its remediation goals 
regarding formerly federally owned property; (4) land-use 
restrictions, in which new owners agreed to limit future use to 
commercial and industrial purposes in exchange for EPA' s 
release of remediation liability ;  (5) national and regional 
brownfields pilots, in which EPA provided grants to states 
and local governments lo help promote environmental 
cleanup and .redevelopment of contaminated properties; and 
(6) Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credits, in which
federal guidelines were changed to permit banks to fulfill 
CRA' s local-lending obligations by providing loans for envi­
ronmental remediation and brownfields redevelopment. 
Kibel, The Urba11 Nexus, supra note 237, at 604 (citations omitted). 
stantial agency240 and scholarly attention241 to the environ­
mental justice implications of brownfield redevelopment. 
However, it may come as a surprise that EPA has noted that 
there are no pending Title Vl challenges in the brownfield 
context.242 Nonetheless, the attention is not misplaced. The
environmental justice perspective on brownfield redevel­
opment is perhaps best described as the good, the bad, and 
the ambivalent. 
On the positive side, brownfield development may result 
in more clean urban environments and economic develop­
ment. The idle and often abandoned sites contribute to urban 
blighiJt times become a magnet for drug and criminal ac­
tivity, 3 may contain unremediated contamination, and
generally become a source ofcommunity demoralization.244
From that grim baseline, a project that involves any degree 
of cleanup and added employment opportunities is attrac­
tive, especially if the redevelopment project involves light 
industrial use or a nonpolluting business. On the negative 
side, because brownfield sites are often located near com­
munities of color and the poor, the less stringent use-based 
cleanup standards are problematic when considering the ex­
isting pol lutant-loadings impacting many host communi­
ties. To add to the environmental problems, some develop­
ers specifically purchase these sites with plans to return the 
site to heavy industrial use. In this respect, brownfield rede­
velopment has the effect of locking in the legacy of past in­
dustrial development. 245 Thus, as the project sponsor subse­
quently applies for the necessary environmental pennits to 
begin operations, developers and local officials worry that 
240. NEJAC WASTE ANO FACILITY SmNG SUBCOMM., ENV1RONMEN·
TAL JUSTICE, URBAN °REVITALIZATION, AND BROWNFIUOS: THE 
SEARCH  FOR A UTHENT IC  S tGNS  O P  HOPE ( 1 996) ( EPA 
500-R-96-002) [hereinafrer NEJ AC, AuTHENTIC StGNS OP HoPE). 
24 1 ,  Gabriel A. Espinosa, Building on Brownfields: A Catalysrfor Neigh­
borhood Revita/iwtlon, 1 1  VJLL. ENVTL. L.J. I (2000): Mank, Re­
forming State Brownjit'ld Programs, supra note 1 1 1  ; Lincoln L. 
Davies, Working Toward a Common Goal? Three Case Studies of 
Brownjields Redevelopmenl in Environmental Justice Commu­
nities, 18 STAN, L.J. 285 ( 1999); Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Policies
for Sustalnablt' Cities, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 187 ( 1999); 
Kirsten H. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives and Environmental Justice:
Second-Class Cleanups or Market-Based Equity?, 1 3  J. NAT. Re.• 
SOURCES "' ENVTL. L. 3 1 7  (1998) (describing brownfield redevelop­
ment from three perspectives: a righL�-based approach, a mar­
ket-based approach, and a pragmatic approach); E. Lynn Grayson,
An Alliance of Necessiry: Enviro)ustice and Brown.fields, 1 4  ENVTL. 
CoMPLIANCE & LJTIG. STRATEGY4 ( 1 998); Kibel, The Urban Nexus,
supra note 237 (discussing the brownfield agenda within the context
of urban sprawl and failed urban renewal policies); John S. 
Applegate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental
Justice: Evaluating the Brownjields Bargain, 1 3  J. NAT. RE· 
SOURCES & ENvrL, L. 243 ( 1 997-1998); Stephen M. Johnson, The 
Brownfields Action Agerula: A Model for Future Federal/State Co­
operarion in the Quest for Environmental Justice?, 37 SANTA 
CLARA L REV, 85 ( 1 996); Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate a11d 
Unequal; A Comment on the Urban Development Aspect of 
Brownfie/ds Programs, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. I ( 1996) ; Douglas 
A. McWilliams, Environmenlal Justke and Industrial Redevelop·
ment: Ecorwmics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 2 1  EcoL­
OGY L.Q. 705 ( 1 994) . 
242. Paul Connolly, Environrnen1al Justice: Mayors Rap EPA al Meeting
With Browner for Failure to Consult on Interim Guidance, 29 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 658 (July 24, 1 998) (Administrator Browner notes that
there are no brownfield redevelopment projects delayed because of
an environmental justice complaint). 
243. NEJAC, AUTHENTIC SIGNS Ol' HOPE. supra note 240. at 33.
244. Id 
245. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives and Environmental Justice, supra note
24 1 ,  at 3 1 8 . 
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the potential for disparate impacts (from less stringent 
cleanup standards and/or new emissions) and a resulting Ti­
tle VI claim could either derail a project or result in a chal ­
lenge at the end of the project after the expenditure of sub­
stantial time and capital. EPA, environmental agencies, and 
local governments are understandably concerned that Title 
VI would be a strong disincentive for the purchase and de­
velopment of these sites. Given the potential for good and 
bad consequences, some environmental justice advocates 
are arnbivalent about brownfield redevelopment. Part ofthe 
skepticism maY. be based on a history of failed urban re­
newal pol icies/46 negative experiences with government 
environmental regulators, 247 and a concern that the profit 
motives of the lendinlsand investment stakeholders will 
dominate the process. 
When the brownfield agenda first surfaced, environmen­
tal justice advocates quickly recognized that the public pol­
icy dialogue was too narrowly focused on removing barriers 
to real estate and investment transactions. In response, the 
Waste and Fac ility Siting Subcommittee of the National En­
vironmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJ AC) maintained 
that "EPA's Brownfields locomoti ve left the station without
a major group of passengers,"249 and it began a series of pub­
lic dialogues to allow residents of impacted corrununities 
and environmental justice advocates to s>;:stematically con­
tribute input into the public policy debate.250 The public dia­
logue first served to broaden the issue by placing brownfield 
redevelopment in the context of an urban ecosystem with 
four environments that had to be addressed: natural, built,
social, and cultural/spiritual.251 Environmental justice ad-
246. Kibel, The Urbari Nexus, supra note 237, at 608.
247. The public dialogues disclosed much evidence of lack of conununi­
catlons and distrust between government.al organizations and com­
munities concerned with brownfield programs and that the distrust is 
a continuing barrier 10 effective implementation. NEJAC, Au­
TB£NTIC SJONS OF HOPE, supra note 240, at 5 1 .  
248. Kibel, The Urban Nexus, supra note 237, at 612. Lenny Siegel of Pa-
cific Studies in Oakland. Cal., explains: 
One of the fint times I heard the notion of Brownfields was 
from the environmental attorney for one of the nation' s  larg­
est corporations. She told me that she liked the idea of 
Brownfields because thal meant that they could build facto­
ries in communities that were already contaminated rather 
than going out and threatening the Greenfields, which were 
pristine . . . .  I think there are a lot of people in government 
who have basically the same attitude. We pollute cenain ar­
eas of the country; th.ere are certain kinds of people that live 
there. Let's keep on polluting the same areas. lf Brownfields 
get misused as a concept, it could lead to more of that. 
NEJAC, AUTHENTIC SIONS OF A'.oPE, supra nore 240, at 33. 
249. NEJAC. AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HoP1; , supra note 240, al 67.
250. Id. at I .  
25 1 .  Id. at IO . The subcommittee formulated a more useful characteriza-
tion of the urban environment as comprising: 
( I )  an oversaturation of communities with multiple sources 
of environmental pollution in highly congested spaces, (2) the 
c�xistence of residential and industrial sites as a result of 
imprudent land use decisions, (3) a lack of documentation of 
mos! envirorunental health risks in urban commwiities, (4) the 
ellistence of as yet nor understood effects of multiple, cumu­
lative, and synergistic risks, (5) the absence of a comprehen· 
sive environmeni.al enforcement and compliance activity 
which results, for some communities, in a virtual non-exis­
tence of such activity; (6) the lack of health services and ade­
quate information on environmental risks, (7) the severe de-­
cay in the institutional infrasl.rUCture, and (8) a high degree of 
vacates also argued that potential liability was a relatively 
minor impediment to brownfield redevelopment. Redlining 
by investment and insurance companies, lack of training, 
and the poor quality of education, public safety, housing, 
and transportation all led to the deindustrialization of urban
areas, 252 along with the contribution ofindirect subsidies for
greenfield development.253 Activists promoted the concept
of "urban revitalization"-a corrununity-based approach 
focused on building capacity, partnerships, and mobilizing 
resources-as opposed to ''urban redevelopment''-a gen­
trification-driven policy that displaces existing corumuni­
ties. 254 In a report to then-EPA Administrator Browner, the 
NEJAC offered specific recommendations designed to in· 
corporate env i ronmenta l j ust ice concerns into the 
brownfield redevelopment process. ln response to the con­
cerns raised during the public dialogues, EPA reportedly re­
vised its criteria for applying for brownfields pilots, for ex­
ample, by emphasizing communi� involvement and requir­
ing that participation be verified. 55 
One might think that heavy involvement by the commu­
nity in a formerly narrow transaction might disrupt the deli­
cate system of incentives designed to entice prospective 
purchasers to consider brownfields. This involvement is 
particularly risky when community residents approach the 
project with skepticism about cleanup remedies, a determi­
nation to bring a broader range of concerns to the table, and 
an insistence that they maintain a direct involvement in land 
use decisions that affect their communities. As noted in the 
NEJAC report, however: 
Those who claim that the community wi ll always require 
the maximum level of cleanup . . .  ignore the fact that far 
better than anyone else, the community recognizes the 
dangers of losing any cleanup by demanding a full 
cleanup. Urban revitalization may demand compro­
mises, but these compromises must be supported by 
those who bear the burdens of incomplete cleanup. 256 
Thus, in a process where both stand to gain and lose signifi­
cantly. EPA in its pilot program may have set up a different 
system of incentives that allowed a more nuanced renegotia­
tion to take place."' 
As enlightening and informative as the 1 995 public dia­
logues were, the report did little to assuage the fears of state 
and local agencies that environmental justice claims would 
stifle redevelopment in inner-city areas, particularly in light 
Id. 
social alienation and decay caused by living in degraded 
physical environments. 
252. Id. 36·39; see also Robertson, One Pfece of the Puu.Je. supra note 
237 (concluding that the fai lure to address nonenvironmental chal­
le nges w i ll co ntinue to hinder brownfield development .  
Nonenvironmental challenges include infrastructure, site and 
building configuration, utility cos-u., crime rates, education issues, 
and racism), 
253. NEJAC, AuniENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE, supra note 240, at 44 
(mentioning government-buil t infrastructure such as roads, water, 
and sewerage). 
254. Id. at 13 .  
255. Id. at es-ii. The NEJAC subcommittee cautioned, however, that
meaningful public participa�ion is different in many ways from sim­
ply holding meetings and getting letters of support. ll involves ongo­
ing slAkeholder involvement and a recognition that the community
brings a wealth of site-specific knowledge to the table. Id. at 22.
256. Id. at 43.
257. See generally Lazarus, supra note 37.
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of the subsequent Title VI claims and the 1 998 Interim
Guidance. Therefore, in July 1 998, then-EPA Administrator 
Browner promised participants at a mayors' forum held in 
Detroit that her office would undertake a study to ascertain
whether the guidance in fact hindered redevelopment. 258
Thus, a case study of seven EPA Assessment Pilot Projects 
was undertaken in early 1 999 . The pi lots were chosen based 
on an objectively high risk of Title VI c laims using criteria 
such as a relatively high affected minority population and 
involving projects with tentative redevelopmentzilans for 
reuse that would require environmental permits. In four 
of the pilot cities, there was significant environmental jus­
tice activism and protests that were anticipated to cause
some concern to stakeholders.260 However, the interviews
subsequently disclosed that developers and investors did not 
perceive Title VI complaints to be a major barrier but were 
more concerned with other issues such as financing, con­
struction season, and c leanup costs.261 These concerns
turned out to be more prescient. as activities of several sites 
were delayed by unresolved liability, ownership, and juris­
dictional issues.262 None were delayed by environmental
justice disputes . 
Other important con.siderations from the community's 
perspective were that the redevelopment was an improve­
ment over the existing blight and that the project sponsor
was willing to promote job creation for local residents. 263
For example, a stamping press manufacturer in Chicago cre­
ated 100 new jobs for local residents and a plastic rack man­
ufacturer in Detroit created 30 new jobs with a potential for 
70 more. 264 As important as these considerations were, how­
ever. they did not override the community's concerns about 
the cleanup and potential reuse of the property. A more sur­
prising finding of the case study i s  that despite the selection 
criteria, typical redevelopment activities of the chosen pi­
lots did not ultimately include pollution-heavy or permit-in­
tensive projects, a finding that may beJeneralized to a fair 
number of the EPA-sponsored pilots. 2 Of the three pilots
that did involve heavy industrial use,2
66 an important com-
258. U .S. EP A, BRoWNFIELDs Trn.E VI CASE Sruores: Sm,tMAJtY RE­
PORT{ 1999) (EPA 500-R-99-003) [hereinafter BIIOWNPIELOS TITLE 
Vl c. ... se STUDIES] .  
259. Id. at 2 .  
260. Id. at 7 . 
26 1 . Id. at 7. 
262. Id. at 9. 
263. Id. at 8 .  
264. Id. at 1 0. 
265, Id. at 8. Three sites included a stamping press operation, a plastic 
rack manufacturer, and a construction company, Of20 sites targeted 
for possible inclusion in the case studies , reuse plans included con­
crete manufacturing. co1Jtainer-ma.king, parking, residential, retail 
and office build ings, flex space, and road and bridge improvements. 
Id. at 5 .  As noted in the report; 
[Wlhile in-depth infonnation was only gathered at seven of 
more than 200 active Pilots, these Pilots were chosen for their 
high potential for Ti tle VI complain1s (e.g. ,  double digit mi­
noriiy rat.es, active redevelopmenr and relatively high rate of 
existing perm.its). It is logical to assume thal if Title VI com­
plaints were nol negatively impacting progress at sit.es cho­
sen for their high likelihood of conflict ,  remaining sites are 
not likely to be impacted (s ic] than those in this study. 
Id. al 6-7. 
266. A container manufacturer in Chicago, and cement plants in Miami
and Camden. Id. at 12 .  
ponent ofreducing conflict was "involving the com unity[, 
which] allowed potential problems to be identified and 
solved from the beginning when stakes were lower and de>
sign changes could more easily be made.":267 For example,
in a Miami project involving a proposed cement processing 
operation, a neutral toxicologist was hired to explain the
emissions. 268 In Camden, the developer described the new1 
cleaner process and agreed to the community's request that 
an independent engineering firm conduct on-site monitor­
ing. 269 In Charlotte, the developer lowered the height of 
planned buildings in re�nse to community concerns about 
light and tree health.27 
Although there are undoubtedly many factors that con­
tributed to the ultimate support of the brownfield pilot pro­
jects by the affected communities, what is striking is that the 
"community define[db the problem from the vantage point
of their aspirations," 
1 thus injecting more positive ele­
ments into an economic transaction formerly devoid of so­
cial responsibility or civic possibility. In the Chicago pilot. 
for example, stakeholders built on the brownfield-inspired 
relationship between fhe city and local communities to sub­
sequently institute a cooperative enforcement program that 
included brochures in several languages, a hotline for citi­
zens to report illegal dumpin� in their communities, and 
heavier penalties for violators. 72 Equal ly import.ant is the 
steadfast insistence by the community-and the subsequent 
cooperation by permitti ng officials and project spon­
sors-to expand public participation opportunities and also 
to attempt in some substantive fashion to mitigate the facil­
ity's adverse impacts on health, safety, and quality of life in 
the host community. These projects reflect a more compre­
hensive strategy-apparent in the public dialogues of envi­
ronmental justice activists-of addressing brownfields in 
its complex social context This may wel l  be an example of 
the product of a process of reframing issues and restructur­
ing power relations that Sheila Foster describes as the
"transformative politics'' of the movement.273 
Unfortunately, however, the Draft ntle VI Guidance may 
unwittingly undennine this transfonnative process, regard­
less of the assumptions concerning the connection between 
brownfields and Title VI, To the extent project sponsors 
may be concerned about potential Title VI claims, the Draft
Title VI Guidance eliminated leverage that might have been 
helpful to these communities to broaden the issues and pro­
mote a more responsive negotiation process. In these in­
stances, project sponsors seem more willing to negotiate 
and accommodate rather than forego the project altogether. 
Thus, the percep,tion that the Drqfl Title VJ Guidance evis­
cerates Title VI 74 may make brownfield sponsors less will­
ing to solicit community support by undertaking voluntary 
on-site mitigation measures (this holds true for non­
brownfield facility projects as well) . 
267. Id. at 8. For another study confinning the same advantage of early 
public partic ipation, see Davies supra note 241 , at 285. 
268. BROWNFIELDS 'l'm..E VI CA.SE Sruou;s, supra note 258, at 1 0, 1 8 .
269. Id. a t  1 2. 
270. Id.
27 1 . NEJAC, AUTHENTIC S1GNS OP HOPE, sJJ.pra note 240. at 25 . 
272. Id. at 1 9 .  
273. Poster, .mpra note 89.
274. See s14pra note 230 (director of a stace environmental agency d� 
scribing the guidance as a "tiger without teeth.") 
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To the extent that brownfield project sponsors are uncon­
cerned with Title VI liability in the first instance, the Title VI 
investigatory fr amework is at best irrelevant. If it is the case, 
as some believe, that Title VI was weakened to respond to 
the perception that Title VI would act as a barrier to in­
ner-city redevelopment, that perception is inaccurate in 
those instances.27 At worst, the publicity surrounding the 
Draft 'litle VJ Guidance may prompt prospective project 
sponsors to believe that negotiating with the host commu­
nity will yield little benefit. Such a powerful misconception 
is indeed unfortunate because a more protective interpreta­
tion of Title VI-one requiring close or moderate nexus mit­
igation, for example-may not have a chilling effect on 
brownfield redevelopment as participants seem to volun­
tarily opt for mitigation measures closely tailored to respond 
to community concerns. 
The Proposed Tier 2 Refinery Proposal 
In May 1999, EPA proposed a major program that was de­
signed to reduce emissions from cars and light trucks, pri­
marily nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds. 276
Termed the "Tier 2" program, the central idea was to achieve 
emission reductions by tailpipe controls and low sulfur 
fuel. 277 Although the program is certain to achieve major re­
ductions overall, it has the potential to increase pollutant 
levels in areas near refineries. This is because the refineries, 
in removing sulfur from fuel, must make changes to their fa. 
cilities that are anticipated to increase significantly emis­
sions in five criteria pollutants278 unless the facility owner 
can find a way to contemporaneously reduce emissions in 
other units within the same facility, thus "netting" out of
NSR 279 When a source nets out of review, overall opera­
tions may still result in an emissions increase, but the in­
crease is considered "de minimis" for regulatory p�ses. 
Although an occasional small increase in isolation28 is not 
problematic generally, the Tier 2 initiative presents a differ­
ent scenario. Many of the refineries are clustered in the
nonattairunent Gulf Coast area of Region VI,28 1 the changes
have to occur during the same time frame (meeting the new
sulfur standard by 2004),282 and EPA anticipated that many
sources in nonattainment areas will not be able to net out of
review.283 Thus, the residents in communities near Gulf
Coast refineries-who tend to be predominantly African 
American and low-income-could be disproportionately 
affected by the aggregate of both the significant and the de 
minimis emission increases from several refmeries all oc-
275. See U.S GAO, REPORT ro THE CHAIRMAN, COMMllTEE ON CoM­
MBRCE, HOUSE OP REPRE.SENTAT1V£S, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC­
TION: AGENCIES HAVB MADE PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE 
FEDERAL 8ROWNFU!LO PARTNERSHIP INmATIVE (1999). 
276. 64 Fod, Reg. 26004 (M�y 13, 1999) [hereinafter Proposed Tier 2
Rule ] .  See also 65 Fed. Reg. 6698 (Feb. 10, 2000) (hereinafter Final 
Tier 2 Ruic] . 
277 . Proposed Tier 2 Rule, !iUpra note 276, at 26004.
278. The l.echnologies typically requm; lhc use of a fwnace and therefore
have. 1he potential to increase nitrogen oxide (NOJ, VOCs, panicu­
late ltllllter, carbon monoit.ide, and S02• Id. at 26065 , 
279. Id at 26064.
280. Twenty-five tons per ye11r of NO, and VOCs in a severe ozone
nonattainment area. Id. at 26065. 
28 1 .  Id. 
282. Id. at 26008,
283. Id. at 2606S. 
curring within the same time frame.284 Such a scenario is an
unfortunate but classic case of distributional inequity. 
In the initially proposed Tier 2 rule, EPA didnot acknowl­
edge the distributional implications but instead proposed a 
suite of regulatocy relief measures for the refineries, includ­
ing the use of "plantwide applicability limits" (PALs) to 
avoid triggering NSR285 ; streamlining approaches to speed 
up the permit process1 including a preswnptive uniform 
technology requirement for lowest achievable emission rate 
(LAER) and best available control technology (BACT) 
rather than the typical case-by-case determinations; mobile 
source offsets; model pem:ut and permit applications; prior­
ity processing of permit applications; EPA permitting teams 
to help permit applicants troubleshoot individual permitting 
issues; separately issued advance Title V permits for the 
desulfurization project only; a single emission limit or con­
trol requirement to comply with multiple applicable re­
quirements; advance-approved changes in operation; the 
use of pollution prevention approaches; and less stringent 
hardship requirements for small refineries during the early
years of the program.286 
From an environmental justice perspective, expedited 
permits in general tend to disadvantage vulnerable com­
munities because these communities often lack the re­
sources to evaluate technical permit terms and use public 
participation opportunities effectively, and a shorter time 
frame magnifies this difficulty. In addition. one approach 
proved to be particularly problematic: the use of expected 
reductions from mobile source emissions to "offset" the
emission increases at the refineries.287 This is a significant
departure from normal regulatory standards as offsets are 
typically reductions from other stationary sources (facili­
ties) that are measured and obtained from processes and 
po llution contro l technologies rather than diffuse re ­
ductions from the tailpipes of an indefinite number of 
motor vehicles . 
EPA received several comments on the proposed rule, 
and in particular on its proposal to assist the refineries in ob­
taining the necessary pennits. 288 In responding to the com­
ments of various stakeholders, EPA disagreed wi th 
commenters who opposed the use of mobile source off:
sets. 289 In response to stakeholder concerns about potential
Title VI claims, the Agency specifically noted that a Title VI 
284. Su NATIONAL Ass'N OP MANUPAcnJKERS, REGrON 6 EXECUTIVE
SUMMA!I.Y: SHOULP EJ BE A TTB1t 2 PERJ,ffmNG fssUE1 ( 1 999),
available at http://www. nam.org/rer/BNEJ/bnej-tier2.h1ml (last
visited Sept. 19, 2000). According to this summary, 25 of the refiner­
ies bad a high score on the "potential environmental justice index." 
The method averaged data over a four-mile radius and would miss 
smaller environmental justice neighborhoods in lhe study area. Id. at 
2. The repo11 concluded that based on the demographic information,
EPA should consider environmental justice issues as a potential fac­
tor in the sulfur role penn.ltting. 
285. Proposed Tier 2 Rule, supra note 276, at 26065-66. This would al­
low the facility operator to make changes without having to evaluate 
a baseline for each modification and calculate a netting equation. Id.
at 26066. 
286. id. at 26066-69.
287. Id. at 26066-67.
288. See generally U.S. EPA, Tl.ER 2 MOTOR VEtllCLE EMISSION STAN­
DARDS AND GASOLINE SULPUR CoNTR.OL Rl!QUIJIBMENTS: RE­
SPONSE ro CoM'MENTS ( 1 999) (EPA 420-R-99-024) [hereinafter 
'fIER 2 RESPONSE TO COMMENTS]. 
289. Some automobile manufacturer.; objected to the use of these offsets,
notit\g that the refiner.; should not be allowed to benefit from the in­
vestm ents being made by the automotive industry. Id. al 20- IO. 
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claim should not delay issuance of the permit. 290 To address
the environmental justice issues more generally, EPA 
agreed to institute a stakeholder outreach process and iden­
tify areas that may experience local emissions increases as a
result of refinery modification. 291 Although the Agency as­
serted that at the county leve1 benefits were anticipated to 
outweigh expected emission increases, the Agency con­
ceded that it could not determine the precise local environ­
menta1 impacts with certainty W1til the types of modifica­
tions and control requirements were determined. 292 EPA 
agreed to address the environmental justice issue on a
case-by-case basis, 293 and it would use the permit teams to
address community concerns and conduct edu.cational
meetings with affected communities.294 
The subsequent stakeholder interviews revealed common 
impediments to the stakeholder process when dealing with 
environmental justice issues, such as the- need for independ­
ent technical assistance for affected communities295 and the 
fact that the environmental justice activists would not pur­
port to represent the views and speak for the residents of all
of the impacted Gulf Coast communities. 296 More generally,
environmental justice advocates were concerned about the 
overwhelming pollutant burdens, streamlined permitting 
processes, the lack of enforcement at the refineries, and
were distrustful of state environmental agencies. 297 All en­
vironmental justice organizations noted their lack of input 
prior to the proposed rule in contrast to EPA's extensive con­
sultation with industry representatives.298 The refining in­
dustry was concerned about the time it would take to process 
applications, particularly if there was community opposi­
tion to the pennits.299 Some state environmental agencies
were concerned about their capacity to process the multiple 
permit applications that were expected, especial ly in light of 
existing backlogs.300 Conventional environmental organi­
zations were particularly concerned that environmental jus­
tice communities would press their position and attempt to 
"scuttle the rules," thereby putting "the national groups in 
the difficult position of either continuing to support the 
rules despite local communities' objections or opposinJi 
the implementation of rules they have fought bard for. "3 
Ultimately, however, they appeared to believe that this po­
tential impasse could be avoided since Tier 2 implementa­
tion could be achieved without emission increases, they 
290. Id. at 20- 1 3 . Ironical ly , this was six months before EPA issued the
Draft Tir/e VI Guida11Ce io June 2000. Draft Title VI Guidance, su­
pra not.e 1 27 . The Interim Guidance did not explici tly address the is­
sue of whether a Title: VT claim could stay a permit. 
29 1 .  TIER 2 RESPONSE. TO COMMENTS, supra note 288, at 20- 15 .  
292. Jd. 3 1  20-20.
293. Id.
294. Id. a1 20-23.
295. See PROPOSED TIER 2 GASOLINE RULE, SUMMARY OF THE PHAsll l
STAKEHOLDER CONVENING ON REl'INERY PERMJITINQ 1SS1)ES 5 
( 1 999) {hereinafter PHASE I STAKEJiOLDER REPORT] ; see also Pao­
POSED TIER 2 GASOLINE RULE, SUMMARY OF THE PR ASE TI STAKE· 
HOLDER CONVENING ON REFINERY PERMl'lTlNG ISSUES (2000) 
[hereinafter PHASE n STAKEHOLDER REPORT). 
296. PHASE I STAKEHOLDER REPORT, supra note 295, at J O.
297. PHASE II STAKEHOLDER REPORT, supra note 295. at 1 -3 .
298. Id. 
299. Id. at 5 ,,
300. Id. 
301 .  Id. lt 4. 
maintained, because "no refinery is operating with BACT
on all equipment."302 
These concerns notwithstanding, the Agency decided to 
proceed with a proposal to allow mobile source offsets by
guidance,303 a decision that sparked vehement opposition
from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 
Communities for a Better Envirownent (CBE), and other
environmental justice organizations.304 In addition to dis•
cussing the potential impact to vulnerable communities, the 
comments of these organizations were revealing for another 
reason. They laid out the extreme degree to which EPA was 
using its interpretive authority. For example, they pointed 
out that existing statutes and regulations only allowed the 
use of stationary source offsets under nonattainment 
NSR.305 They particularly questioned the rationale support­
ing the Agency's positions. For example, offsets must be
"surplus," i.e., not otherwise required by the CAA.306 The
proposed guidance stated that because the Tier 2 rule was 
based upon findings that involved the Administrator's dis­
cretion, the mobile source reductions were not "otherwise
required" by the CAA.307 This logic is particularly puzzling
because, as noted by the NRDC, "[o]nce the Agency bas 
made this positive finding, and determined that there is a 
'need for further reductions in emissions, ' the Administra· 
tor is required to promulgate emission standards.''308 Thus, 
the Tier 2 tailpipe reductions are required under the CAA 
notwithstanding a degree of discretion that the Administra· 
tor has in making the finding that triggers the requirement. 
That being so, the reductions are not surplus and are ineligi­
ble for offset purposes. The commenters also pointed out 
that the mobile source offsets were not quantifiable by usual 
qualitative criteria309 and could not be considered "in effect" 
by the time the refineries commenced operation because the 
fuel was yet to be produced and sold. 3 1 0  The NRDC was par­
ticularly concerned that the proposed Tier 2 guidance, if 
adopted, would be harmful precedent that would lead other 
302. Id. at 3. As one s takeholder no1ed: "It' s a matter of us ing technolo­
gies that may cost more. but wi l l  reduce the pollutants." Id. (quoting
a stakeholder). 
303, Notice of Availabi lity; Memorandum, Use of Emissions Reductions 
From Motor Vehicles Operated on Low-S ulfur Gasol ine as New 
Source Review (NSR) Offsets for Tier 2/Gasoline Sulfur Refinery 
Projects in Nonattainment Areas, 65 Fed. Reg. 43009 (July 12 ,  
2000) [hereinafter Tier 2 Offset Memo]. 
304. See Comment letter by Natural Resources Defense Council dated
August 1 1 , 2000 (on file with author) [hereinafter NRDC Tier 2 
Comments] , and Commenl Letter by Communities for a Better Envi ­
ronmen t et al . ,  dated August J I , 2000 (this letter, endorsed by ap­
proximately 67 organizations and indiv iduals. is on file wilh the au­
thor) [ hereinafter CBE et al. Tier 2 Comments). 
:ms. NRDC Tier 2 Comments, supra note 304, al 9 ;  CBE cc al . Tier 2 
Comments, supra note 304, at 6. A related criticism was that the 
Agency, assuming it had aulhority to al low mobile source offset 
should have proceeded by notice-and-<mmment rulemaklng because 
the guidance contradicted established regulations. NROC Tier 2 
Conunents. supra note 304, at 3 .  
306. 42 U.S.C. §7503(c)(2), ELR STAT, CAA § 173(c)(,2).
307. Tier 2 Offset Memo, supra note 303 , attach . at 5.
308. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. §752 l (i)(2)(A),
( i )(3)(A)( i ) ,  & ( i ) (3)(C)(i), ELR STAT. CAA §202( i )(2)(A),
( i)(3)(A)(i), & (i)(3)(C)( i) (emphasis added)) . 
309. Id. at 7-8 (noting that the crude emission estimates used ror SIP plan­
ning purposes is insufficient); CBE et al. Tier 2 Comments, supra
note 304, at 5-6. 
3 1 0. CBE el al . Tier 2 Comments, supra note 304. at 5: NRDC Tier 2 
Comments, supra note 305, at 4-7. 
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source categories to demand similar treatment3 1 1  and further 
asserted that the Agency's logic supporting the mobile 
source reduction could be applied to almost any manufac­
turing activity tbat would result in an environmentally bene­
ficia1 product-bicycle manufacturers, for example, would 
be in a position to request mobile source offsets and expe­
di1ed permit processing.3 1 2
The comment letter from CBE and other environmental 
justice organizations noted that a similar issue had previ­
ously arisen in California, with the refineries advancing 
similar arguments for an exemption from full review wider 
the California Environmenta1 Quality Act.3 1 3  The California
state legislature decided to subject the projects to full re­
view, which resulted in feasible yet protective technologies 
and control measures.3 14  They maintain that feasible tech­
nologies exist that will enable refineries to produce the Tier 
2 fuel without an i ncrease in emissions, especially consider­
ing that the "majority of U.S. refineries are decades old, with 
ample opportunities to achieve such reductions."3 1 5  Even 
the national organization of air pollution control officials 
noted that "such a proposal could discourage refineries from 
seeking on-site offsets, resulting in emission increases at re­
fineries that will have a diswoportionate, negative impact
on refinery communities."3 6 
It remains to be seen whether the Agency ultimately 
adopts and allows the use of mobile source offsets for refin­
eries as agency pol icy or, more broadly, whether the refinery 
permitting aspect of the Tier 2 rule can be implemented 
wi th out the d ire conseq uences predi cted by these 
commenters, in particular the harm to populations near re­
fineries. One thing appears certain: should the states in the 
Gulf Coast region opt to devise area-specific agreements to 
reduce pollutants in the affected communities, any subse­
quent Title VI claim based on the aggregated increases at the 
refineries will l ikely be dismissed. This would save the 
Agency from the obvious embarrassment of having to even 
consider a disparate impact claim based upon a state 's com­
pliance with EPA's own guidance. 
Title VI aside, other observations can be made about 
EPA's approach to resolving this distributional issue. First, 
in its understandable zeal to implement a program that wiJl 
yield an immense environmental benefit, the Agency first 
opted to ignore apparent environmental justice conse­
quences. In the initially proposed rule, the Agenc.x did not
address the environmental justice implications. 7 When 
3 1 1 . NRDC Tier 2 Comments, supra J1ote 304, at 2. 
3 1 2. Id. at 7 .  
3 1 3 .  CBE et al. Tier 2 Comments. supra note 304, at 3 .  
3 1 4. Id. 
3 1 5. Id. at 2. 
3 1 6. Co�nJs of Stale and Territorial Air Pollution Program Adminis­
trators (STAPPA) and the Association of local Air Pollution Con­
tro l Officials  ( A LA PCO ) ,  2 ( A u g .  1 7 , 2000) , a t  
hrtp : //www.4cleanair.org/members/comml t1ee/penni1.html (las1 
visited Oct. 25, 2000). 
3 17. The only reference to environmental jus1ice was a passing refer­
ence in the cost-benefit section of the proposed rule, where the 
Agency concluded: 
Finally, when considered along wilh other important eco­
nomic dimensions-including environmental justice, smaU 
business financial effects, and other outcomes related to the 
distribu tion of benefi ts  and costs a mong partic ular 
groups-the direct comparison of q uantified economic 
benefils and economic costs can provide useful insights 
comment letters subsequently forced the issue. the Agency 
responded, but not by developing a programmatic response 
by rule or guidance. In the subsequent Tier 2 final rule, the 
Agency addressed environmental justice only in a general 
fashion. partly by assuming the issue would not arise at the 
local level and partly by a commibnent to address the issue
by guidance at a later date. 3 18 The second observation is that
EPA opted for procedural remedies in this case by belatedly
instituting a separate stakeholder process.3 1 9  This process
was insufficient for a variety of reasons, the most obvious of 
which was that the inevitable trade offs that occur in rule de­
velopment had already been made. 320 What followed in fact 
was the guidance on mobile source offsets, an action that d id  
not alleviate, but intensified, environmental justice con-
into the overall  estimated net economic effec t of the pro­
posed standards.  
Proposed Tier 2 Rule, supra note 276, at 26078. 
3 1 8. The rule states: 
['IJhe Tier 2/gasoline sulfur rule will achieve environmental 
benefits in the local areas where refineries are located, due to 
reductions in tail pipe emissions from vehicles driven in 
those are.as. Although we expect residual emissions increases 
ar some refineries even after iJ1stalling the stringent level of 
emissions controls required under the Act, for the vast major­
i ty of areas, we believe that these potential refinery emission. 
increases will be very small compared to the Tier 2 benefits in 
those same local areas. 
We believe i t  i important to understand and address con· 
cems relating to potent ial localized emissions increases 
from refineries that make significant process changes to 
meet the requirements of the Tier 2 rule. We believe that. 
among other things, the keys to addressing any potential 
concerns are as follows: 
- Providing meaningful community involvement early
and throughout the process;
- Determining what information and actions would elimi·
nate concerns; and
- Detennining what EPA, States, and indu try can do to 
make the permitting prooess smoother by ensuring ongoing 
community involvement in the dedsion making process 
and by building trust among stakeholders . . . .  [W]e plan to 
undertake additional actions in the future, including pro­
viding education and outreach about the rule and its im­
pacts in local communities, developing pennitting guid· 
ance through a publ ic process and addressing Title VI peti­
tions if they arise. 
Final Tier 2 Rule, supra note 276, at 6774. 
3 1 9. The rule states: 
Id. 
BPA's Office of Air and Radiation and the Alternative Dis­
pute Resolution Team within EPA' s Office of the Adminis­
trator implemented a national convening process which was 
designed to bring together a broad spectrum of stak.eholdern 
to exp Ion: with !hem their perceptions and v iews of issues as­
sociated wilh Tier 2 pennitting and to assess the potential for 
a collaborative process lo address specific implementation is­
sues at some time in the future. The convening was carried 
out by an outside neutral party who conducted interviews 
with representatives from selected EPA offices, States, in­
dustry, environmental groups, and environmental justice or­
ganizations. Second, EPA held infonnalional briefings and 
provided background materials to the National Environmen­
tal Justice Advisory Council 's (NFJAC) Air and Water Sub­
committee and Enforcement Subcommittee to provide an op­
portunity for them to provide feedback and recommendations 
IO the Agency. Finally, in October 1 999, we met with both na­
tional environmental groups and environmental justice advo­
cacy representatives, IO discuss their views on the pennitting 
aspects of the p{oposed rule. 
320. Gauna. supra note 24.
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cems. The third observation is that the Agency ultimately 
opted to address environ men tal j us tice issues on a 
case-by-case basis, in th.is case without providing a frame­
work for addressing potential impacts that are fairly predict­
able. In this respect, the Agency lost an opportunity to test a 
framework within a discrete and manageable context. The 
last observation about the Tier 2 refinery proposal is that i t  
il lustrates the Agency's expansive interpretation of i ts  au­
thority in providing regulatory relief to refineries in stark 
contrast to the conservative use of its authority to condition 
or deny pemtits on environmental justice grounds. The same 
liberal approach can be seen in reinvention initiatives with 
much broader applicability. 
Another Draft Guidance- " White Paper Number 3 "  
One recent agency initiative is i llustrative. Perhaps more 
than any other venue, the reinvention enterprise is at its most 
aggressive in the area of pennitting emissions of criteria air 
pollutants-usually by large industrial facilities-via a pre­
construction permitting program termed NSR. If the EAB 
decisions, Title VI complaints, and the Tier 2 refinery com­
ments are any indication, this is also an area that routinely
raises signi ficant environmental justice concems . 32 1 To 
magnify the difficulty of this conflict, the preconstruction 
air permitting profraDl under the federal CAA is extraordi­
narily complex,32 with separate statutory requirements for
permitting major sources of criteria pollutants in attainment 
areas (tenned PSD review)
323 
and nonattainment areas
(termed nonattainment NSR). 
324 Joining these preconstruc­
tion permitting programs is the umbrella operating permit 
program under Title V of the 1 990 Amendments. 325 Although 
a general discussion could not do justice to the breadth and 
depth of these air permitting programs,326 this Article hopes 
32 1 .  S ix out of l O  appeals board decisions concern major source air per­
mitting. and 2 1  of 6 1  Title VJ administrative complaints presently 
accepted for investigation or under rev iew similarly involve air per­
mits. See infra notes 32 1 -73 and accompanying tex1; see also Title VJ 
ComplainJs Fifed With the EPA as of November 30, 2000, at
bttp://www.epa.gov/civ ilrigbts/docs/t6csnov2000.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 9, 200 1 )  (on file with author). 
322. See generally Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya D. Winner, A Clean Air
Act Primer: Part I, 22 ELR 1 0159 (May 1 992). 
323. 42 U.S.C. §§7470-7492, ELR STAT. CAA § § 1 60- 1 69B. For a dis­
cussion of the mechanics of the PSD program, see Craig N. Oren, 
Prevention of SignificanJ Deterioration: Control Compelling Versus 
Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. I ( 1 988). 
324. 42 U.S.C. §§750 1 -75 15 ,  ELR STAT. CAA §§ 1 7 1 - 1 93.  For a discus­
sion of the mecbanios of nonaltainment NSR, see Gauna, supra note 
1 09. 
325. 42 U.S.C. §766 1 , ELR STAT, CAA §50 1 .  Title V Is procedural and
not int.coded to create new substantive requirements. 57 Fed. Reg. 
32250, 32284 (July 2 1 ,  1992). However, the reg11lations for Title V 
opomling permits programs envision the integration of PSD review. 
nonauainmenl NSR, the pennitting of hazardous air pol lutants, and 
existing EPA-approved state NSR requirements. The existing regu­
lations can be found at 40 C.F.R. pt . 70 (2000); see also Proposed Re­
visions to Part 70, 59 Fed. Reg. 44460 (Aug . 29, 1 994 ); Proposed Re­
visions to Part 5 1  and Pa11 70, 60 Fed. Reg. 45530 (Aug. 3 1 ,  1 995);
Notice of Avai labi lity of Draft Rules and Accompanying Informa­
tion, 62 Fed .. Reg . 30289 (June 3, l 997) (draft final rule to Part 5 1  and 
Part 70). This Article will focus primllrily on major NSR. 
326. The current regulations can be found at 40 C.F.R. pl. .5 1 . See also 
NSR MANU AL, supra note 67, at 2-3 .  The NSR Manual does not es­
tablish binding regulatory requirements nor is it an official statement 
of policy. Id. at I .  The NSR Manual i s  used to generally prescribe the 
mechanics of the NSR program, but is subject to NSR regulations 
and vatiation by state pennitting authorities !hat have been autho­
rii.ed by EPA. 
to highlight some of the potential difficulties that rein­
vention in this area may pose to impacted communities. 
Since 1 993, EPA has been engaged in o�oing dialogues 
with various stakeholders to reform NSR. 7 The most re­
cent product of this effort is a Draft Guidance on Design of 
Flexible Air Permits (Draft Flexibility Guidance), also
known as "White Paper Number 3 ,',328 which partly draws
on alternative permitting approachi;:s proposed but never 
formally adopted by final rule. White Paper Number 3 is in· 
teresting in several respects. First, although not finalized, 
the proposed guidance reveals current Agency thinking on 
potential alternative permi tting strategies under consider­
ation, at least in some quarters of the Agency. However, the 
proposal contains flexibilities that may be problematic to
communities impacted by these large facil ities. The guid­
ance is a procedural curiosity that i tself illustrates the con­
tradictory institutional messages that tend to confound 
stakeholders. Shortly before its issuance as proposed 
Agency guidance, White Paper Number 3-then termed an 
internal memo- had been leaked to the press. 329 In re-
327. The reform effort concerns mainly the permitting of crile.ria pollut­
ants by large industrial sources. On March 1 6- 1 7, 1 993, and Juoe 4,
1 993, EPA held an NSR simplification workshop, See U.S . EPA, New 
Source &view Simplification Workshop Tran$cript (Mill. 1 7- 18, 
1993) , al http://www.epa.gov/l tn/nsr/rule_dev.htrnl (last modified
June 29, 2000); U.S. EPA, New Source Review Simplification Work­
slwp Transcript (June 4, 1 993). at http://w w w.cpa.go v/ttn/nsr/ 
rule_dev.htmJ (last modified June 29, 2000). On July 7, 1 993, an NSR 
subcommittee was subsequently established a part of the existing 
CAA Federal Advisory Commit I.Ce. 58 Fed. Reg, 36407 (July 7. 
1993). The subcommiuee bas met on several occasions JO discuss re· 
form ofNSR, See, e.g. ,  U.S. EPA, New Sourr:e Revil!W Subcommit­
tee Meeting TrMscript (July 2 1 -22, 1.993); U.S .  EPA, New Source
Review Subcommittee Meeting Transcript (Nov. 8-9, 1 993); U.S. 
EPA, New Source Review Subcomminee Meeting Transcript (Jan. 
20-2 1 ,  1 994): U.S. EPA, New Source Review Subcommittee Meeting 
Transcript (Mar. 1 6· 17,  1 994); U.S. EPA, New Source Review Re·
form Subcommittee Mee/ing as to New Source Review Reform 
Rulemaldng Transcript (SepL l 7, J 996) (all transcripts on file with 
author and available at h ttp ://www.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/rule_dev.html 
(last modified June 29, 2000)). The goal of this ongoing effort. 
termed NSR reform, is to reduce complexity, speed up review, and, 
where possible, afford flexibi l i ty to regulated enti ties without sacri­
ficing environmental protection. The deliberations of the workshop 
and subcommittee contributed 10 a major refonn proposal on July 
23 , 1 996. See Prevention of Sig_nificant Deterioration (PSD) and 
Nonat111inmenl New Source Review (NSR) EPA Notice of 
Rlllemaking, 6 1  Fed. Reg. 38250-38344 (July 23, 1 996); Notice of 
Availability of Draft Rules and Accompanying lnfonnalion, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 30289 (June 3, 1 997) (draft final rule on Part 5 1  and Part 70); 
Noiice of Availabil i ty ;  Altema1jves for New Source Review (NSR) 
ApplicabiUty for Major Modifications· Solicitation of Comment, 63 
Fed. Reg. 39857 (July 24, 1 998). The rule has yet to be final ized, but 
White Paper Number J appears to draw upon several proposals out­
l ined in  the 1 996 proposed rule and subsequent refinements. The re· 
form effor1 in its entirety is beyond the scope of this Article. 
328. See Notice of Availabi lhy for Draft Guidance on Design of flexible
Air Pennits (White Paper Number 3). 65 Fed, Reg. 49803-01 (Aug. 
1 5, 2000) (avai lable al EPA ' s  NS R website, ht tp://www .epa.gov/ 
ttn/nsr/whatsnew.html). The tenn "White Paper Number 3" indi­
cates that this proposed guidance is part of an ongoing effort to 
streamline permits as it is the third in a series of white papers. See
Proposed Tier 2 Rule, supra note 276, at 26068 (referring to White 
Paper for Streamlined Development of Patt 70 Permit Applications, 
Lyd ie N. Wegman. Deputy Director, Office of Ai( Quality Planning 
and Standards, U.S. EPA, July J O, 1 995, and White Paper Number 2 
for Improved Implementation of the Part 70 Operating Permits Pro­
gram, Lydia N Wegman, Deputy Director. Office of Air Quality 
Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Mar. 5, 1996). 
329. The int ernal memo was roponedly given to 1he press by Public Em­
ployees for Environmental Responsibi lity, a Washington-based ad­
vocacy group. H . Josef Hebert, EPA Considers Relaxing Pollution 
Rules on Industrial Plants, ASSOCIATED PRE.SS NEWSW1R£S, June 5 ,  
2000. available at APWIR£S 1 7:59:00. 
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sponding to j ournalists' inquiries, Agency officials charac­
terized the internal memo as "an idea sheet" by mid-level 
staff members that was "embryonic'' and did "not represent
much of anything/' least of all Agency policy. 330 Approxi •
mately two months later, White Paper Number 3 was issued 
as proposed guidance 1 a move that departed from the 
Agency's seven-year effort to accomplish reform of NSR 
and its eight-year effort to revise the operating permit pro­
gram regulations by rule. Indeed, the expressed mid-stream 
change of position-that the changes contemplated by the 
proposed guidance were authorized by the current regula­
tions all along13 1-provoked a particularly sharp conunent 
by the NRDC an environmental organization that had sig­
nificantly and consistently participated in the ongoing 
rulemaking process .332 Although the scope of the Draft
Flexibi/i ty Guidance does not encompass the numerous pro­
posals undertaken in the NSR or Title V rulemaking pack­
ages, the focus of this guidance is on two concepts that are 
central to the reform project generally-operational flexi­
bility and permit streamlining. Under the Draft Flexibility
Guidance, these ideas will be applied in a regulatory context 
more expansive than the relatively narrow confines of pi lot 
projects, e.g . • brownfield redevelopment and facility XLs, 
and the Tier 2 refinery proposal. 33 And once again, in the 
proposal we see that EPA is willing to push its interpretive 
authority to the limits. 
One of the central strategies to provide flexibility is the 
use of a bubble (plantwide or partial) to avoid applicability 
of new permit proceedings when changes are made subse­
quent to the initial permit. A PAL allows wiits to be added 
and modified, and e.missions increased within the PAL level 
without triggering NSR or without the type of state agency 
review and approval that is usually required in connection
with the change. 334 Although PALs have been allowed, typi-
330. Id. See also John J . Fialka, EPA Is Considering Increased Fle.xibility
In lssuing Industry Air-Pollution Permits, WALl. ST. J., June 5,
2000, at A-3,  available al 2000 WL-WSJ 303 1 786; Jwie 5. 2000,
Dow Jones Business News 00:43 :00.
33 1 . See, e.g .. advance approvals are really a fonn or reasonably antici­
pated operating scenarios, White Paper Number3, supra note 328, at 
1 1 , 1 6 , and PALs are permissible under existing regulat ions ,  Id. 
at 3 1 .  
332. A comment letter s igned by approximately 56 organizations, includ-
ing the NRDC, stated:
Adoption of the document ' s  "flexibilities" through guidance 
rather than rulemaking would circumvent and short circuit 
pending Agency iulemakings thal are addressing many of 
these same issues. These rulemakings under part 70 and the 
NSR program are ones in which some of our organizations 
have been involved p.s �takeholders for ovor eighl yefilS, and 
we con.s ider it deplorable that EPA would treat our sustained 
participation as stakeholders so cavalierly. 
Conunent letter from NRDC and other organizations addressed ro 
Michael Trutna, U.S. EPA (Sept. 1 4, 2000) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter NRDC et al. White Paper Number 3 Comments] . NROC 
Senior Attorney David Hawkins consistently had been Involved 
with the ongoing refonn efforts. See U.S. EPA, New Source Review 
Simplification Workshop Transcript, supra note 327. at 1 8 ;  see also 
NSR Reform Stakeholder Members, at ht tp ://w ww.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/ 
rule_dcv.html (updated Jan. 20, 1 999) (on file wi th author) . 
333. For example, the fleltibil ities provided by guidance not only apply to 
PSD and nonanainment NSR (new and modified major sources of 
criteria pollutants), but a lso to sources of hazardous air pollutams.
new source perfonnance standards and SlP requirements, and
nonfederal requirements (ststc/local/tribaJ) as well. White Paper
Number 3,  s11pra note 328, at 2 1 -27.
334. Id. at 30. Under curren1 regulations, sources can avoid major NSR by
a netting transaction, bu! prior review and approval by the ,state
cally they rn1ve been granted in connection with a permit pi­
lot project. with the Agency promising to evaluate claims of 
superior environmental performance and the practical 
enforceabilit;; of the experimental approach before adop­
tion by rule. s The NRDC and others noted that the most 
common permit pilot projects, Project XL, have site-spe­
cific rulemakings and opportWlities for public flarticipation 
that have yet to be concluded and evaluated.3 6 Yet, in the
Draft Flexibility Guidance, the Agency has taken the posi­
tion that PALs are permissible under the current regulations 
and that previously proposed regulatory language in the 
pending NSR rulemaking proceeding was intended merely 
to clarify the PAL approach.337 Thus, the extent to which a 
PAL may be approved in practice now depends on a state 's 
current SIP and not on finali zation of the pending 
rulemak.ing proceedings. 
Although PALs may eliminate major NSR/PSD applica­
bility, the addition of new equipment wider the PAL might 
trigger minor source review and Title V requirements. 
Therefore, the Draft Flexibility Guidance contains another 
strategy that will allow the source to avoid these subsequent 
permit proceedings as well. This flexibility tool-also as­
serted to exi st under current law-is the advance at> 
pro val. 338 Under this provision, if the permit applicant antic­
ipates a need to add or modify processing equipment or pol­
lution control devices in the future, the applicant can request 
advance approval of those changes in the application for the 
initial flexibility permit.339 Advance approval can even be 
obtained when the precise changes are not s�cifically
known at the time of the initial pennit application. 340 Under
the Draft Flexibility Guidance, the family of advance approv­
als can apply to "a potentially wide spectrum of changes, in­
cluding the addition of specific new process units, modifica­
tions to existing units, or even for the addition ot modification 
of units which are not known but which are within a described
category of changes. "341 Advance approvals niay also be used
in connection with PALs and other strategies that are de­
signed to allow the source to avoid triggering NSR. 342 Con­
ceding that the number of different operating scenarios could 
be extensive, EPA advised that where it was impractical to de­
scribe the operating sceruµios in detail, they could be de­
scribed as a category of advance approved changes. 341 
agency is  necessary and Title V permit terms are generated because 
decreases used to generate netting credi t  must be made enforceable. 
!d. A use of a PAL avoids this requirement. Id. at 3 1 .
335. NRDC et al .  White Paper Number3 Comments, supra note 332, at 1 7 .
336. Id. at 1 8. 
337. White Paper Number 3, supra note 328, at 3 1 . 
338 . Id. at J I .
339. Id. a t  I 0- 1 1 . 
340. Id.
34 l .  Id. at IO.
342. These include potential- to-emit l imits and minor ongoing modifica­
tions (MOMs) or "cap and track" strategics. Id. at 30-35. MO Ms ap­
pear to be partial caps that pertain to groups or interrelated changes
within the facility, while "cap and track" is a cap that falls just below
lhe applicable s ignificance level that would trigger NS R. Id. 
343. Id. at 1 9: 
Where the possibilities of lhese changes are so great that it is 
practical only to describe the conditions that assure compli· 
ance and not each of the scenarios in detail In the permit, these 
different operating scenarios may, in some instances stil l be 
included in title V permits as a described category of changes 
. . .  in a menu fonnaL 
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To assure permit authorities that the future changes will 
comply with legal requirements, the facil ity operator may 
state in advance a menu of "replicable operating proce­
dures, "344 mechanical procedures that do not require judg­
ment and would yield identical results regardless of the op­
erator. 345 Anticipating that compliance requirements would
necessarily change with a change in operations and equip­
ment, the Draft Flexibility Guidance provides for streamlin­
ing compliance requirements as well .  The source operator 
can approve sign ificant changes in advance by inserting into 
the initial flexible permit a menu of compliance require­
ments (such as monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting) 
with a protocol for choosing the appropriate compliance ap­
proach. 346 When minor compliance details are missing, it is
possible for the source to add the detai ls later through the 
Title V minor permit modification process, a process that 
does not require advance notice to the public or public 
hearing opportwlities.w 
Toe aggressive use of bubbles, a menu approach (of ad­
vance approved changes and compliance requirements), 
and the Title V minor permit modification process results in 
significant obstacles to effective public participation. As the 
Agency acknowledged, advance approved changes can be 
incorporated into the Title V permit without public review 
unless the proposed advanced change itselfwould constitute 
a major modification.348 However, since advance approved 
changes are generally designed specifically to keep the 
source from subsequently undergoing the type of modifica� 
tions that trigger Title V proceedings, as a practical matter, 
all that EPA can do is encourage (but not require) the permit­
ting authority to rrovide notification to the public at the time 
of the change .34 Even for advance approvals of "non-Title
V requirements/' EPA announced its intent to grant defer­
ence to the states in interpreting their own rules and SIPs, 
thus �ignaling its endorsement of creative interpretation by 
the states to al low sources to avo id applicability of 
NSR/PSD proceedings. 
The upshot is that new facilities acquiring a flexible per­
mit can avoid the potential appl icabi lity of major NSR or 
PSD and minor NSR and Title V, and can make any subse­
quent changes through the minor Title V modification pro­
cess and avoid public participation. To be sure, there is pub­
lic review of the initial flexible permit. At that point, how­
ever, any concerned member of the public can expect to en� 
counter a dizzying menu of operating procedures, materials, 
equipment, and compliance protocols designed to cover an 
array of choices the facility operator may or may not make 
during the term of the pennit, Citizens or conununity-based 
344. Id. at I 2.
345. "All replicable operating procedures must be scientifically credible
and 1heir use must not require judgement [sic] . Thal is, the 
'replicability' requirement means the procedure for che same inputs 
must be capable of yield ing the identical result whether applied by
you, the source, a member or the public, or us." Id. at 20. 
346. For significant chang�s to monitoring, record.keeping, or reporting
requirements, the Agency proposed several "streamlining tech·
niques'' of using a menu of monitoring approaches and protocols for 
selecting the appropriate monitoring approach. Id. at 35·36. 
347. Id. at 28. 35. This anomaly, which the NRDC contends is i l legal, was
reponedly due to former Presiden1 George Bush's intervention on 
the jndustry' s behalf. See NRDC et al. White Paper Number } Com· 
ments ,  supra note 332, at 1 3  (citing a news article in the WASH. 
POST, May 1 7. 1 992, al A l ) . 
348. Whjte Paper Number J, supra noie 328, at 28.
349. Id. at 29. 
organizations on a limited budget might want to forego tech­
nical review of all of the proposed advance approvals and 
tum instead to the compliance provisions, reasoning per­
haps that they may obtain adequate assurances if they can 
effectively monitor compliance of emission limits during 
the term of the permit (regardless of the operations em­
ployed under the PAL or partial cap). In this respect. reports 
obtained from instrumental continuous emissions monitor­
ing equipment (CEMs) may be the best inforniation avail­
able. Unfortwlatelyi however, the Draft Flexibility Guid­
ance. allows non-instrumental .. CEMs•equivalent' monitor­
ing methods, such as "equations for mass balance or 
stoichiometric calculations or records of fuel or raw mate­
rial purchases or usage,"350 an llf.Proach that can be con­
founded by technical problems. 35 · Thus, technical review of
a menu of these types of propc,sed compliance methods is 
l ikely to be beyond the resource capabilities of ordinary citi­
zen groups. Another potential problem is that, due to strong 
industry pressUI'e, the use of CEMs-equivalent monitoring 
may be applied in practice so liberal ly so as to yield little, if 
any, verification of compliance.352 In short, CAA permits 
are notoriously complex to begin with, and the Draft Flexi­
bility Guidance promises to increase that complexity by or­
ders of magnitude without assurances that compliance can 
be adequately verified. 
The flexibilities advanced by this Draft Flexibility Guid­
ance pose additional impediments to environmental justice 
communities that host the facility. First, to the extent that 
E PA s u pports  a n d  e nc o u rages s o u rces  to a v o i d  
nonattainment NSR, the alternatives analysis an d  social 
cost criterion cannot be used to protect vulnerable conunu­
nities or aid in the development of substantive fairness-ori­
ented permit criteria. In addition, the com unity is now in 
the position of having to raise money to obtain the technical 
expertise to independently evaluate a permit application 
that has an assemblage of advance approvals and compl i­
ance protocols instead of one set of requirements.353 As 
noted by the NRDC and others, EPA is "condensing all of 
the public 's opportunities to participate in permitting 
through minor NSR, PSD, major NSR, and Title V into one 
fleeting 30-day period every five years."3s4 Even an associa­
tion of air pollution control officials-who strongly s upport 
the concept of operational flexibility-expressed concern 
about the increased complexity and resource burdens that
would be required to process flexible pennits .355 
350. Id. al 38. 
35 l. For example, the choioe of emissions factors, correlating emissions 
with operating range parameters, and missing emissions data, or 
choice of averaging times may cause emissions to be under or over 
estimated. Id. at 384 1 .  
352. Professor Steinzor 9uestions the  prac1ice, i n  the  name of flexibi lity, 
of granting exemptions from precise monitoring requirements that
bear no relationship to producing superior performance. Dangerous
Journey, supra note 229, at 1 94. 
353. See Leiter from Eileen Gauna, 10 U.S. EPA (Sept. 1 3 , 2000) (on file
with author) (containing comments on White Paper Number 3). 
354. See NRDC et al. -white Paper Number 3 Comments, supra note 332,
at 2. 
355 . See Letttr from STAPl'A and ALAPCO, to EPA (Sepl 2 1 ,  2000) at 
http://www.4cleanair.org/Wl-IlTEPAPER3COMMENT-9I00.PDF 
(last visi ted Dec. 30, 2000) (commenting on White Paper Number 3 
and requesting that EPA provide guidance on rejecting sources and 
noting that Ti tle V fees may be insufficient to meet increased re­
source demands). 
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Asswning that these obstacles are overcome, however, 
others remain. An advance approved change may subse­
quently occur without anyone consideri ng socioeconomic 
factors and health indicators at the time of the change. For 
example, if recent studies document an abnormally high rate 
of respiratory illnesses or elevated blood lead levels, an 
emissions increase can occur without noti fying the commu­
nity about the increase, much less giving the community an 
opportunity to bring the health-related information before 
the permitting authority. Even though the increases may be 
considered under the cap (or partial cap) or de minimis for 
regulatory purposes, the emission increases still may pres­
ent problems to a vulnerable community when combined 
with other sources of pollutants. At a time when environ­
mental justice advocates and others are encouraging the 
Agency to bring the public into the permitting and pre-per­
mitting process as early as possible in order to resolve po­
tential problems,356 the Draft Flexibility Guidance substan­
tially weakens public participation opportunities.357 This is 
yet another example of the contradictory messages from the 
Janus, as EPA has repeatedly endorsed increasing opportu­
nities for public particwation, particularly in the environ­
mental justice context. 3 In addi ti.on, the use of flexible per­
mits may be at odds with a community's request for mitiga­
tion measures that are narrowly tailored to reduce or elimi­
nate facility-related impacts. 
Another problem is that the ability of the faci lity owner to 
change processes, equipment. and compliance protocols at 
any time without public notice will impede the ability of the 
community to monitor operations and use private citizen 
suit enforcement rights to keep the facility in compliance. 359
The community is in the difficult position of having to dis­
cern which set of processes, equipment, m aterials, and com­
pliance protocols pertai n  within any given time frame to de­
termine if suspected violations have in fact occurred or are 
occurring. In particular, correlating and interpreting data to 
evaluate whether a violation has occurred when non•instru­
mental compliance protocols are allowed may again lie be­
yond the resource capabilities of a community·based group. 
Additionally, as noted by the NRDC and others, the Draft 
Flexibility Guidance raises uncertainty about potential ap­
plication of the permit shie ld, a provision that precludes citi­
zen suits in some instances.360 All of this contradicts EPA's
expressed desire to promote private enforcement capacity 
within environmental justice com.munities.361 Indeed, for
356. See Tm.E VI FACA REPORT, supra note l l  l , at 30; NEJAC, EN­
VTRONMENTAI. JUSTICE IN TI[£ PERMITTING PRocl!ss; A REPORT
FROM THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JusncE ADVISORY COUN­
CIL 'S  PUBLIC MEETING ON E N V I RONM ENTAL PERM JTIING, 
AfLINGlON, Vtll.OfNIA, NOVEMBER 30..0ECEMBl!R 2, 1999, at 1 7  
(2000) (EPA 300-R-00-004), available at http://epa.gov/ooca/mai.n/ 
ej/nejacpl1b.htmi (hereina fter 1 999 NEJ AC REPORT ON PER· 
MTITINGJ (containing detailed reco1JUJ1endatioos, largely from envi­
ronmen!al justice advocates. aimed at identifying both deficiencies 
in lhe c11mlnl pennir process and remedies or alternative approaches 
to pennitting), 
357. NRDC et Ill. White Paper Number 3 Comments, supra note 332, a t4. 
358. See U.S. EPA, EPA's ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY, 6-8
( 1 995), available at http://w w w .e pa. gov/docs/oej pubs/strategy/ 
stra<ogy.nt.html ( last visited Jan. 9, 2001) . 
359. For a discussion of the technical difficulties enforcing blanket emis­
sions limits, see NRDC et al. Comments on White Paper Number 3, 
supra note 332, at 2 1 -27 .
360. Id. at  1 0-. 1 2.
36 1 .  See EPA 's ENVIRONMENTAL JusncE STRA TEOY, supra note 358, at
1 5· 16. 
many of these communities, public enforcement even under 
a more prescriptive and� therefore, more enforceable regime
has proven inadequate. 62 Thust the Draft Flexibility Guid­
ance may well promote an unintended perverse incentive; it 
appears to benefit well-resourced industries that anticipate 
compliance problems by allowing them to obtain a flexible 
permit and to locate in a community that is lacking private 
enforcement capacity due to the community's inability to 
b .  . hni I d ' 363o tam expensive tee ca a vice. 
In addition to the impediments to public participation and
to the development of substantive environm.ental justice cri­
teria, mitigation measures, and enforcement, the Draft Flex­
ibility Guidance once again illustrates the expansive use of
EPA's interpretive authority. The NRDC and others derided
the Agency's endorsement of untested "replicable operating
procedures"364 and persuasively posit that the Agency's au­
thority to grant the specified flexibilities could not possibly
be derived from current regulations.365 For example, the
commenters noted that an advance approval is not autho­
rized wider the current regulations ' provision for ·'reason·
ably anticipated operating scenarios," which only allows the
source owner to accommodate different operational states
of existing emission units, not future emission units or
modification to existing units .366 They further asserted that
it was irresponsible for the Agency to authorize the whole­
sale use of strategies that had not been proven even in l im­
ited pilot projects (such as facility XLs, which often em­
ploy PALs), and were particularly concerned that the Draft
Flexibility Guidance would subvert EPA's prior promises
to test and quantify the asserted superior environmental
performance of these reinvention strategies before consid­
ering their adoption. 367 
As in the proposed Tier 2 rule, the Draft Fleribility Guid­
ance similarly neglects to mention environmental justice
and the procedural and distributional issues are not ad­
dressed. This may not be surprising, considering that the
seven-year intensive stakeholder process through the NSR
FACA subcommittee did not have an environmental justice
represent ative.368 Instead, the Agency gave an information
briefing session on this complicated guidance to the NEJAC
Air and Water Subcommittee during a monthly telephone
362. See Unequal Protection, supra note 1 5. 
363. This could even extend to lhe establishment of the- tle,uble pennit a� 
well as enforcement. The- flexibility guidance specifically notes thal
"[w]here a concern arises as to whether this guidance is consistent
with your EPA-approved rules, we will work: with you to make this
detennination. Source.� should be aware, however, that our exercise
of discretion does not shield them from a citizen suit." See White Pa­
per Number 3, supra note 328. at 1 4.
364. The commenters explain: 
Although the Draft Guidance is tellingly vague as to what 
qualified as a ROP . . . . BP A appears to be suggesting that the 
application of complex regulaUons and the interpretation of 
regulatory lenns can be disti lled to the equivalent of a mathe· 
matical fonnula. This is an absurd proposition . . . because en­
vironmental regulations arc not algorithms and applicability 
derenninations (with their embedded legal interpretations) 
do not proceed according IO the "rules" of mathematics. 
NROC et al. White Paper Number 3 Comments, supra note 33 2, 
at 9.  
365. ld. at  27-42.
366. Id. at 3.+35. 
367. Id. at 16-17 .
368. See supra note 327 (transcripts containing membership list),
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conference shortly before publication of the document.369
Subsequently, many environmental justice organizations 
were apparently unable to prepare their own comment letter 
but opted to co-sign the comments by the NRDC and others 
that opposed the adoption of the Draft Flexibility Guidance
on a variety of grounds .370 Ultimately, this may be a case
where, because of the daunting complexity of the penni tting 
program coupled with the relative lack of stakeholder in­
volvement by environmental j ustice advocates, the full en­
vironmental justice implications of this proposal and similar 
broad-based reinvention initiatives may never be analyzed 
and voiced prior to ultimate adoption and implementation, 
This is a serious obstacle considering that these initiatives 
represent a fundamental shift from a permitting regime 
founded on public participation and contemporaneous re­
view to one that, while affording flexibility, also reduces 
public participation and is heavil:>.:: dependent on source-con­
ducted, after-the-fact verification. 37 1 This effectively negates 
the one l imited remedy that the Ageocy has indicated its 
willingness to adopt in response to environmental justice 
claims, i .e . ,  enhanced public participation opportunities. 
When juxtaposing community c-oncems about permitted 
activities with the Draft Title VI Guidance and these pro­
posed reinvention initiatives, several contrasting themes be­
come apparent. Community residents in overburdened com­
munities see the permit process as the frontline defense 
against continuing environmental disparities. Yet permit­
ting officials at the local, state, and federal levels generally 
resist imposing additional conditions or denying permits on 
environmental justice grounds, although the lack of support 
from the upper management levels may make this hesitancy 
understandable. When environmental justice concerns sur­
face and become unavoidable, the primary response instead 
has been to enhance public participation opportunities and 
negC'tiate voluntary mitigation measures. While this is de· 
sirable, it is not L ikely to appreciably reduce the scope and 
intensity of impacts that heavily impacted communities ex­
perience. And as illustrated, the enhanced public participa­
tion that the Agency promises wi th one band may be taken 
away with the other. The only substantive programmatic re­
sponse to environmental justice permitting concerns bas been 
the relatively crude, unquantifiable, and voluntary off-si te 
mitigation measures proposed by the Draft Title Vi Guidance,
which sit in stark contrast to the more sophisticated and 
mandated offsets, pollution control requirements, and com­
pliance measures required by traditional regulatory standards. 
At the rulemaking or guidance-making level, the regula­
tory dynamics that impede fairness-oriented reform are 
even more troubling. 1n a manner disturbingly reminiscent 
of historical race relations, environmental j ustice is ren� 
dered invisible by its absence in major rules and guidance 
documents. 372 During the cri tical stakeholder-intensive pro-
369. Aug. 8, 2000, Air and Water Subcommittee monthly telephone con­
ference. The author was invited to participate in the telephone con­
ference- as a prospective member of the subcommlttee, but could not
participate due to prior commitments . The author was subsequent Jy
appointed to 1he NEJAC Air and Water Subcommittee on Aug. 2 1 ,
2000.
::.70. N RDC et al. White Paper Number 3 Comments, supra note 332, nt 
2-3 (Overview of Comments).
37 I. Telephone I nterview with John Walke, NRDC (Nov. 27, 2000).
372. A literary version of "invisibility" as a racia1 phenomenon is elo­
quently ex.pressed in Ralph Ellison's 1952 classic novel "The Invisi­
ble Man."
cesses that informed attempts to develop efficiency-ori­
ented reform of air permitting programs, envirom;nentaJ jus­
tice representatives were absent. In contrast, industty stake­
holders , conventional environmental groups, state and loca1 
regulatory agencies, and even federal land managers for 
years engaged in extensive discussions about the technical i­
ties of air permitting in an attempt to understand the con­
straints of each group and to work out acceptable trade offs. 
This put environmental justice advocates in the unfortu­
nately reactive posi tion of attempting to understand the 
daW1tingly complex proposals and address the environmen­
tal justice i mplications within a hopelessly short time 
frame. m When environmental justice concerns became un­
avoidable at the rulemaking level, the Agency responded 
not by integrating more protective strategies within the 
framework of the pennitting pmcess, but by a combination 
of assuming away the problem, further study, separate af­
ter-the-fact stakeholder processes, or when pressed by 
agreeing to address the problem on a case-by-case basis. 
Most disappointing of all is the contrast between the 
Agency's aggressive use of its interpretive authority-in 
some instances beyond the constraints oflogic-to propose 
and promote strea.oilined permits and operational flexibility 
to help permi t applicants, while at the same time declining 
to explore the potential of existing omnibus clauses to pro­
mote on-site mitigation or alternative-site analyses, even in 
the most heavily impacted areas. 
Although these criticisms may seem harsh, it is important 
to remember that the political pressures on EPA are enor­
mous. Once noted to be a perpetual victim of ''battered 
agency syndrome," the Agency is working against unrelent­
ing pressure from state and local regulators to provide guid­
ance, certainty, and safe harbors in this difficult area, while 
the industty stakeholders want regulatory relief in the foon 
of streamlined permit proceedings and enhanced opera­
tional flexibility. From the perspectives of these powerful 
stakeholder groups, the types of safeguards and mitigation 
requested by impacted communities would destabili ze and 
worsen an already cumbersome permit process. As difficult 
as this conflict is, however, it is also obvious that at present 
the regulatory strategies to address environmental justice 
are wholly inadequate. This is unfortunate because even 
aggress ive fairness-oriented reforms in permitt ing can 
be designed to co-exist w ith efficiency-oriented mea­
sures and may ulti m,ately provide more certainty by pro­
viding a framework within which to address the funda­
mental concerns of overburdened and disparately im­
pacted communities .  
Protective Permitting 
While one might conclude that EPA either lacks the desire or 
is too politically constrained to seriously address environ­
mental justice by reforming the permitting process, the 
more optimistic, perhaps aspirational, approach would be to 
view fairness-oriented reform as an inevitable aspect of reg­
ulatory evolution. ln any event, the continuing conflicts that
arise during permit proceedings ultimately may make pro-
373. This is a serious deficiency considering I.bat the President's 1 994 Ex­
ecutl ve Order on Environmental Justice mandated federal agencies
to identify and address disproportfonate effects of its programs.
Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 41, § 1 - 10 1 ;  see also EPA's EN­
VIRON MENTAL JUSTICE STRAT£GY. supra note 358. 
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grammatic reform the best option from a practical stand­
point Ad hoc resolutions provide no predictabil ity for the 
regulated community. Because of the differences in re­
sources and pol itical wi l l  among the states,374 this type of
programmatic refonn is best developed nationally. Should 
EPA embark on such an endeavor, it should be able to de­
velop and provide a protecti ve permitting framework under 
the authority of statutory omnibus clauses either by guid­
ance or pending rulemaking proceedings. 375 At present, the 
Agency already has a suite of recommendations for address­
ing environmental justice in permit proceedings. At a recent 
NE.lAC meeting, an assortment of stakeholder groups came 
forward with ideas and suggestions that ran the gambit from 
broad principles to numerous specific reconunendations.376
EPA, however, lacks a basic framework within which to ex­
periment with, develop, and apply more protective criteria 
in a  systematic or consistent manner. This Article concludes 
with a few exploratory suggestions on a framework the 
Agency might consider. 
To begin with, two procedural refonns are necessary to 
promote negotiated solutions in advance of more formal 
permit proceedings: early public participation opportunities 
and mechanisms to provide the conununity independent 
technical review of the pennittee 's proposals. When the 
community is brought into the pre-permitting process and 
provided the means to independently exami oe the proposal, 
the commW1ity is able to participate on a more level playing 
field and the comfort level is likely to increase. As such, the 
dynamics are more likely to change from an encounter 
marked by hostility and suspicion to one with greater coop­
eration and trust, thus providjng optimal conditions for col­
laboration and creative problem solving. The permitting 
agency can use additional methods to enhance this process, 
for example by cultivating preexisting relationships with 
community-based groups. 
As important as procedural and capacity-building mea­
sures are, however, there will be instances where they do not 
resolve all conflicts. If pre-pemritting negotiations do not 
yield voluntary commitments acceptable to all , then the 
Agency needs to have in place a more protective and certain 
process to address the environmental justice complications. 
S ignificantly, the Agency is not only dealing with technical 
issues-which it is undoubtedly qualified to address-but 
fairness claims as well . Thus, the conunon-Jaw tradition of 
equity is the logical place to look, as a measured use of equi­
table principles might be particularly well-suited to resolve 
confl icts over mitigation. It is not unheard of in environ­
mental law and regulation for an agency to use com on-law 
concepts to implement statutory requ irements. 377 In addi­
tion, the Agency could look beyond the pollution control re­
gime to permit programs that address the preservation of 
374. Devolution and the Public Health, supra note 226.
375. To date EPA has not developed environmental justice guidance on
the parameter.i oftbe valuable sources of omnibus authority. Su su·
pra notes 14- 1 10 and accompanying text. 
376. 1999 NEJAC REPORT ON PERM11T1NG, supra note 356.
377. See ROBERT v. PERCIVAL E.T AL. ,  ENvtRONMENTAL REGULATION
LAW, SCIENCE,  /IND Poucy 280 (2d ed . 1 996) (noting thal 
"CERCLA is a direct extension of common law principals ofslrict li­
ability for abnormally dangerous activides."): cf United States v. 
Price, 688 F.2d 204, 2 1 2, 1 2  ELR 2 1 020, 2 1 023-24 (3d Cir. 1 982) 
(noting lhat by e!lllcting the endangerment provisions of RCRA and 
the Safe Drinking Water Act. Congress "sought to invoke the broad 
and flexible equity powers of the federal courts in instances where 
haz.a.rdous waste threaten human health."). 
highly protected resources, such as wetland preservation, 
endan�ered species protection, and historic building preser­
vation. 78 These permit schemes have potential because the
primary otzjecti ve is not to issue the pennit, but to protect the
resource.3 Although these pennitting frameworks carry
their own brand of conflict, it is important to remember that 
adopting similar approaches in the environmental justice 
context wi ll not result in a moratorium on all development 
activity. To put the matter rhetorically and. admittedly, pro­
vocatively, i f we can take extraordinary measures to protect 
wetlands and endangered species, shouldn' t  we be similarly 
aggressive in protecting vulnerable communities? 
Any framework selected, however, must begin with the 
difficult issue of assessment, i .e., determining whether the 
conununity is an "environmental j ustice community." Be­
cause of the disparate conditions that present these concerns 
throughout the country, from sparsely populated Native 
American reservations to congested inner city encla ves1 this
may be an area best suited for precise definition by the com­
mon law's incremental approach, i.e. , using a general princi­
pal that is refined by case-by-case adj udication. Using Rich­
ard Lazarus' fonnulation, the permitting official could 
make·this determination based on the presence of risk aggre­
gation or risk dispro�ortionality, perhaps directed by 
EPA-issued guiclance.3 In order to make a realistic assess­
ment of the historic, socioeconomic, political, and cultural 
context of the host community, a range of factors other than
emission-related impacts should be considered. 38 1 This de-
378. Many of these ideas were presented in a letter to the NFJAC follow.
ing the author's presentation on a panel , See L:t1er 10 NEJAC by 
Eileen Gauna (Apr. 1 8, 2000) (copy on file with author): see also
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 473-76 (Michael B. 
Gerrard ed. ,  1999) (discussing site-based pennit requirements under 
several statutes). 
3 79. Dredge and fiU operations (of wetlands) are regulated under §404 of
the Clean Wat.er Act (CW A). 33 U.S.C. § 1 344, ELR STAT. FWPCA 
§404. Congress stated that the purpose of the CW A was to "restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical and biologkal integrity of the
nation 's wate�." 33 U.S.C. § 125 1 (a), ELR SrAT. FWPCA § 10 /(a), 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) states that it is the '"po licy of 
Congress that all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to con­
serve endangered species and threatened species . . . .  " 16 U.S .C. 
§ 1 53 l(c)( l ) ,  ELR STAT. ESA §2(c)( l ). Specifically, the ESA bars
federal government agencies from performing, funding, or permit· 
ting any activity that will jeopardize the critical habitat of a listed or 
endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1 536, ELR STAT, ESA §7. See also 
Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and the Pitfalls of Habitat Conserva­
tion Planning Under the Endangered Species Act, 29 ELR 10592, 
10593 (Oct 1 999) (discussing how the ESA' s powerful prohibition� 
against the "rake" of species listed as endangered or threatened ex­
tend to private property and even prohibit private l.andowners from 
engaging in actions on their property that adversely modify habitats
of l isted species). The poncipal federal legis lation in the field of 
historic preservation is the National Historic Preservation Act. 1 6  
U .S .C.  § §470-470w-6, originally enacted in I 966. The Act estab­
lished the National Register of Historic Places . See ulso DANIEL
P. S!!L!,(I & JAMES A. KUSH.N Eil, LAND USE REGU I../ITION:
CASES AND M I\TERIALS 800 ( 1 999) (noting that societal benefits, 
both of a monetary and a psychological kind, accrue from preser­
vation of historic sites, and tbat these benefits appear to have a so­
cietal consensus). 
380. Lazarus & Tai, supra note 9.
38 1 .  In addition to the expected impacts from the new, modified, or ex­
panded faci l ity (including emission-related impacts, adwtional 
safety risks or risks of accidents. the compliance record of the 
permittee at other locations. nonemissio11-relatcd impaclli such os 
noise, tnffic. odor, and foreseeable injury to nontraditional cul tural 
practices) •. 
other relevant factors might include the existing pollution
load (nonpennittcd contributors, pennined contributors, and point
and nonpoint sources), the compliance histozy of the existing permit­
ted sources. thc risk of accidcntaJ releases. expected. foreseeable de· 
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termination may be less complicated than in a Title VI in­
vesti gation because a part ic ular degree of d ispro­
portionality is not absolutely required . Risk aggregation 
alone would justify protective measures, and since regula­
tion is preventative in nature, toxicity weighted exposures 
should be an adequate indicator. Once a vulnerable com­
munity is identified, that should suffice to trigger a range of 
protective mechanisms. 
One mechanism employed could be a substantive alterna­
tives analysis382 similar to one the U.S .  Anny Corps of Engi­
neers uses in protecting wetlands. Under the Clean Water 
Act, the permitting authority determines if there is a rracti­
cable altemati ve to placing fill material in a wetland . 3 1 If an
alternative site is available, the permit is denied without fur­
ther inquiry into the suitability of the proposed site. 384 Un­
like the National Envi ronmental Policy Act, which only di­
rects that alternatives be described in the environmental im­
pact statement and considered by the federal agency,385 the
alternatives analysis in wetland permitting contains a stan­
dard and a substantive mandate, a point at which it becomes 
improper to proceed in light of the alternative offered. 
In the environmental justice context, for example, the 
permitting agency could engage in an analysis of whether a 
practicable alternative exists to permitting the emissions in 
or near a heavily impacted comm�nity. A practicable alter­
native could exist if the permi t involves a new facility and 
there are alternative locations to site the facility in areas that 
are not highly impacted. In such a case, the permit would be 
denied for that site because of the avai lability of alternative, 
more suitable sites. Conversely, if the permit involves a sim­
ple renewal of a permit at an existing facility that is rela­
tively new and bas updated controJ teclmology, then there 
might not exist a practicable alternative to the permi tting at 
the proposed site because of the capital already invested in 
the existing site. this is not to suggest that a findi ng of "no 
practicable alternative" should be applied categorically to 
all existing facilities. There might be practicable altema• 
rives to renewing permits at existing facilities where, for ex­
ample, the facility has a poor compl iance record, is near the 
ve\opmenls, demographics, nontraditional cullural practices, the 
history of land use practices in 1he area (e.g .. expulsive zoning) ,  and 
health issues currently ex.isl ing in the community (relat ively high 
cancer races, asthma, and othe r particular vulnerabilities) . 
382. The mos! obvious candidate omnibus clause would be CAA
§ l 73(a)(5) (nonatcai nment NSR). 42 0.S .C.  §7503(a)(5), ELR
STAT. CAA § 1 73(a)(5). However, other broadly worded clauses
might provide adequate legal grounding as well, such as permit
terms ''necessary to protect human health and the environment'' un­
der RCRA §3005(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. §6925(c)(3) ,  El.R STAT. RCRA
§3005(c)(3), The justification would necessarily differ. however,
given the scope of omnibus authority. See supra notes 14- 1 1 0  and
accompilllying text, 
383 .  40 C.F.R. §230. I O(a) (2000). 
384. Practical alternatives are presumed if the activity is not water de­
pendant. 40C.P.R. §230. IO(a)(.3). The agency looks to whether there
were non-wetland sites available at the time the developer entered
the market and began looking for suitable locations.
385. This is not to say that the National Envirnnmencal Pol icy Act 
(NEPA) and i ts implementing regulations are unhelpful in this ef­
fort. The Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ's) regulations
and EPA ' s own NEPA compliance concerning an agency's consid­
eration of alternatives in an environmental justice context could be 
used in connection with a substantive standard. Su U.S. EPA, Final 
Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Ju.sti'ce Concerns in 
EPA 's NEPA Compliance Analysis ( 1 998), QI http://es.epa.gov/oeca/
ofa/ejepa, html (i-a$t visited Jan, 9, 2001)  (available from the ELR
Document Service, ELR Order No. AD-3856).
end of its useful l ife, has pollution control processes and 
technology that are obsolete, or the facility has been af­
forded favorable regulatory treatment in the past that has 
substantially contributed to risk aggregation or dispro­
portionality, e.g., exemptions, variances, grandfathering, or 
long-expired permits. The practicable alternative standard 
may offer a greater degree of predictability than currently 
exists while at the same time removing the counterproduc­
tive tendency of older facil ities with outmoded technology
to remain online longer.386 
If there is no suitable alternative site, then the pennitting 
officials should adopt the wetland permitting approach, 
which is to consider whether the impacts can be otheiwise
avoided, minimized, or compensated, 387 in that order.388 For
example, the official would not consider compensation of 
impacts that can be minimized or avoided; likewise, the of­
ficial would not consider minimizing impacts that can be 
avoided altogether. The sequencing approach affords more 
protection to the nearby community by ensuring that the 
most protective measures are in fact taken. This is an ap­
proach similar to the closely tai lored mitigation approach 
re commended b y  the Ti t le  VI FA C A  M i tigat ion 
Workgroup. In the environmental justice context, for exam­
ple, it might be appropriate to consider whether the emis­
sions-related impacts might be avoided by substitutions of 
materials, alternative production processes, or more strin­
gent control technology. For nonemissions-related impacts, 
e.g. , noise, odors, traffic, damage to cultural sites, etc., the
knowledge and creativity of community residents can be 
helpful. Because community residents are more intimately
aware of the precise effects of the facil ity, they are in a better
position to advise as to appropriate buffer zones, alternative
traffic routes, or the like.
Only if it is not possible389 to completely avoid the im­
pacts should the pennitting agency proceed to consider 
other means to minimize their effects, such as enhanced 
emergency response systems and ambient monitoring. 
Again,  th is  presents an opportunity to use the expertise 
of the community residents, for example, in determining 
the most advantageous l ocations of the monitors . The 
386. See, e. g., comments of David Hawk.ins regarding the use of"routine
maintenance. repair and replacement" exceptions to NSR in order co 
keep old facilities on li ne long past their initial useful life. EPA Ac­
tion Needed to End Grandfathering. ENVTL. F., Mar.I Apr. 2000. 
at 44.
387. CEQ regulations define mitiga1ion as avoiding the impact, minimiz­
ing 1he impact, rectifying the impact, reducing or eliminating the im­
pact over time, and compensating for the impact. 40 C.F.R.
§ l 508.20 (2000). In lhe permitting context, some of the stated regu­
lalory wetland mi1iga1ion efforts may not be directly transferable to 
the environmental justice cont.ext. Examples include "rectifying 1he
impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environ­
ment, or reducing or elim.ina1.ing the impact over 1jme by preserva­
tion and maintenance operations" Id. The use of pollution control
technologies, buffer zones, ahernative traffic route�. and other com­
mon mitigation measures would tend to avoid the impaclS altogether
rather than restore the environment or reduce impacts over lime.
388. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Pro­
tection Agency and the Department of Anny Concerning the Deter­
minat ion of Mitigation Under the Clean Wat.er Ac t Sec tion
404(b)( l )  Guidel ines, 2 (Feb. 6,  1 990), available a1. http://www.
usace.army.mil/inellfunct ions/cw/cecwo/reg/moafe90. htm (se,
quencing requirement).
389. One workable standard might be "technologically infeasible after
using the lowest ochievablc emissions control technology," in effect
requiring LAER-equivaJent technology for air pollutants or bes\
available technology for water pollutants.
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minimization approach could adapt some of the standards 
and requirements involved in incidental takings permits390 
issued under the Endangered Species Act, modified to the 
environmental justice context. In analogous terms, the per­
mit applicant would submit a location-specific plan that es­
tablishes that facility operations will not appreciably reduce
the like:lihood of a healthy recovery for the impacted com­
munity. 39 1 Here, government-facilitated area-specific agree­
ments could be used to meet this requirement, albeit utilized 
in a different manner than that contemplated by the Draft Ti­
tle VI Guidance. Instead of using area poll utant reduction 
plans to provide unquantified offsets for permitting new ac­
tivities, the plans could be used as a benchmark to measure 
progress. A permit should be issued only if there is an exist­
ing plan-it could be an area-specific agreement or a com­
muni ty recovery p lan-and the i mpacts fro m the 
permirtee 's proposed project does not substantially interfere 
with the gains sought to be made under such a plan. 392 For 
example, closely tailored on-site mitigation as a primary 
strategy is unlikely to interfere wi th such a recovery plan as­
suming unmitigated effects are kept to a minimum. Con­
versely, using onJy off-site mitigation may interfere with re­
covery because the entire emission increases and other faci l­
ity-related impacts consume gains made by the recovery 
plan. An added incentive can be designed into the scheme by 
giving industrial contributors to the recovery p1an priority in 
permit issuances that are able occur in the area, i .e. ,  contri­
butors to the reduction strategies are first in line to get pa.rt of 
the off-site reductions allowed by the plan. This require­
ment would provide an incentive to governmental and in­
dustry' stakeholders to design, commit resources to, and im­
plement pol lution reduction strategies in advance of any 
permit because, absent a comprehensive site-reduction 
plan. an area recovery plan will be required to show that per­
mitted activities will not interfere with real progress in 
achieving healthy communities. 
Compensating for the impact should only be considered 
as a last resort and only to the extent that adverse effects can­
not otherwise be a voided or minimized at or near the facility. 
This is a particularly sensitive issue because i t  raises the po­
tential that a vulnerable community may be forced to accept 
risks and impacts that more affl uent communities can avoid. 
At the same time, however, the potential for positive collab­
orative problem solving is enhanced when the self-determi­
nation and agency of the community is recognized. Thus, 
because of the potential for abuse, compensatory measures 
should not be approved without the support of impacted 
communities after full independent technical review. 
One compensation strategy that might directly pertain to 
the impacts could involve offsetting the new emissions by 
retiring existing emissions in the same location. There are 
390. Primarily, the permit will issue if the plan set fonh by the applicant
"will not appreciably reduce the likelihood oft.he survival and recov­
ery of Lhe species in the wild. "" 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv), ELR
STAT. ESA § 10(a)(2)(B)(iv).
39 1 .  Id. 
392. Su Hsu, supra note 379, at I 0594 (noting I bat under § lO{aX l )  of the
BSA: ''The [U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)] may issue a land­
owner a pennit to ' incidentally take' endangered or threatened spe· 
cies if the landowner submits and agrees to abide by an FWS-ap­
proved (Habitat Conservation Plan], which is a long-term plan of 
mitigation measures aimed at conserving habitat and aiding endan­
gered and threatened species."). The provision was added to the ESA 
in 1 982, H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 29 ( 1 982), reprifl/ed in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2870. 
risks in this approach, however. Environmental justice ad­
vocates have been justifiably critical of market-based re­
gimes because these programs have been instrumental in 
shifting pollution to highly impacted communities,393 al­
though the disproportionate impact has been unintentional. 
Here, the idea is to use the same approach to strategically 
pull pollution away from the impacted community. Thus, if 
such an offset strategy is employed, the offset ratio should 
be greater than 1 to l ( e.g. 1 5  tons per year of pollutants re­
tired for every ton generated), and the"same location'' 
should be determined conservatively. Ideally, the offsets 
should come from the same neighborhood to avoid hot 
spots, but if i t  is clear that the emissions do not have a local­
ized effect, a wider area may be considered. Here, it is im­
portant that the community is given independent technical 
assi stance to determine whether the emissions produce a lo­
calized effect. Engineering estimates should be conserva­
tive to provide a wide margin of safety. Thus, the pennitting 
a g e n cy shoul d rema i n  e xceed ing l y skeptic a l  o f  
point/nonpoint trades and cross-media trades, and should 
not consider cross-pollutant trades. Generally, these trades 
have not been proven in  practice and are inappropriate in 
instances involving little or no margin of error. Compensa­
tory measures might be a viable, last resort strategy if 
they are wel l  designed, if the benefits clearly outweigh 
the potential risk, and if they do not interfere with gains 
made under an existing communi ty recovery plan. Imple­
mented in this manner, the compensation strategy is a 
form of off-site mitigation. 
If it becomes necessary to deny a perm.it at the proposed 
site because of the availability ofa suitable alternative site, 
the permitting agency can mitigate the burden to the appli­
cant-to the extent discretion allows-by affording favor­
able regulatory treatment at the alternative site. For exam­
ple, at the alternative site the permitting official might expe­
dite the permit, facilitate an emissions trade, consider a pilot 
project, or otherwise waive requirements if appropriate. A 
local government might facilitate the purchase of an alterna­
ti ve site by imminent domain if the new facility wil l  pro­
mote a public purpose. The approach here is analogous to a 
type of transferrable development right used in resolving the 
conflicting interests presented by the preservation of his­
toric buildi ngs,  open spaces, and other valuable rc>­
sources.394 This approach is hardly a radical one, as "si te 
shifting" is inherent in PSD/NSR design195 and favorable
.regulatory treatment is a common incentive. 396 Rather, the
approach merely reduces the burden on the permit applicant 
and the potential unfairness of disadvantaging the newest 
(and possibly cleanest) faci1ity for the existing aggregated 
or disparate impact, while at the same t.ime addressing that 
very i mpact. The success of this approach depends in large 
part on the corrunibnent to bring all stakeholders into the 
393. See, e.g .. rucbard Toshiyuk.i Drury et al., Pollution Trading CJ1ld £n.
vironmenJal Injustice: Los Angeles '  Failed Experiment in Air Qual­
ity Policy, 9 DuKE ENvrL. L. & PoL'Y F. 23 1 ( 1999).
394. See SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 379, at 656 (noting that transfer­
able development rights are one of the most promising alternative 
ways of achieving environmental protection and "avoiding the situa­
tion where environmental protection benefits, which accrue to the 
society as a whole, are achieved by imposing large costs on individ­
ual landowners'").
395. See Oren, supra note 323; Gauna, supra note 109.
396. See supra notes 234-373 and accompanying text (discussing
brownfields, Tier 2, and XLs). 
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pre-permitting process early in order to assess all problems 
and increase available options. 
While there are no painless ways to achieve parity and 
eliminate troubling aggregated risk and adverse impacts, a 
more protective pennitting scheme is likely to be more effi­
cient in the long run. An aggressive ' 'reasonable progress'' 
approach that promises real benefits would be the least 
destabilizing to the permit process because it would im­
prove conditions and reduce confl ict. Should EPA attempt 
to continue its current approach, essentially one of attempt­
ing to address environmental justice whi le preserving the 
permitting status quo, it will in all likelihood fail. As long as 
there are unaddressed disparities, there wiU be legal action, 
direct action, and legislative action wherever possible. Per­
mit proceedings will cont inue to be contentious and con­
sume considerable agency and economic resources. And the 
persistence of unequal environmental protection will con­
tinue to erode the legitimacy ofEPA and its sister permitting 
agencies . In the end, the permitting approach EPA ul ti ­
mately devises will be successful only if it appreciably miti­
gates impacts to nearby communities. 
Conclusion 
EPA has spent one of its three decades directly addressing 
the procedural and distributional claims of people of color 
and poor communities. This has occurred within the time 
that industrial sectors have pressed their demands for regu­
latory rel ief and operational flexibil ity, demands that have 
the support of most state and local regulators. These de­
mands have coincided with a philosophical shift to the per­
ceived efficiencies of market regimes and devol ution of au­
thority to the local level. The result has been intense con­
fUcting pressures on EPA. In response , the Agency has 
elected to use its interpretive authority aggressively in pro­
moting regulatory relief measures for industry stakeholders 
and deference to state regulators, whi le at the same ti.me us­
ing its authority much more conservatively in addressing 
environmental j ustice concerns. The Agency appears partic­
ularly hesitant to condition or deny perm.its on environmen­
tal justice grounds, prefening instead voluntarily negotiated 
off-site mitigation measures . The Agency has promoted this 
approach to such a degree as to ef ectively eliminate the pos­
sibility of a successful civil rights c laim premised on the 
granting of a permit. Given the severity of the problem in 
many heavily impacted communities, such an alternative 
compl iance approach is not likely to appreciably reduce or 
eliminate long-standing disparities within the foreseeable 
future, if at al.I .  
This approach has been particularly frustrating to envi­
ronmental justice stakeholders, who view a permit not only 
as exacerbating siting disparities, but as the gateway to fur­
ther environmental insult caused by inadequate standards, 
compliance problems, potential contamination, and insuffi-
cien t cleanup remedies . They are additionally concerned 
about facility operations that impair quality of life and at 
times damage cultural or rel igious resources. The Agency 
has added to this frustration by promoting regulatory 
flexibilities such as mobi le source offsets, emission caps, 
and a menu approach to permitted processes, equipment. 
and compliance protocols. These flexibilities stymie the 
community's ability to technically evaluate the permit and 
monitor compliance. The Agency has also promoted meth­
ods to keep sources out of permit proceedings-proceed· 
ings that not only require public participation but allow de­
velopment of environmental justice criteria. In short, when 
juxtaposing EPA's response to environmental j ustice 
against its approach to regulatory relief, the difference ap­
pears patently unfair. Because this j uxtaposition is not visi­
ble in any one particular permit proceeding and because of 
the normal judicial inclination toward agency deference, the 
courts are not likely to put pressure on EPA to use its discre­
tionary authority under the environmental statutes and regu­
lations to more aggressively promote environmental justice. 
All of this is unfortunate because environmental di spari­
ties are likely to continue, and as long as communities do not 
see an improvement in their environments, they will under­
standably continue to launch campaigns against new and 
expanded permitted activities. Thus, it is the environmental 
condit ions themselves-and not the Civil Rights Act or any 
other legal remedy-that wil I continue to destabilize permi 
proceedings. EPA has a timely opportunity to institute fair­
ness-oriented reform of the permitting process at this criti­
cal time, when many permit programs are under reevalua­
tion and overhaul. lf environmental justice protections can 
be built into regulatory processes at the front end, resulting 
in a more protecti ve permitting scheme, there will be fewer 
challenges upon granting the permit and, therefore, more 
stabi lity over the long run. Meanwhile, the Agency can con­
tinue testing the suspected superior environmental perfor­
mance of alternative compliance approaches, either through 
pilot projects or application in areas that provide a greater 
margin of error because of healthier ambient conditions. lfit 
becomes necessary to util ize more flexible permitting ap­
proaches in heavi ly impacted communities, the Agency 
should do so only after the approaches are proven in prac­
tice, and at a minimum it should provide for independent 
technical review and require compliance protocols that pro­
mote rather than frustrate private enforcement. An added 
benefit to a more protective permitting approach, if adopted, 
is that EPA will be consistent with its message among al l 
stakeholders, which will reduce stakeholder confusion and 
misbust. Merging the alter egos of the Janus can only en­
hance the Agency's legitimacy. Most importantly, however, 
EPA now has the opportunity and abi l ity to make healthy 
and li veable communities for all the legacy of the fourth de­
cade of environmental protection. 
